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The thesis offers a first-hand historically informed research on the trajectory of the 
making of the post-colonial state in Somalia (1940-60). It does so by investigating 
the interplay between the emergence and diffusion of national movements following 
the defeat of the Italians in 1941 and the establishment of a British Military 
Administration, and the process of decolonisation through a 10-year UN trusteeship 
to Italy in 1950. It examines the extent to which the features of Somali nationalism 
were affected/shaped by the institutional framework established by the UN mandate. 
The central argument of the thesis is that the imposition of the UN trusteeship, rather 
than enabling democratization, led to a ‘verticalisation’ of Somali nationalism and 
created a highly restrictive political space.   
Based on a combination of archival and oral sources, the thesis explores the 
socioeconomic context and possibilities of the wartime. It argues that Somali 
nationalism developed an efficient and inclusive message that successfully engaged 
in dialogue with the masses in the 1940s. However, the protraction of the UN debate 
and the extension of the military administration caused the radicalisation of conflicts 
among different groups. The imposition of self-government and democratization 
through the trusteeship system led to the establishment of a highly centralised and 
fixed institutional framework. Within this context, not only nationalism came to lose 
its original horizontal and inclusive political line, but national politics were reduced 
to zero-sum competition to access power and power structures. Ultimately, this  
exclusive, autocratic and distorted version of the nation-state negatively affected the 
process of unification of Somalia and Somaliland.  
By exploring the political trajectory leading to independence and unification, 
the thesis enhances a broader understanding of the development of post-colonial 
politics in Somalia. It contributes to specific discussions that centred on the features 
of the colonial legacy, on the effects of state and nation building, and on the 
consolidation of a clan-based discourse in post-colonial politics. 
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Canto per chi non ha fortuna, 
canto per me. 
Canto per rabbia a questa luna, 
contro di te. 
Canto a quel sole che verrà, 
tramonterà, rinascerà, 
alle illusioni, 









                                               
1 ‘I sing for the unlucky ones,/ I sing for me./ I sing in anger at this moon,/against you./ I sing to that 
sun that will rise,/will set and be revived/ to the illusions/ to the anger I feel.’ Nino Rota, Lina 
Wertmüller, ‘Canzone Arrabbiata’, 1973. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Prelude 
In March 2009, I conducted several interviews
1
 with elderly members of the Somali 
diaspora in London. After preliminary contacts, I was told to join them at the Burger 
King nearby the Stratford Railway Station, or at the ‘Parliament’ as they called it. 
There, they met weekly, sat, drank tea and discussed Somali politics and history. 
Some handled businesses over the phone, managing the sale of off-road vehicles 
from the Arabian Peninsula to Eastern Africa. Others commented the latest news 
coming from Mogadishu. To them I was introduced as ‘the Italian lady’ researching 
Somali independence, nationalism and unification. These were sensitive issues. Once 
an Italian colony and lost during the Second World War, Somalia
2
 was ruled by a 
temporary British Military Administration (BMA) from 1941. The post-war period 
represented a time of possibilities, hopes and optimism for many Somalis. The end of 
Italian colonial rule and economic monopolies spurred socio-economic activities and 
the formation of political associations especially in Somalia’s capital Mogadishu. 
The development of a debate in the United Nations (UN) on former Italian colonies, 
Eritrea, Libya and Somalia, raised the possibility of self-government and 
independence via international mandate. At the same time, powerful nationalist 
organisations emerged from below and began to campaign in support of territorial 
unification of the Somali-speaking regions of the Horn of Africa. By 1946, Somali 
nationalism came to be associated with the idea of Greater Somalia –i.e. the project 
of unifying Somalia Italiana, the British Somaliland Protectorate, Côte Française 
                                               
1 Four interviews with three informants.  
2 The term ‘Somalia’ has multiple meanings. Conventionally, it was used with reference to the former 
Italian colony, namely Somalia Italiana, and, by 1950, to the region under international trusteeship. 
After independence and the unification of the former Italian colony and the British Somaliland 
Protectorate, the name ‘Somalia’ came to indicate either the southern region of the unified country, or, 
more broadly, the Somali Republic. With the term ‘Somalia’, this research refers to the former Italian 
colony, Somalia Italiana, and to the region under trust administration. I use the name ‘Somaliland’ 
with reference to the former protectorate of British Somaliland and to the self-declared Republic of 
Somaliland. When referring to the unified state, I use the term ‘Somali Republic’.  
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des Somalis (today Djibouti)
3
, the Ethiopia’s regions of Ogaden, the Haud and 
Reserved Areas (RA), and the Northern Frontier District of Kenya. In 1950, Somalia 
was placed under a 10-year international trusteeship to work towards independence 
under Italian rule (AFIS). Finally, on July 1, 1960, the trust territory became 
independent and unified with the British Somaliland Protectorate forming the 
Republic of Somalia. At the time, unification of the two was perceived as the first 
step towards Greater Somalia.  
Despite raising hopes of wealth, prosperity and unity, Somali independence 
and unification were soon followed by bitter experiences. In the 1960s, the 
democratic system came to be associated largely with widespread corruption and was 
soon replaced by a military dictatorship led by Siad Barre in 1969. The regime lasted 
21 years during which it became well-known for its brutal rule characterised by the 
‘MOD clan-formula’,
4
 civil rights violations and oppression. Similarly, the optimist 
expectations raised by the idea of Greater Somalia were soon disillusioned: the 
attempts to promote territorial unification were repressed in Kenya; the national 
referendums in support of unification were rejected in Djibouti; tension within 
Somali-speaking regions in Ethiopia led to two armed conflict between Somalia and 
Ethiopia in 1964 and 1977-8. In particular, the latter conflict, the Ogaden War, ended 
with military and humanitarian disaster: hundreds of thousands died either because of 
the war or the famine and epidemics that followed; large crowds of refugees from 
Ethiopia flew to Somalia. In the early 1990s, Barre’s regime was overthrown, 
Somaliland ceded the union, and the Somali state disintegrated. 
Among the elderly Somalis who gathered at the ‘Parliament’, I had the 
opportunity to interview a former representative of the Barre’s government.
5
 The 
interviewee did not want to be recorded nor did he agree to engage directly with any 
                                               
3 In the 1960s, the French colony was renamed as the Territoire Français des Afars et des Issas, and 
after independence in 1977 as the Republic of Djibouti. In this research, I refer to the region as 
Djibouti.  
4 The formula refers to the Mareehaan, Ogadeni and Dulbahante sub-clans to which Siad Barre was 
related. 
5 I have been asked to keep the name of the interviewee anonymous. In the Appendix, I provide a list 
of interviews with some background information to contextualise the anonymous interviews. 
However, no further information is revealed on this interviewee as to do so would compromise the 
informant’s privacy.  
Imagining the Nation, Crafting the State 
Introduction  3 
of my questions. However, he was eager to explain to me  ‘what went wrong’ with 
Somalia. The most vivid part of the conversation was the account of a 1978 meeting 
between the interviewee and a Soviet Union diplomat. Since 1974, Siad Barre’s 
regime had supported the secessionist movement in Ogaden.
6
 In 1977, the Somali 
army embarked on a disastrous war against Ethiopia with the aim of seizing the 
Somali-speaking region. At first, the war was marked by a series of victories of the 
Somali army which, thanks to the military and financial support of the Soviet Union, 
penetrated into the Ogaden and advanced towards the Ethiopian capital, Addis 
Ababa. However, following the establishment of a Soviet-oriented military regime in 
Ethiopia, the Soviet Union switched its alliance by abandoning the Somali side in 
favour of Ethiopia which eventually won the conflict.
7
 The interviewee contended 
that the ‘betrayal’ of the Soviet Union was the ‘beginning of the end’ for Somalia: it 
impeded the fulfilment of the national project of Greater Somalia bringing the 
country to disintegration. The interviewee narrated how he was able to take 
retribution for the betrayal of the Soviet military by expressing his anger and 
contempt to the Soviet Union diplomat. After a few minutes of silence, he concluded 
his account by saying: 
We will be back! That land belongs to the Somalis. You know, the Ethiopians are 
like the brooms. They will pass away with the time. But we, we shall remain!
8
 
Meanwhile, a bunch of young and noisy Somali teenagers sat on the table 
next to ours. They had probably never been to Somalia or if they had, they were too 
young to remember it. Elderly Somalis call them the ‘Fish & Chips’ generation. The 
teenagers looked at us briefly with a bit of curiosity but soon kept on laughing, 
joking and having a good time as every other teenager in the ‘Parliament’. Their 
                                               
6 Recently, Tobias Hagmann contested the use of the name ‘Ogaden’ to indicate Ethiopia’s Somali-
speaking region for being inappropriate and ethnically charged. He proposed the use of the term 
‘Region 5’. See Tobias Hagmann, ‘Beyond Clannishness and Colonialism: Understanding Political 
Disorder in Ethiopia’s Somali Region, 1991-2004’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 43:4 (2005). 
7 On the Ogaden War see Christopher Clapham, Africa and International System: The Politics of State 
Survival, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univesity Press, 1996) chapter 6; Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, Arms for the 
Horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, 1953-1991, (Pittsburgh: The University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1991), chapter 9.  
8 Interview, 26th March 2009. 
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teenage-carelessness was in stark contrast to the interviewee’s concerns about Somali 
irredentist claims. And I wondered whether they knew anything at all about Greater 
Somalia. 
 
1.2 The research problematic 
This anonymous interviewee offered a way to make sense of the parabolic history of 
Somalia from the golden age of independence in 1960 to disintegration in 1991. 
Explaining this trajectory has become a major concern to scholars and political 
analysts alike. Within thirty years, Somalia passed from symbolising one of the 
‘brightest stars’ among decolonised African states with a relatively strong cultural 
and historical national heritage,
9
 to be almost exclusively associated with state 
collapse
10
, ethnic warfare and chaos.
 
Most scholarly attention has focused on state 
collapse with the aim of providing theoretical frameworks for understanding the 
dynamics and mechanisms of recent developments in Somali politics and proposing 
solutions for future reconstruction.
11
 Although these studies have proposed new 
approaches to the study of Somali society and politics, their analysis is penalised by 
lack of first-hand historically informed research on the political trajectory of the 
                                               
9 Peter J. Schraeder, ‘From Irredentism to Secession: The Decline of Pan-Somali Nationalism’, in 
Lowell W. Barrington, After Independence: Making and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial and 
Postcommunist States, (USA: the University of Michigan Press, 2006), p. 107. 
10 For definitions and differences between collapse states and failed states see Robert I. Rotberg, 
‘Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators’, in Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), State 
Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror (Cambridge Mass.: World Peace Foundation, 2003). 
Accordingly a ‘collapse state is a rare and extreme version of a failed state. Political goods are 
obtained through private or ad hoc means. Security is equated with the rule of the strong. A collapsed 
state exhibits a vacuum of authority. It is a mere geographical expression’, p. 9.  
11 See: Hussein M. Adam, Richard Ford (eds.), Mending the Rips in the Sky: Options for Somali 
Communities in the Twenty-First Century, (Lawrenceville NJ: Red Sea Press, 1997); Hussein M. 
Adam, ‘Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born?’, in William Zartamn, Collapsed States: The 
Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, (London: Lynee Rienner Publishers, 1995); 
Matt Bryden (ed.), Rebuilding Somaliland: Issues and Possibilities (Lawrenceville NJ and Asmara: 
The Red Sea Press Inc., 2005); Bronwyn E. Bruton, Somalia: A New Approach, (Council Special 
Report n.52) (Council of Foreign Relations Press, 2010); Terrence Lyons, Ahmed I. Samatar, 
Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention. And Strategies for Political Reconstruction, 
(Washington D.C.: Brookings Institutions, 1995); Ken Menkhaus, Somalia: State Collapse and the 
Threat of Terrorism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); War - Torn Societies Project Somali 
Programme, Rebuilding Somalia: Issues and Possibilities for Puntland (London: HAAN Associates, 
2001). Different trends on Somalist studies are discussed in section 1.3. 
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making of the post-colonial state and unification.
12
 There is a need to explore the 
development of these processes which include the crafting of institutional patterns 
ideated to support the nation-state. Such an investigation has to consider the interplay 
between the actors at play, and their interactions with state structures and governing 
bodies. 
This study investigates the process of the making of the Somali state by 
looking at the interaction between nationalism and decolonisation in Somalia. In 
exploring this process, my intention is to analyse the features of the Somali nation 
imagined in the 1940s and the institutional structures and governing bodies that were 
crafted to frame and support the nation in the 1950s. The main argument suggests 
that the imposition of the UN trusteeship, rather than enabling democratization, led 
to a ‘verticalisation’ of Somali nationalism and created a highly restrictive political 
space. In order to express this contrast, the thesis will show that Somali nationalism 
developed a series of horizontal links to promote the collective project of territorial 
unification while simultaneously, the process of state-craft was marked by vertically 
oriented institutions. The thesis explores the construction of governing bodies, as 
representative organs at local and national level, electoral procedures, and their 
impacts on everyday politics. The conclusion will argue that as part of Somalia’s 
colonial legacy, the institutional framework of the post-colonial state was marked by 
ambivalent tensions between its modernist character and ‘traditional’ features. This 
‘tribalised’, exclusive, and autocratic state had a detrimental effect upon the features 
of nationalism and 1960 Somali unification.  
Before investigating these processes, it is important to review the various 
historiographic trends on Somali studies. This is because over the last few decades, 
different theoretical approaches led scholars to emphasise certain aspects of Somali 
politics and history while neglecting issues related to the process of decolonisation 
and the making of the post-colonial state which remain under-explored. Afterwards, 
the chapter contextualises the historical themes of this research by presenting the 
                                               
12 As discussed in the next section, such analysis remained based on secondary sources which are 
based either on a limited focus or limited sources. See also: Lidwien Kapteijns, ‘The Disintegration of 
Somalia: A Historiographical Essay’, Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somalis Studies, 1(2001), 
pp.11-52. 
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broader framework of the process of decolonisation in Africa and, in particular, in 
Somalia. The discussion then turns to aspects related to the legacies of the process of 
state-crafting. The chapter provides a definition of the concept of nationalism with a 
specific reference to the emergence and proliferation of Somali nationalist parties in 
the 1940s. Finally, the chapter presents the methodology in use for this research and 
the problems that have arisen in relation to the process of data collection.  
 
1.3 Historiographies on Somali studies 
The dissolution of nation-state in Somalia produced a vigorous and bitter scholarly 
debate. The core of these discussions has investigated the extent to which the 
paradigm of agnation at the basis of Somali society – commonly defined as clan 
system – has to be accounted for the collapse of Somali state, the eruption of civil 
conflicts and the fragmentation of the Somali nation. Discussions have been led by 
proponents of two different trends which can be broadly divided into primordialist 
and constructivist approaches. Led by the pioneer works of anthropologist Ioan 
Lewis, primordialist trends approached Somali society, history and politics through 
the basic institution constituted by the paradigm of agnation. This paradigm 
constitutes a system based on patrilineal descent consisting of clan-families and sub-
clans which regulate socio-political organisation. Divided into clan-families, it was 
argued that Somali society consisted of achefalus pastoral nomads chiefly and of 
some sedentarist (or semi-) agriculturist communities living in the southern regions 
among which social hierarchy was more predominant.
13
 Scholars tended to stress the 
importance of this paradigm as all-embracing principle for Somali society which, it 
was suggested, was characterised by distinct features of homogeneity in terms of 
culture, history, language, religion and social structures.
14
  The stress on homogenous 
                                               
13 Ioan M. Lewis A Pastoral Society: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern Somali 
of the Horn of Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), especially chapters 4-5. 
14 Ibid.; Ioan M. Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali, (Oxford: James Currey, 2002), especially 
chapter 1. Lewis’s comprehensive study on Somali history was originally published in 1965 as a 
history of the British Somaliland Protectorate and later expanded. This thesis relies on the fourth and 
most recent edition of the volume. It is worth noticing that although revised and expanded, the work 
and the core argument remained essentially the same. In particular, the first nine chapters (the ones 
dealing with the period under investigation in the research) remained unchanged including data and 
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elements within Somali society coupled with classic theories of nationalism,
15
 led to 




Following the state collapse and eruption of civil conflicts, primordialist 
approaches have restated the importance of tradition and traditional divisions within 
Somali society. In particular, it was argued that the paradigm of agnation was 
provided with a segmentary lineage system broken down into sub-clans which 
always constituted and fostered cleavages within the social structure. The paradigm 
of agnation was therefore interpreted as a source of both centripetal and centrifugal 
forces in constant tension between them as promoting unity and disintegration 
respectively. In understanding the eruption of civil conflicts, state-collapse and 
nation fragmentation, stress remained on blood-ties relations, and the array of 
alliances and rivalries dictated by the clan system.
17
 From this perspective, the civil 
conflicts that erupted in the 1990s were seen as a continuation and expansion of 
traditional clan-based cleavages. As Lewis contended, with the eruption of civil 
conflicts, Somali clans were ‘doing what they have always done -  only with greater 
access to more lethal weapons.’
18
 
Influenced by the works on the invention of tradition by Hobsbawm and 
Ranger,
19
 a new generation of scholars adopted constructivist approaches to 
challenge the alleged homogeneity of Somali society arguing that Somalia, in the 
                                                                                                                                     
sources. For more details see the review of the latest edition of the volume: James Quirin, ‘Clan and 
State’, Book Review, The Journal of African History, 45:1 (2004). 
15 Ernest Renan ‘What is a nation’, in Geoff Eley, Ronald Grigor Suny (eds.), Becoming National: A 
Reader, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 41-55. The essay was originally 
presented in March 1882, at Sorbonne University, Paris. 
16 Saadia Touval, Somali Nationalism. International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of 
Africa (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963). On the migratory expansion of Somali 
clans in the Horn of Africa, see: Ioan M. Lewis, ‘The Somali Conquest of the Horn of Africa’, The 
Journal of African History, 1(1960). On pastoralism and the clan system: Lewis, A Pastoral 
Democracy. David D. Laitin, Said S. Samatar, Somalia: A Nation in Search of State, (Boulder and 
London: Westview Press, 1987). 
17 Ioan M. Lewis, ‘The Ogaden and the Fragility of Somali Segmentary Nationalism’, African Affairs, 
88:353 (1989); Hussein M. Adam, ‘Somalia: a Terrible Beauty’, pp. 168-89. 
18 Ioan M. Lewis, ‘Doing Violence to Ethnography: Some Comments on Catherine Besteman’s 
Distorted Reporting on Somalia’, Current Anthropology, 13:1 (1998), p 101. 
19 Eric Hobsbawm, Terence Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
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ways it was described by early historiographic trends, was an invention.
20
 
Constructivist approaches paid more attention to socioeconomic changes taking place 
in the twentieth century especially. New investigations dealt with issues such as 
class-formation, race and ethnicity, land divisions, class cleavages and racialization, 
cultural and socio-economic differences and the ethno-territorial divisions,
21
 pointing 
out how these have played a considerable role in shaping clan identities and 
alliances.
22
 In this way, the eruption of civil conflicts was understood as a by-product 
of conflicts based on class rather than clan.  
Despite the increase of academic production on Somali studies, the violent 
dissolution of the nation-state hindered the collaboration among scholars leading to 
the crystallisation of the different theoretical positions.
23
 In fact, attempts to bridge 
between the historiographic trends were made only recently. From this perspective, 
the recent collection of essays on Somali culture, society and politics, edited by 
Hoehne and Luling in 2010, calls for the development of new analytical approaches, 
drawing from different historiographies.
24
 When tackling Somali studies, the editors 
maintain, scholars should consider both transformations taking place over the last 
                                               
20 See the collection of essays in Ali J. Ahmed (ed.) The Invention of Somalia (Lawrenceville, N. J.: 
The Red Sea Press Inc., 1995). 
21 Abdillahi H. Jama, ‘The Ethno-political Situation in the Horn of Africa’, The European Association 
of Somali Studies, 1st Conference, 23rd-25th September 1993; Abdi M. Kusow, Putting the Cart 
before the Horse: Contested Nationalism and the Crisis of Nation-State in Somalia (Trenton N.J.: The 
Red Sea Press Inc., 1994); Abdi M. Kusow,  ‘The Genesis of the Somali Civil War: A New 
Perspective’, Northeast African Studies, 1:1(New Series) (1994). 
22 See Mohamed H. Mukthar, ‘Islam in Somali History: Fact and Fiction’, in Ali J. Ahmed (ed.), The 
Invention of Somalia; Federico Battera, ‘Le Confraternite Islamiche Somale di Fronte al Colonialismo 
(1890-1920): tra contrapposizione e collaborazione’, Africa [Rome], 2 (1998); Rima Berns, 
‘Transformative Islam & Shifting Gender Role in the Somali Diaspora’, in Kusow, Putting the Cart 
before the Horse; A. O. Mansur, ‘The Nature of the Somali Clan System’, in Ahmed (ed.) The 
Invention of Somalia. 
23 The exchange of opinions between Ioan Lewis and Catherine Besteman represented, perhaps, the 
bitterest moment of the debate. See Lewis, ‘Doing Violence to Ethnography’, along with Besteman’s 
reply: Catherine Besteman, ‘Primordialist Blinders: A Reply to I. M. Lewis’, Cultural Anthropology, 
13:1 (1998). 
24 ‘In our perspective… the truth lies – as usual – in between.’ Markus V. Hoehne, Virginia Luling, 
‘Introduction: Lewis and the Remaining Challenges in Somalis Studies’ in Markus V. Hoehne, 
Virginia Luling (eds.), Milk and Peace, Drought and War: Somali Culture, Society and Politics: 
Essays in Honour of I. M. Lewis, (London: Hurst & Co., 2010), p. 7. In a review of the volume, 
Kapteijns notes that the editors failed to engage directly with the accomplishments, influences, 
critiques of the work of Ioan Lewis over the last decades. Lidwien Kapteijns, ‘Review of Markus 
Hoehne and Viginia Luling ‘Peace and Milk, Drought and War’’, The Journal of African History, 52 
(2011), pp. 273-4.  
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century, most notably the establishment of a centralised state and of a ‘new tradition 
of autocracy’ as part of the colonial legacy, and  continuities with the past, 
particularly in relation to the clan system.
25
 
However, no general consensus emerged in regard to the extent and ways in 
which colonial rule affected the development of post-colonial politics. According to 
an early interpretation, the experience of colonial rule did not modify the basic 
features of Somali pastoral society, or at least in Somaliland, although it introduced 
arbitrary partitions of the Horn of Africa.
26
 Conversely, recent studies argued that, in 
fact, far from being accidental, colonial rule, territorial division, brutal occupation 
and its political economy had major impacts on Somali society. For instance, the 
works of Samatar underscored the ways in which pastoral economy and trade was 
transformed during the colonial occupation in Somaliland.
27
 In advancing the model 
of ‘African suspended state’, Samatar and Samatar contented that the political 
economy of colonialism alienated and negatively affected relations between state and 
society.
28
 Similarly, Menkhaus investigated the impacts of colonial plantations on 
systems of agricultural production in southern Somalia.
29
 The experience of colonial 
rule has also been analysed in relation to the process of class formation in Somalia.
30
 
                                               
25 The authors argue that a clan-based discourse remains a key feature of in Somali politics. From this 
perspective, tradition constitutes as a source of peace and reconstruction as, for instance, in 
Somaliland and Puntland. Hoehne, Luling, ‘Introduction’, in  Hoehne, Luling (eds.), Milk and Peace, 
pp. 7-8. 
26 Lewis, A Modern History , especially chapters 2-6; Robert L. Hess, Italian Colonialism in Somalia, 
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), especially chapter 8. 
27 Abdi I. Samatar, The State and Rural Transformation in Northern Somalia, 1884-1986, (Madison 
Wisconsin, the University of Wisconsin Press, 1989). 
28 Abdi I. Samatar, A. I. Samatar, ‘The Meterial Roots of the Suspended African State: Arguments 
from Somalia’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 25:4 (1987); Abdi I. Samatar, ‘Destruction of 
State and Society in Somalia: Beyond the Tribal Convention’, Journal of Modern African Studies 30:4 
(1992); Ahmed I. Samatar, ‘The Curse of Allah: Civic Disembowelment and the Collapse of the State 
in Somalia’, in Ahmed I. Samatar (ed.), The Somali Challenge; see also Lidwien Kapteijns, ‘Gender 
Relations and Transformation of the Northern Somali Pastoral Tradition’, International Journal of 
African Historical Studies 28:2 (1995). 
29 Ken Menkhaus, ‘From Feast to Famine: Land and State in Somalia’s Lower Jubba Valley’, in 
Catherine Besteman, Lee V. Cassanelli (eds.), The Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia: the War 
Behind the War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996); Kathryn Craven, Ken Menkhaus, ‘Land 
Alienation and the Imposition of State Farms in the Lower Jubba Valley’ in Besteman and Cassanelli, 
The Struggle for Land. 
30 Charles Geshekter ‘Anti-Colonialism and Class Formation: The Eastern Horn of Africa before 
1950’, International Journal of African Historical Studies, 18:1 (1985); Ahmed I. Samatar, Socialist 
Somalia: Rhetoric and Reality, (Zed Books: London, 1988). 
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Recently, the dual, British and Italian, colonial rule has been investigated in relation 
to the end of union between Somalia and Somaliland. Where early historiographic 
approaches tended to overlook this duality, a growing body of literature argues that 
differential colonial rule with different legislations, militaries, bureaucracies, led to 
tense relations between the two regions, the neglect of Somaliland by a central 
government, contributing to eruption of civil war and cession in 1991.
31
 More 
generally, colonial rule has been linked more directly to the dissolution of nation-
state with the claim that imposed an alien model on Somali society.
32
  
In spite of the renewed scholarly interest on the issues related to colonial 
legacies in Somalia, the process of decolonisation and the construction of the post-
colonial state remain under-explored. This might be due to a combination of 
circumstances. From a disciplinary viewpoint, Somali studies have been 
conventionally characterised by a solid scholarly tradition of anthropological 
research which remains among the major trends today. On a different level, lack of 
historical research might be attributable to problems in accessing sources. In 
particular, the nature of archival materials is very fragmentary and required the 
knowledge of English and Italian languages. Moreover, due to the difficulties related 





 which are relatively more accessible to researchers. For all these 
reasons, recent attention on the process of decolonisation has been drawn to a 
reinterpretation of existing works on the topic rather than promoting new first-hand 
research.
35
 However, this remains problematic due to the narrow focus adopted by 
the early historiography on Somali studies.  
                                               
31 Ioan M. Lewis, Understanding Somalia and Somaliland, (London, Hurst and Co., 2008); Mark 
Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, (London: Progressio, 2008). 
32 Anna Simons, ‘Democratisation and Ethnic Conflict: the Kin Connection’, Nations and 
Nationalism, 3:2 (1997), p. 274; Martin Doornbos, John Markakis, ‘What Went Wrong in Somalia’, 
Review of African Political Economy, 21:59 (1994), pp. 85-6.  
33 See Luca Ciabarri, Dopo lo Stato. Storia e Antropologia della Ricostruzione Sociale nella Somalia 
Settentrionale (Milan: Angeli, 2010). 
34 Markus Hoehne, ‘Political Identity, Emerging State Structures and Conflict in Northern Somalia’, 
Journal of Modern African Studies, 44:3 (2006). 
35 See for instance Kapteijns, ‘The Disentegration of Somalia’; Abdisalam M. Issa-Salwe, The 
Collapse of the Somali State: The Impact of the Colonial Legacy, (London: Haan, 1996). 
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By focusing on the extent to which Somali society was characterised by 
elements of ‘homogeneity’, early studies on Somali national politics and history 
devoted their attention to problems related to the process of nation-building and 
irredentism rather than to the processes of state building and unification. This trend 
was not confined to Somalia but reflected a general approach to African politics at 
the time. For instance, in a 1964 essay on the influences of western ideologies on 
African states, Thomas Hodgkin explored the concept of democracy as the means 
through which power was transferred from colonial rule to  African elites. Within 
this context, great importance was given to the national project while the actual 
institutions of the system of power were discarded. In fact, the latter were seen as a 
mere means to achieve the national project.
36
  
Similarly, Somali national politics have been analysed in relation to the 
national project of Greater Somalia. To be more precise, discussions centred on the 
nature of the cultural, historical, and sociological arguments which supported 
irredentism. Little attention was turned to the actual institutional structures that were 
built in support of the national project. For instance, the work by Laitin and Samatar 
on Somali post-independence national politics, the only comprehensive study on the 
topic, dedicated only four pages on pre-independence politics and the process of the 
making of the Somali state. Their assessment of the period suggested that 
independence represented an incomplete achievement  as it led to the unification of 
only two out of five Somali speaking-regions.
37
  
A lack of research characterised the period under investigation, the rule of the 
BMA and AFIS. Most works published on the topic have been produced by the BMA 
or AFIS, or by Ministry of Information whose accounts are embedded with a series 
of biases often linked to the wartime propaganda. AFIS rule has been object of 
analysis of a few works published by technicians who worked for the Italian 
                                               
36 Thomas Hodgkin, ‘The Relevance of ‘Western’ Ideas for the new African States’, in Ronald 
Pennock (ed.), Self-Government in Modernizing Nations, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 
1964). 
37  Laitin, Samatar, Somalia: A Nation, pp. 65-8. 
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 Worth of 
consideration are the works by Karp on the political economy of AFIS
41
 and the 
essays by Alphonse Castagno on political developments during AFIS.
42
 Ioan Lewis’ 
comprehensive work on Somali history dedicated little attention to the period.
43
 
Conversely, Angelo Del Boca provides a valuable analysis which is, however, 
penalized by the broader approach to investigate the development of Italian colonial 
rule in the Horn of Africa.
44
 The recent works of Paolo Tripodi
45
 and Antonio 
Morone
46
 on Italian trusteeship in Somalia are exceptional and made an invaluable 
contribution to the discussions. However, both studies focus mainly on the Italian 
administration without including the period under the BMA.  
As pointed out by Chris Allen when proposing a theoretical framework to the 
approach of African politics,
47
 an investigation of the historical patterns of political 
development, especially the process of decolonisation, is instrumental for achieving a 
broader understanding of the trajectory of post-colonial politics. For the case of 
Somalia, such analysis needs to be grounded on first-hand research based on archival 
sources combined with oral memories. However, before addressing issues related to 
the methodology adopted by this research, it is necessary to contextualise the 
                                               
38 Paolo Contini, The Somali Republic: An Experiment in Legal Integration, (London: Frank Cass, 
1969). 
39 M. D’Antonio, La Costituzione Somala: Precedenti Storici e Documenti Costituzionali, (Rome: 
Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1962). 
40 Giuseppe Costanzo, Problemi Costituzionali della Somalia nella Preparazione all’Indipendenza 
(1957-1960), (Milan: Giuffrè, 1962). 
41 Mark Karp, The Economics of Trusteeship in Somalia, (Boston: Boston University Press, 1960). 
42 Alphonse A. Castagno, ‘Somali Republic’ in James S. Coleman, Carl G. Rosberg (eds.), Political 
Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964); 
Alphonse A. Castagno, ‘Somalia’, International Conciliation, 522 (March, 1959). 
43 In fact, the author dedicates one chapter to the period under the BMA, and the disposition of former 
Italian colonies, and one chapter to AFIS rule. However, both chapters are extremely under-referenced 
and relied on a limited set of secondary sources. See Lewis, A Modern History, chapters 6-7. 
44 Del Boca’s work on Italian colonialism in the Horn Africa comprises of four volumes organised 
according to a chronological order. For the phase under the BMA and AFIS rule see: Angelo Del 
Boca, Gli Italiani in Africa Orientale: Nostalgia delle Colonie , (Bari: Laterza, 1984). 
45 Paolo Tripodi, The Colonial Legacy in Somalia, (London: Macmillan Press, 1999); Paolo Tripodi, 
‘Back to the Horn: Italian Administration and Somalia’s Troubled Independence’, Journal of Modern 
African Studies, 33:2/3 (1999). 
46 Antonio M. Morone, L’Ultima Colonia: Come l’Italia è Tornata in Africa 1950-1960, (Bari: 
Laterza, 2011). 
47 Chris Allen, ‘Understanding African Politics’, Review of African Political Economy, 22:65 (1995).  
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research themes and to discuss some theoretical issues related to the study of the 
process of decolonisation in Somalia.  
 
1.4 The decolonisation process and the making of the 
post-colonial state in Somalia 
The themes discussed in this research are situated within the broader historical 
context of the process of decolonisation in Africa. It is possible to define this process 
as the series of actions and circumstances that led to the relinquishment of the 
empires and to the establishment of independent African states. Conventionally, the 
occurrence of the Second World War is seen as a watershed within this process, a 
catalyst for ideological, political and socioeconomic changes.
48
 Most notably, in the 
1940s a new international scenario emerged that was characterised by the rise, as a 
world power, of the United States which had different imperial interests. This 
scenario came to be subject to the new economic imperatives and strategic policies 
dictated by the Cold War, and somewhat hostile to European colonial empires. 
Moreover, the period was also marked by the establishment of the UN which 
assumed a less-benevolent international attitude towards colonialism. At the same 
time, starting with the mid-1940s, national elections in Europe resulted in leftist 
governments promoting progressive plans with regards to the colonial possessions.
49
 
In addition to this, the formulation soon after the war of a Pan-Africanist ideology, of 
which several nationalist leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah were the driving force, 
                                               
48
 The process of decolonisation has been the object of debate of numerous studies. See for instance: 
John G. Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World 
(London: Macmillan, 1988); John G. Darwin, The End of the British Empire: The Historical Debate 
(London: Blackwell, 1991); John D. Hargreaves, Decolonization in Africa (London: Longman, 1988) 
R. F. Holland, European Decolonization, 1945-1961: An Introductory Survey (London: Macmillan, 
1985); Wyndraeth H. Morris-Jones and George Fischer (eds.), Decolonisation and After: the British 
and French Experience (London: Frank Cass, 1980); Prosser Gifford and W. Roger Louis (eds.), The 
Transfer of Power in Africa: Decolonization 1940-1960 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982) 
Prosser Gifford and W. Roger Louis (eds.), Decolonization and African Independence: the Transfer of 
Power, 1960-1980 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988). 
49 For a useful summary of major trends in scholarly debate on decolonisation in Africa see Robert 
Tignor, Capitalism and Nationalism at the End of Empire: State and Business in Decolonizing Egypt, 
Nigeria and Kenya, 1945-63, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), chapter 1. 
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The effects of the Second World War on African economies and societies 
fostered a series of pressures coming from local associations, trade unions, 
nationalist movements starting in the 1940s. Due to the systematic subordination of 
African economies to the war effort, an increased demand of African raw materials 
and the scarce availability of manufactured goods during the war-time created a 
context of low morale and social dissatisfaction in which issues like labour became 
central in the colonies. In the 1940s, an increasing number of African men and 
women began a wave of strikes in the French and British colonies, especially in West 
Africa. Although, the strikers were brought together by demands for socioeconomic 
improvements, African nationalists were able to catalyse these pressures in order to 
advance their quest for independence.
51
 The ways in which colonial rulers responded 
to pressures from below marked a shift in colonial policies that led to the adoption of 
more progressive policies of dominion. Starting from the 1940s, this shift was 




Recently, Paul Nugent illustrated how the new socio-economic and political 
scenario emerging from the Second World War brought the contradiction at the heart 
of the colonial project into public display.
53
 From this perspective, he adopted the 
idea of ‘colonial contradiction’ of Homi Bhabha – the tension inherent to the colonial 
discourse which sought to replicate itself in the colonised but refuse to acknowledge 
                                               
50
 Most notably, two events, the Pan-African Federation in 1944 and the Pan-African Congress held in 
Manchester in 1945, were central in the ideation of the Pan-African ideology. A. Ajala, Pan-
Africanism: Evolution, Progress and Prospects (London: A. Deuthsch, 1973). On the Pan-Africanist 
anti-colonial ideology see R. Makonnes, Pan-Africanism from Within (Nairobi, London: Oxford 
University Press, 1973); R. W. Walters, Pan-Africanism in the African Diaspora.: an Analysis of 
Modern Afrocentric Political Movements (Detroit: Wayne State, 1997); V. B. Thompson, Africa and 
Unity: the Evolution of Pan-Africanism  (London: Longmans, 1969); J. A. Langely, Pan-Africanism 
and Nationalism in West Africa, 1900-1945: a Study in Ideology and Social Classes (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1973). 
51 Frederick Cooper, Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British 
Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), especially chapter 10. 
52 Frederick Cooper, Africa Since 1940:The Past of the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), chapter 3. 
53 Paul Nugent, African Since Independence, (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave, 2004), chapter 1. 
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this replication  – to indicate the tension that arose around the exercise of colonial 
dominion.
54
 On the one hand, this discourse was justified by the ‘efforts’ made by 
colonial rule of improving ‘Africans’ interests’; on the other, it perpetuated Africans’ 
dependency to colonial rule by reducing these efforts to the lowest level. If colonial 
powers managed to keep this tension at bay until the late 1930s, the outbreak and the 
effects of the Second World War brought the colonial contradiction to its 
culmination. In this sense, the post-war context was characterised by a series of 
promises made by the colonial powers during the conflict under which African 
colonies were to be rewarded for their instrumental contribution to the war effort. 
Once expectations were raised, colonial powers were forced to face and address the 
demands for reforms emerging from the post-war socioeconomic pressures which 
eventually led to the relinquishment of African empires.
55
 
A general consensus among scholars indicates that the interaction between 
pressures from below and initiative from above came to assume a special 
significance within the process of the decolonisation. This interaction determined 
modes, time and patterns for dismantling the empires, relinquishing power and 
granting independence. Its intensity and features varied from case to case indicating 
that decolonisation was the result of a constant dialogue, more or less violent, 
between colonial rulers and African demands. As Tony Kirk-Greene suggested this 
dialectic relation resembled collective bargaining: 
Like a typical trade union negotiation, the process [of decolonisation] was a two-
way affair, of concession in response to pressure.
56
 
It was this interaction that ultimately defined ‘a certain kind of decoloni[s]ation’ by 




This research centres on the investigation of the ‘two-way affair’ in Somalia, 
specifically looking at the interplay between the politics of nationalism and 
                                               
54 Homi Bhabha quoted in Nugent, African Since Independence, pp. 11-13. 
55 Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
56 Tony Kirk-Greene, ‘Decolonisation in British Africa’, History Today, 42:1(1992), p. 47. 
57 Cooper, African Since 1940, p. 66.  
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decolonisation starting with the Second World War. This is not a simple task. In 
many ways, the decolonisation of Somalia followed a peculiar trajectory mainly due 
to the fact that the Horn of Africa was the scene of the struggle between the armies of 
two colonial powers, Great Britain and Italy. The most striking effects of the conflict 
were the defeat of the Italians, the establishment of a temporary military occupation, 
the BMA, and the placing of Somalia under a 10-year UN trusteeship in 1950. Due to 
the change of regime in 1941, Somalia – together with Italian colonies, Eritrea, Libya 
– ceased to be, technically speaking, a colony. In fact, especially between 1941 and 
1950, when the administrative future of former Italian colonies was undecided 
pending the end of the war and further decisions of the UN, the colonial status of 
Somalia was officially ‘suspended’.
58
  
The fact that the nature and features of the BMA were never really defined – 
the BMA was a military occupation within a colonial setting – contributed to create a 
somewhat grey area within which the interaction between different communities was 
articulated. Investigating these relations can be problematic. In particular, issues arise 
around the nature of the interplay between the military occupiers, the former colonial 
masters and the quasi-colonial subjects. From this perspective, the main challenge for 
historians of the 1940s Somalia is to look beyond the series of biases and myths 
which characterised the Allied wartime propaganda. The features of these myths 
need to be addressed because they came to influence our understanding and 
perception of the time as their echoes still resonate in contemporary literature today.  
The Allied propaganda reflected the alliances of the War. Italy entered the 
Second World War as a member of the Axis Coalition and hence against the United 
Kingdom.
59
 In June 1940, Italian troops attacked and occupied British Somaliland. 
Soon after, in November 1940, the British launched their counter-attack and, within a 
                                               
58 Trevaskis  refers to Eritrea under the BMA as a ‘colony in transition’. I prefer the expression 
‘suspended colony’ because the colonial status of former Italian colonies was not fully addressed 
before the 1945 Peace Conference in San Francisco. Thus, following the Italian defeat in 1941, their 
status came to be suspended. See G. K. N. Trevaskis, Eritrea: A Colony in Transition: 1941-52, 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1960). 
59 In Horn of Africa, the war began with the Italian aggression against Ethiopia in 1935. 
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few months, defeated the Italians in the Horn of Africa.
60
 As a result, a temporary 
military occupation under the British, the BMA, came to administer former Italian 
colonies. However, its nature remained ambiguously embedded with the aims of the 
Allied liberation campaign – the defeat of fascism – and the colonial setting in which 
it operated involving the use of structures of former colonial (fascist) rule and the 
reliance on personnel (both colonial and military) in use in the British empire. 
Therefore, while the BMA was not a colonial regime, its institutional framework 
resembled its former colonial setting.  
This tension was reflected in the Allied wartime propaganda of ‘the 
international fight against Nazism’ and ‘the liberation campaign from fascism’ 
adopted by the BMA in Somalia. Although this discourse clearly indicated the aim of 
the campaign – the defeat of fascism – its usage in the context of a ‘suspended’ 
colony became problematic because it did not specify what forms of rule would have 
replaced the fascist regime, and what prospect awaited the former colonies and local 
communities. However, due to the provisional nature of the BMA, this tension was 
never fully addressed by the British Government. For instance, one of the first 
accounts of the operations published by the Ministry of Information was entitled The 
First to Be Freed, highlighting the role of liberators of the BMA in the Horn of 
Africa.
61
  Nevertheless, the Allied propaganda of ‘freeing’ the Horn of Africa from 
fascism came at odds with the nature of military occupation. In fact, if the BMA 
differed from previous colonial rule, and by defeating fascism ‘freed’ Somalia, it was 
less clear what kind of administration the BMA represented. In other words, whether 
former Italian colonies came to be ‘freed’ from fascism in 1941, the presence of a 
military occupation by a colonial power did not make them ‘liberated’. 
The uncertainties related to the features of the BMA fostered a series of 
myths regarding the relations with the colonial subjects, and the nature of British 
policies that came to be very influential among some scholars of Somali politics and 
history. Establishing the criteria through which dealing with the Italians as enemies, 
                                               
60 For an account of the operations see James Rennel Rodd, British Military Administration of 
Occupied Territories in Africa During the Years 1941-1947 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1948). 
61 K.C. Gandar Dower, The First to Be Freed: The Record of British Military Administration in 
Eritrea and Somalia, 1941-1943, (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1944). 
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with the Somalis as ‘suspended’ colonised, and at the same time maintaining racial 
hierarchies, became a difficult task for the BMA. The relation between the British 
and the Italians was a matter of particular concern to the British policy especially due 
to considerable amount of Italians living in the colonies.
62
 In June 1941, the BMA 
was set up in Somalia Italiana under the name OETA – Occupied Enemy’s Territory 
Administration. Consequently, Italian soldiers and officials were made prisoners of 
war and temporarily moved to special camps located along the Somali coasts before 
being shipped to Kenya, India, South Africa or Great Britain. It was also suggested to 
set a special naval service to repatriate Italian civilians. Although the majority of 
Italians was evacuated from the Horn of Africa within a couple of years, a certain 
number of Italians, technically speaking citizens of a hostile power, decided to 
remain in the colonies. As chapter two discussed in details, due to various movement 
of people, this number changed dramatically over the years, reaching possibly 12,000 
Italians in Mogadishu in 1942, circa a third of the total population. 
Additionally, the shifting war alliances contributed to make British policy 
even more confused. In September 1943, as a result of a change of regime, Italy was 
split in two: in the south, a new-formed Italian Government signed an armistice with 
the Allied forces and joined the Allied coalition; in northern Italy, a new fascist 
government was formed on the Nazi side. Similarly, the Italian community in 
Somalia Italiana divided between the ones who were supportive of the pro-Allied 
government, the ones who were supportive of fascism, and the ones who did not 
express preferences. The British policy was redrafted accordingly but with some 
difficulties. On the one hand, instructions sent from London to the BMA prescribed 
to remove the word ‘Enemy’ from the acronym OETA that became OTA –Occupied 
Territory Administration. On the other, the War Office, in charge of the local 
administration, recommended that an ‘aloof attitude’ to be assumed towards the 
Italian communities in Somalia. 
What was meant by an ‘aloof attitude’ remained unclear to most of the BMA 
in Somalia and generated a great deal of confusion on how to deal with Italians and, 
                                               
62 In 1940, there were possibly 60,000 Italian civilians in the Horn of Africa. See Angelo Del Boca, 
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because of that, with the Somalis. On an official level the Italians were allied but on 
a practical level they were not to be trusted. Here is an extract that expresses the 
problematic: 
The status of co-belligerency does not mean that Italy is henceforth to be 
reckoned as one of the United Nations or is to be admitted by the British and 
America Government to their counsels as an ally. It means that the Italian 
Government will be fighting the same enemy, and that the United Nations 
support is for that immediate and limited purpose only.
63
 
Shifting war alliances between British and Italian governments affected the 
perceptions of the time especially with regards to the British-Somali relations. 
Accordingly, if the British and Italians were enemies, it was implicitly suggested that 
a certain bond existed between the occupiers and the ‘suspended’ colonised, and that 
the British considered the Somalis as ‘allies’. Due to a certain degree of hostility of 
the BMA towards the Italian communities, the British were somehow considered to 
be fond of the Somalis.
64
 From this perspective, the narrative adopted by the well-
known Somalist scholar Ioan Lewis in his comprehensive study on Somali history is 
very telling: 
To understand the atmosphere in Somalia at this time [i.e. during the BMA], and 
the nature of the relations between British officials and Somali, it has to be 
remembered that the new rulers saw themselves as liberators from fascist 
oppression and to a considerable extent were so received. Indeed, the generally 
friendly reception accorded to them reinforced the Administration’s tendency to 
regard the Somali as allies against the Italians. And many British officials made 
no secret of their admiration for Somalis and contempt for the defeated Italians. 
Hence there was from the beginning a considerable bond of sympathy between 
                                               
63 These were part of the instructions sent to the BMA in Somalia: Author unknown, ‘Relations with 
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the rulers and the Somali public which, in the liberal currents of opinion of the 
times, found expression in a strong and quite explicit pro-Somali policy.
65
 
In investigating the emergence of Somali nationalist organisations under the 
BMA, the thesis attempts to challenge this perspective. There are several reasons for 
doing so. An alleged bond of sympathy between the occupiers and Somali subjects 
conceals the racial-based and patronising features of the British rule. Under the 
BMA, Somalis were not treated equal to Europeans or spared of colonial arrogance 
and prejudice. Racial discourse continued to be central to British rule. In fact, the 
presence of a white enemy community caused a further hierarchisation of the 
military regime. Although the nature of the BMA remained vague, its social 
stratification was never questioned. As expressed by a British writer of the time, if 
the Italians were considered ‘an allegedly hostile European race’, the Somalis were 
believed to be ‘difficult to deal with even at his friendliest’.
66
  
On a different level, considering the BMA as characterised by a ‘pro-Somali’ 
policy hinders our appreciation of Somali nationalist organisations. Conventionally, 
the adoption by the BMA of partially liberal policies which allowed the formation of 
political organisations previously forbidden and the 1946 British proposal to create a 
Greater Somalia
67
 were considered as proofs of British support to Somali national 
agenda.
68
 This discourse is misleading. By stressing the well-disposed intentions of 
the BMA towards Somali communities and political organisations, the British role in 
the emergence of Somali political movements is over-stressed to the detriment of 
Somali-rooted capacity to propose and carry out political choices. Scholars such as 
Lewis, Touval conventionally assume that due to the British approval of Somali 
nationalism and irredentist aspirations, the BMA ‘provided during the early 1940’s 
guidance and help to the inexperienced Somali politicians’ in the process of creation 
                                               
65 Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali, p. 120.  
66 Gandar Dower ‘British Military Administration in Eritrea and Somalia’, undated (likely to be 
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of nationalist parties.
69
 Conversely, the thesis argues that the most striking character 
of nationalist movements in the 1940s was a self-help movement which appropriated 
elements of Somali culture in order to promote a horizontal structure and links of 
cooperation and solidarity. Due to the limited resources of the BMA, it was this 
movement which fostered a series of socio-economic activities proving a source of 
inspiration to Somali nationalists. 
Additionally, imperial interests in the area should be not discarded. Assuming 
a bond of sympathy between British and Somali communities overshadows the 
British (colonial) policies in the area. As the thesis discusses, throughout the 1940s 
the administrative future of Somalia became a matter of debate of the UN. These 
discussions were influenced by the competing alliances dictated by the Cold War. As 
a result, the Great Powers, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union of the United 
States, advanced their interests in the Horn Africa. The British support to the project 
of Greater Somalia reflected the intention to control the regions via an international 
mandate. In fact, the British claim on Greater Somalia was seen as a legitimate 
reward for the British role played during the war and in particular during the 
liberation campaign to ‘free’ the Horn of Africa from the fascist occupation. This 
position was made clear by the then Foreign Secretary, Ernst Bevin in 1946 when 
replying to the Soviet Union’s Foreign Minister Molotov who criticised the British 
attempt to encourage the creation a Greater Somalia: 
But what attracted M. Molotov’s criticism was, I am sure, that I suggested that 
Great Britain should be made the administrating authority [of Greater Somalia]. 
Was this unreasonable? In the first place we were surrendering a Protectorate 
comparable in size to the area we hoped that Ethiopia would contribute. 
Secondly, it was a British force, mainly East African and South African force 
which bore the main brunt of restoring the independence of Ethiopia and of 
putting the Emperor back on his throne after several years’ sanctuary in this 
country. We do not seek gratitude on that account but I think it right to express 
surprise that our proposals should have met with such unjustified criticism. After 
all, when we were defeating Italy in East Africa, Britain was open to invasion and 
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we were fighting alone. I hope the deputies at the Paris conference [i.e. Peace 
Conference] will now consider a greater Somaliland more objectively.
70
  
Although during the BMA the colonial status of Somalia was ‘suspended’, 
imperial interests were considerable. As Barnes points out although it was discarded 
officially in 1946, the idea of Greater Somalia remained a recurrent and influential 
theme within British policy and policy-making until 1948.
71
 For this reason, the 
BMA implemented different policies in the former Italian colonies: if freedom of 
association was partially granted in Somalia as soon as 1943, in Eritrea, where the 
British interests were limited and of a different nature, political organisations were 
banned until the late 1940s.
 72
 Strong imperial interests also led a late withdrawal of 
the BMA from the Ogaden and Haud and RA with major consequences on the 
development of local politics, as discussed in chapters two and six.  
In understanding the development of local politics, the research makes an 
attempt to explore the socio-economic effects of the military occupation. Further 
problems arise in relation to the series of myths and biases which have characterised 
the historical accounts of 1940s Somalia. As pointed out by Michel Foucault, it is a 
common procedure for the winners of a certain conflict to rely on propaganda in 
order to affirm their political dominion over the enemies.
73
 Shaped by war alliances, 
this discourse adopted a clear-cut distinction between the wrong/bad side and the 
good/right side, between the Nazi-fascist and the Allied coalitions. Reports of the 
war and occupation were narrated through the lens of this simplistic discourse while 
the effects and reactions to both the conflicts and military occupation were 
downplayed. 
Propaganda was used by the BMA to legitimate its rule and eventually 
produced distorted views of the nature of British administration and of relations 
between the Somali subjects and military occupiers. By stressing their role of 
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‘liberators’ of African colonies from fascism, British accounts of the operations 
depicted the occupation of Somalia the by-product of an ‘easy’ and quick campaign. 
Accordingly, the enemy’s army is often disorganised, military resistance is limited, 
Somali populations are either described as passive or welcoming the operations.  
Similar tones characterised the accounts of the operation of the 22
nd
 East African 
Infantry Brigade, advancing from Kenya into Somalia that, although admitting to 
have encountered some opposition, ridiculed the degree of the conflicts: 
 […]opposition was never very serious, and, though at various times there was a 
considerable amount of enemy fire, causalities were ridiculously [sic!] light.
74
  
By pursuing a demystification of the enemy, this rhetoric downplayed the 
socioeconomic effects of the war and the military occupation . As chapter three 
discusses in details, this discourse led to dismissing the effects of the military 
occupation and the nature of resistance to this occupation and the extent to which this 
affected political development. Acts of resistance taking place across the regions 
were labelled as ‘tribal’ and so was the political front which backed the Italians in 
opposition to the BMA before the UN. The thesis deals with the issue of Somali 
support to Italian rule illustrating how this consent often concealed dissent to the 
military occupation.  
The process of decolonisation in Somalia became even more peculiar 
following the UN decision to place the ‘suspended’ colony under a 10-year 
trusteeship administration ruled by Italy from 1950. It is important to note that the 
UN decision represented a somewhat progressive trend within the context of colonial 
Africa. Where at the time most African nationalists and social organisations were 
confronting colonial rule to advance their quest for self-government and 
independence, the modes and terms of Somali independence had already been 
defined in 1949. The thesis illustrates how the features of the trusteeship 
administration affected the making of the Somali state. Despite the fact that the 
colonial status of Somalia was replaced by the one of ‘trust territory’, the process of 
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state-crafting shared similarities with decolonising programmes undertaken 
elsewhere in colonial Africa. This circumstance makes possible to investigate the 
extent to which the UN programme of democratisation shaped Somalia’s patterns of 
political development. In this way, the research engages with the scholarly debate 
that focuses on the ways in which the colonial states left their successors with 
enduring and negative legacies.  
Starting in the 1990s, a debate in Africa studies began to investigate the 
relations between the legacies of the colonial state and poor performances in social, 
economic, and political fields of post-colonial states. In a comparative study, 
Crawford Young indicates how the highly exploitative character of the colonial state 
produced a series of pernicious legacies.
75
 As colonial dominion had two main aims, 
i.e. the extraction of local resources and control over borders, Young contends that 
state structures and institutions were conceived to support state self-interests 
exclusively. The coercive features of this ruling system prevented the consolidation 
of a strong and healthy civil society which would challenge state self-interests and 
counterbalance its power.  
In capturing the disruptive character of this state system, Young makes use of 
the image of Bula Matari, the crusher of rocks – the nickname given to Henry 
Morton Stanley and his 1880s expedition into Congolese interiors to set up colonial 
dominion.  
Over time, as the new state on whose construction Stanley had surreptitiously 
embarked ceased to be his personal undertaking as Leopoldian emissary and 
burgeoned into an impersonal embodiment of oppressive European power, Bula 
Matari came to represent this intrusive alien authority more generally. The 




In opposition to Young’s image of colonial state as an omnipotent and 
persistently hostile deus ex machina,  other scholars suggest that in fact colonial state 
achieved little effective dominion over society and remained overall weak and 
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fragile.
77 
In this sense, it was pointed out that within the broader history of African 
society, colonial rule represented a brief digression whose importance should be not 
overestimated but linked to particular time and circumstances. Moreover, scholars 
suggested that Young’s image of Bula Matari implies that colonial rule followed 
clear plans of dominion. Conversely, it has been argued that these plans were 
constantly subject to negotiations with specific, local circumstances testifying a 
rather limited power of states against local social forces.
78
 A correlated argument is 
that client-relations between African elites and colonial rulers were central to 
enduring state dominion. From this perspective, it has been argued that the role 
played by elites was not simply one of collusion but that of conscious actors of 
‘extraverted’ patterns of colonial and post-colonial politics.
79
 
Although these critiques posit serious questions around the effective power of 
colonial state-system embodied by Bula Matari, there are aspects of colonial legacy 
worth close consideration. First, the state has to be considered together with its 
governing bodies and structures rather than taking it as an abstract concept. As 
pointed out by Cooper, African states emerged as successors of colonial states and by 
default inherited its ruling apparatus made of institutional and governing bodies, 
bureaucracies, legislative system, militaries and geographical border divisions.
80
  
This apparatus necessarily impacted and conditioned post-independent states during 
the historical phase following independence. For this reason, an investigation of the 
late colonial period, starting roughly with the Second World War, is important to 
understand what kind of practical features were established and inherited by post-
colonial successors. From this perspective, the late colonialism assumed particular 
significance because it coincided with the ideation and implementation of a series of 
policies and development plans imposed by colonial rule in response to African 
demands which shaped infrastructural apparatus of post-colonial state.  
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By examining the concept of Trusteeship System, the thesis underscores a 
tension between the aims and scopes of the international mandate and the modes and 
practices through which the process of democratisation was enhanced. Moreover, it 
is illustrated how the imposition of a Trusteeship System in Somalia Italiana affected 
the interaction between the trust power and the Somali demands by reducing the 
space of political action for Somali nationalists. As the System scheduled a clear and 
fixed programme of decolonisation towards independence, which was granted in 
1949 already, the range of political actions and possibilities for Somali nationalists 
came to be very limited. Due to the fact that the transfer of power was already 
scheduled and plans for self-government drafted, a dialectic interaction between 
AFIS and nationalists did not evolve properly. In fact, on the one hand AFIS backed 
by the UN became less susceptible to demands and requests from below, on the 
other, Somali nationalists were encapsulated within a very restricted political space 
which forced them to accept terms and conditions imposed by AFIS and wait for the 
termination of international administration. This circumstance affected the political 
line of political parties which began to engage in dialogue with AFIS and, as a result, 
increased the competition among different parties. 
Another aspect related to colonial legacy has been underscored by Mahmood 
Mamdani. His arguments suggest that colonial rule was exercised through a 
‘decentralised despotism’ which divided among urban and rural domains, civic and 
ethnic ties. In this way, it was established a ‘bifurcated state’ with dual governing 
bodies and tribally organised local authority and a distinct division between ‘tribal’ 
and ‘modern’, ‘subjects’ and ‘citizens’.
81
 As a result of the decolonisation process, 
colonial state and its structures were ‘deracialised’, marking transfer of powers from 
European colonial rulers to African leaders and politicians, but remained essentially 
‘tribal’ and thus embedded with despotic features of their predecessors. By inheriting 
colonial governing bodies and ruling systems, post-colonial states inherited a culture 
of dominion based on clear-cut divide between structures of power and mass of 
population. More recently, Paul Nugent made use of Mamdani’s theorization of 
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‘decentralised despotism’ to investigate how the process of decolonisation involved a 
multiple transfers of power - from colonial officials to African politicians, and from 
chiefs to elective leaders – indicating a tension between modernity and tradition 
proper of colonial rule and post-colonial state system.
82
 
In investigating the transfer of power in Somalia, the thesis underscores the 
existence of a similar tension between the modern goals of the trusteeship system, 
aiming at democratisation, and the methods adopted to achieve these goals which 
relied on traditional, or what was taken as traditional, social institutions. In 
particular, the aims and scopes of the trusteeship system and the process of state-
craft, investigated in chapter four, have been analysed by looking at the 
establishment of representative bodies, deliberative assemblies and electoral 
procedures. It will be illustrated how this process produced a state system based on a 
distorted model of nation-state which was, in fact, ambivalently embedded with 
modernist elements and outlooks and traditional practices and ties. 
Another important aspect of colonial legacy which is the subject of analysis 
in the thesis concerns the historical trajectory contributing to the failure of African 
states to perform their political and economic functions properly. From this 
perspective, Frederick Cooper elaborated the concept of the ‘gatekeeper state’ to 
indicate the post-colonial state system based on restrictive channels to control 
economic resources and characterised by politics of exclusion and of clientage for its 
control. As successors of the colonial states, post-colonial states derived their 
legitimacy from international recognition but lacked internal recognition and failed 
to extend their dominion inwards effectively. In this way, post-colonial states were 
created as ‘gates’ through which revenues from taxes, customs and foreign aid are 
collected and distributed. Since independence, post-colonial politics have been 
reduced to conflicts among economic and political competitors for accessing the 
resources controlled by the gatekeeper state.
83
 
As highlighted in chapter five and six of the thesis, the conflicts for 
controlling the state became a central theme of Somali politics after the introduction 
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of self-government in 1956. It illustrates how these conflicts expanded and included 
competitors from Somalia and Somaliland affecting the process of unification of the 
two. Furthermore, it is argued how politics of exclusion and clientage assumed a 
particular significance following the introduction of self-government when Somali-
led governments took direct control over domestic issues such as the appointment of 
Somalis to institutional posts, i.e., the ‘Somalisation’ of the state. In this way, 
political leadership was put in the exclusive position to decide who would be 
included to key posts before independence and when the process of state-craft was 
still evolving. Moreover, as the decolonisation plan put great emphasis on electoral 
procedures and elections, political leadership was forced to rely constantly to 
backing from electorate and, in order to secure this support, it resorted to politics of 
clientage and negotiation of key posts with members of the opposition. Affecting 
both state-building and national project, the process of ‘verticalisation’ of Somali 
political space reached a completion with the unification of Somalia and Somaliland 
in 1960. 
 
1.5 Defining nationalism 
A core theme examined by the thesis is the emergence and proliferation of modern 
nationalism
84
 and nationalist movements in Somalia in the 1940s. Scholarly debates 
over nations and nationalisms have produced a vast body of literature characterised 
by different schools of thought. However, it is possible to state that the term nation 
indicates a community consisting of individuals who share common cultural 
elements and feel to be one. In this sense, nationalism is a doctrine that legitimates 
the existence of nations.
 
This doctrine assumes that the world is divided into nations, 
that each person belongs to a nation or has a nationality, and that each nation has a 
proper past, a foreseeable future and a defined territory.
 85
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Commonly understood as a modern phenomenon that consolidated with the 
rise of the modern state and democracy,
86 
the notion of nationalism provides the basis 
for the concept of nation-state. The latter indicates a state –understood as Weber’s 
definition of ‘an agency within society which possesses the monopoly of legitimate 
violence’- which claims legitimate sovereignty over a nation. Therefore, within the 
context of a nation-state the physical borders of the nation are identical to the 
geographical borders over which the state exerts its legitimacy.
87
 
Benedict Anderson contends that the relations between nations and certain 
given sociological and cultural conditions –as language, ethnicity or religion- is not 
predetermined but subject to a ‘process of imagination’. In this sense, a certain 
community consisting of individuals who share common cultural elements is not 
necessarily a nation, but becomes a nation when these individuals resort to a process 
of imagination to create their vision of the nation.
88
 The process of imagination 
assumes a special important role in the formulation of nations because it represents 
time, modes and features through which cultural elements, as language, religion, 
history, are appropriated by a certain community who seeks to identify and 
distinguish itself. Accordingly, ‘attitudinal boundaries’ are created to differentiate an 
imagined community from others and to include and exclude its imagined 
members.
89
 This process represents the ways through which a certain community is 
kept together by a common sense of belonging and the reasons why its members, 
who do not know each other, feel or wish to be one. As a product of ‘cultural 
artefacts’, nation remains, Anderson maintains, essentially a ‘political imagined 
community’: 
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It is imagined because the members of the smallest nation will never know most 
of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of 
each lives the image of their communion.
90
 
In spite of the fact that process of national imagination is based on cultural 
elements, nations and nationalisms are intrinsically embedded with political 
aspirations and purposes.  In fact, some scholars have argued that nationalism, as a 
political principle, emerges only within a state context either as a reaction to the state 
or to the forms in which the state operates.
91
 As Hall posits it, the nationalist 
sentiment arises when people who feel they belong to the same nation believe that its 
national principle has been neglected.
92
 On a similar note, Breuilly suggests that 
nationalist organisations can be understood as ‘political movements seeking or 
exercising state power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments.’
93
 These 
organisations pursued at constructing an imagined nation with fixed boundaries, 
scopes and aims within which promoting horizontal-wise message of common 
belonging. As Anderson posits it: 
[…]regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, 
the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is 
this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many 




Formulations of nationalism have been criticised due to their Eurocentric 
approaches and for having provided a theoretical framework based on Western 
models and, thus, inadequate to the study of African and Asian nationalisms. With a 
specific regard to Anderson’s theory of imagined communities, Partha Chatterjee 
convincingly argues that the theorisation of the process of imagination is limited 
because it is based on institutionalised patterns made available from the West. 
Although providing important insights on the mechanisms of imagination, using 
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these patterns in order to understand the development of nationalism in the former 
colonies compromises the whole process of imagination. In fact, in this way, rather 
than being a process of imagination, African and Asian nationalism is reduced to a 
the process of imitation of imported models from the West. As Chatterjee puts it: 
If nationalisms in the rest of the world have to choose their imagined community 
from certain “modular” forms already made available to them by Europe and the 
Americas, what do they have left to imagine?
95
 
Conversely, Partha Chatterjee contends that in order to understand the 
features of nationalisms in colonial Africa and Asia, one needs to explore a duality of 
domains: a spiritual or ‘inner’ domain, and an official or ‘outer’ domain. In the 
‘inner’ domain, nationalism imagines, preserves and reforms its own cultural identity 
whose components can be for example language, family or religion. This domain is 
created before national movements engaged directly with the colonial rule. In fact, 
colonial intervention in the ‘inner’ domain is resisted systematically.
96
 The ‘outer’ 
domain is instead the domain of the colonial state. At this level, nationalist 
movements and elites engage directly with the colonial rule within its 
institutionalised framework. Once nationalists assimilate these models, they are 
ready and well-equipped to challenge colonial rule in its own domain. At this stage, 
the confrontation between nationalist elites and colonial rule marks the formal 
relinquishment of colonial empires and the transfer of power from colonial authority 
to nationalists, and the independence of colonies. 
The formal end of colonial empires and the rise of independent (nation)states 
represents a moment of tension between and within the duality of nationalism.
97
 
Following the transfer of power, nationalism is trapped in an uneasy relationship 
between its ‘inner domain’ and state domain inherited from colonial rule. This 
inherited domain, made of legislations, governing bodies, bureaucracies, comes at 
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odds with the distinctiveness of ‘inner’ domain. Chatterjee considers this conflicts 
detrimental to post-colonial nationalism: ‘Here lies the root of our postcolonial 
misery’, he contents, ‘not in our inability to think out new forms of the modern 
community but in our surrender to the old forms of the modern state’.
98
 
The thesis approaches the issue of Somali nationalism by exploring the 
emergence of modern national movements in the post-war period. In response to the 
power vacuum within the domain of colonial rule following the Italian defeat in 
1941, a powerful movement from below (re)imagined new forms and patterns of the 
Somali nation. By focusing on the activities of the Somali Youth League,
99
 perhaps 
the most important nationalist organisation of the time, the thesis shows how the 
League appropriated and transformed cultural elements, such as language and 
religion, with the aim to (re)imagine a national project which worked beyond the 
domain of colonial rule. In response to the challenges posited by the war-time, the 
national formulation of the League promoted the construction of a new egalitarian 
and united society, enhanced the use of Somali language and Somali-made economic 
initiatives.   
By looking at the imposition and development of a decolonisation 
programme, the thesis investigates the moment in which the newly (re)imagined 
Somali nation had to engage directly with the outer domain of former colonial rule. 
As it will be illustrated, this shift was imposed by the UN which urged Somali 
communities to organise politically and to express their preferences on the future of 
the colonial domain. At this point, Somali nationalists moved their attention to a 
direct confrontation of former colonial rule within its own sphere. The consequences 
of the enforcement of political competition within the outer domain are illustrated in 
chapter three providing the analysis for the radicalisation and politicisation of 
groups’ interests. The dialogue between former colonial domain and nationalists is 
developed further in chapter four which deals with the process of constructing the 
post-colonial state in Somalia. Here, the tension between the hegemonic plan of 
                                               
98 Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments, p. 11. 
99 The organisation was also known as Lega dei Giovani Somali in Italian, and abbreviated as either 
SYL or LGS. As the term ‘league’ was adopted by a few organisations in the area and in order to 
avoid confusion, the thesis generally refers to the organisation by using its full name. 
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colonial rule and the attempts to appropriate state institutions by nationalists is 
shown to be a key moment for shaping and transforming the national project itself.  
In investigating the historical trajectory leading towards independence, the 
thesis underscores a tension between the features of Somali nation imagined in the 
1940s and the institutional structures established as framework of the independent 
state. From this perspective, one of the key claims of the thesis is that the imposition 
of a fixed programme of democratisation via international mandate modified the 
characters and features of nationalism. In order to express this tension, the thesis 
adopts Ernest Gellner’s narrative of horizontal/lateral social stratification within 
agrarian society.
100
 According to Gellner, agrarian social structure is characterised by 
a rigid stratification, supported by an ideological apparatus, which divides between a 
tiny ruling minority and the peasants majority. This system is further stratified by 
sub-layers which are represented by sub-categories, such as warriors, priests etc.
101
 
The whole social structure is based on cultural differentiations and cleavages which 
work horizontally keeping each strata separated from each other.
102
 Conversely, the 
use of a similar narrative in this research has a different significance. Specifically, it 
aims at addressing the contrast between the horizontal, inclusive character of the 
Somali nation imagined in the 1940s and the vertical, exclusive ties introduced by 
the crafting of institutional framework in the 1950s. Moreover, the usage of a 
vertical/horizontal narrative is useful to underscore the effects of the process of state-
craft on the space for local political action which is a matter of discussion in the last 
two chapters of the thesis. In particular, chapter five discusses the consequences of 
the imposition of institutional framework on the development of ‘everyday’ politics. 
Chapter six turns the discussion on the effects on the process of unification of 
Somalia and Somaliland 
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1.6 Methodological choice 
The thesis is based on a methodology that combines both archival sources and oral 
materials. The data have been collected through research at British and Italian 
archives, and during a 3-month fieldwork in Somaliland which included a research-
trip to Djibouti. To be more precise, British sources were collected at the National 
Archives in London among the Colonial, Foreign and War Office collection. I also 
investigated personal documents of former colonial officials at the Rhodes House in 
Oxford. Italian colonial sources were accessed at the Archivio di Stato, Archivio 
Storico e Diplomatico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Archivio dell’Ufficio Storico 
dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito Italiano in Rome. Additional data has drawn upon 
fieldwork notes taken during my stay in Somaliland and Djibouti, or gathered 
through more informal conversation with members of Somali diasporas in Italy and 
the United Kingdom. The following section discusses specific questions concerning 
the use of archival sources and the collection of oral memories.  
 
1.6.1 Archival sources 
Most of the primary sources in use for this research have been collected at British 
and Italian archival collections. The nature of these collections is very fragmentary 
due to the war developments and change of regime.
103
 In order to overcome these 
limits, the thesis relied on a broad range of sources, especially as far as the period 
under BMA is concerned. The collections produced by the War Office and in part by 
the Foreign Office proved to be rich in material related to the development of local 
politics. These documents include monthly and yearly reports drafted by the Chief 
Administration in Mogadishu, discussions on British administrative policy, relations 
with the Italians, intelligence summaries. In particular, the thesis made use of a 
dossier drafted by the Colonial Office in 1947 which gathered information on the 
political organisations of the Somali-speaking regions. This dossier included parties’ 
manifestos, logos, regulations, and data on membership. Additionally, the thesis 
explored documents produced by the UN Commission of Inquiry, published in 1948 
                                               
103 The fragmentary nature of colonial sources is discussed in the next section. 
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and collected among the archival collection of the Foreign Office, which provided 
useful information on features of Somali nationalist parties in the 1940s. The thesis 
made extensive use of sources gathered at the Archivio Storico e Diplomatico degli 
Affari Esteri, especially of the AFIS collection. Despite being extremely fragmented 
and lacking a catalogue, this collection proved to be extremely useful. For instance, it 
included minutes of parliamentary discussions of the Somali-led governments which 
provided insights on the ‘everyday’ politics illustrated in chapter five. The 
newspaper, Il Corriere della Somalia, printed in Mogadishu in the 1950s has been 
widely used in this research. By 1956, the Corriere came to be controlled by the 
Somali-led governments becoming the main organ of political propaganda. The 
newspaper published regularly letters from the public constituting a space, although 
limited, of interaction between the readers and political leadership. It is important to 
note that, being the period under investigation extremely under-explored, archival 
sources in use in this research have been mainly unpublished.  
All the sources collected at the British archives are written in English and, 
when quoted, reported as such. Conversely, I have translated all the quotes taken 
from Italian archival collections, the Corriere, Italian magazines and newspaper, 
primary sources produced by the Italian government, and by the Italian 
administration in Somalia, and secondary sources produced in Italian. Due to the 
sketchy and fragmented nature of archival collections, the reference numbers of 
several documents (especially the ones gathered at the Italian archives) are missing. 
The official script of the Somali language was created in 1972. For this reason, 
names of Somali politicians are reported as found in the sources. Names of places 
and localities are instead written according to the Somali spelling, with the only 
exception being the name of Somalia’s capital Mogadishu for which it is used the 
English spelling.
104
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1.6.2 On the use of oral memories 
Defined as the ‘chain of transmission’ that links the past with present,
105
 oral 
tradition became an important tools for collecting evidence of the African past  
starting from the 1970s.
106
 Soon, this historiographic trend consolidated among 
Africanists working on all regions. For instance, in the Horn of Africa, the works of 
Irma Taddia on Eritrean memories of Italian colonial occupation brought significant 
contribution to the topic.
107
 Scholars of Somali studies have relied extensively on 
oral history to investigate issues related to Somali society, history, culture and 
politics. Noticeably, Lee Cassanelli, Virginia Luling, Ken Menkhaus explored issues 
related to the social history of southern communities; Ioan Lewis extensively 
published on the social structure of Somali clans; Francesca Declich and Catherine 
Besteman on ethnic minorities.
108
 Conventionally, Somali oral tradition is important 
due to the central role played by poetry into the society and by special importance 
given to the act of memorising.
109
 This has also been facilitated by the fact that 
Somali communities speak idioms that are very similar to each other.
110
 In fact and in 
spite of the regional variants, a common dialect, to which linguistics referred to as 
‘Common Somali’, is easily understood throughout the Somali-speaking regions 
functioning as a sort of lingua franca.
111
 Transmitted ‘from mouth to mouth’ all 
around Somali peninsula,
112
 oral tradition has functioned as tool for mass 
                                               
105 See Joseph C. Miller, ‘Listening to the Africa Past’, in Joseph C. Miller (ed.), The African Past 
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107 Irma Taddia, Autobiografie Africane: Il Colonialismo nelle Memorie Orali, (Milan: Franco Angeli, 
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It is worthwhile to note that the importance of oral tradition in Somali society 
did not fade away with colonial occupation nor with the crafting of the independent 
state. In fact and in spite of several attempts to formulate a script version of the 
Somali in the 1950s and 1960s, it was in 1972 only that a Somali alphabet was 
completed and only in 1973-5 that literacy mass campaigns were launched in the 
regions.
114
 Since then, oral tradition and orality broadly-speaking represented the 
main vehicle for sharing information. As Cassanelli argues, oral tradition does not 
simply carry fragments of the past but represents a product of shared experiences, 
‘the product of beliefs about the past and of beliefs about the relationship of the 
present to the past’, a series of relationship between history, tradition and beliefs.
115
 
Drawing from these methodological approaches, this research relied on the 
use of oral memories which have been collected during a three-month fieldwork in 
Somaliland, including a short-trip to Djibouti, and among Somali diasporas in the 
UK, especially in London, and in Italy, especially in Turin and Rome. Thirty 
interviews have been conducted based on an in-depth, semi-structured format most 
of which have been used in the thesis. In order to gather a grasp of everyday life 
experiences, ten interviews have been conducted with politicians or family members 
of Somali politicians and the rest with ‘ordinary’ Somalis.  
The interviews comprise of a first part in which my research interests, aims 
and scopes were explained. A second section in which the interviewees were asked 
to narrate their own personal histories which very often entailed stories of growing 
up during the late colonial period. In the final section, I would pose more precise 
questions on nationalist activities, movements and leaders. Most of the time, my 
                                               
113 Samatar, Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism, p. 3. 
114 On the formulation of the Somali script and literacy campaigns see S. Lingappa, ‘Education and 
Socio-Economic Environment: Recent Developments in Somalia’, Reports and studies (UNESCO 
Document), 44 (1977); Ali A. Warsame, ‘How a Strong Government Backed an African Language: 
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115 Cassanelli, The Shaping of Somali Society, p. 7; for further comments on the use of Somali oral 
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knowledge of the topic would make a positive impression on the interviewees who 
became more passionate about the topic and enjoyed the discussion on well-known 
events and characters of the ‘nationalist days’. Finally, I would ask them whether 
they remembered the day of independence and unification. Although this memory 
led to different reactions, all interviewees remembered or claimed to remember, 
those days. Some broke into tears under the burden of engendered emotions other 
recited by heart the Somali song of the independence. 
Most of the interviews have been carried out in English or Italian and I have 
translated the latter. Seven interviews have been carried out in Somali and I have 
relied on a research assistant for the translations. Before addressing issues related to 
the data collection, it is important to discuss peculiar biases which characterised 
some oral memories. 
 
1.6.3 Somali contested past: further issues on the use of oral 
memories 
The use of oral tradition to reconstruct the historical past requires some critical 
evaluations. The process of oral transmission is subject to the biases of both tellers 
and listeners. The chain of transmission gets necessarily modified throughout the 
time as within the process of narrating, listening, remembering and re-narrating the 
past, each individual chooses what to include and what to exclude from the narration. 
Further problems arise when oral tradition gets modified due to contemporary issues 
and disputes. The recent developments of Somali political history, especially the end 
of the union between Somalia and Somaliland in 1991 and the latter’s demand for 
international recognition, created a public space of contested national memory that 
makes the evaluation of oral memory more problematic.  
The traumatic and violent end of the union caused the emergence of different, 
conflicting, historical narratives that  often pursue political goals. For instance, 
Somaliland’s 20-year long quest for international recognition contributed to establish 
a narrative that attempts to legitimate Somaliland’s independence by stressing 
cultural, historical, social differences between Somaliland and Somalia and so by re-
imagining a political discourse in which Somaliland stands separated from the other 
Somali-speaking regions. Although arguably legitimate, this trend can be very 
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problematic as it led recently to the promotion and revival of Somaliland’s colonial 
past by institutional bodies in opposition to Somalia’s colonial past.
116
 For instance, 
on the occasion of the visit of a British delegation to Somaliland in 2004, images of 
the British Queen were distributed in the streets of Hargeysa.
117
  Moreover, in the 
1990s, a delegation of former British colonial officials were officially invited to 
Somaliland by the then President Mohamed Ibrahim Egal.
118
 The anniversary of 
Somaliland’s independence which occurred five days before Somalia, is also 
revived.
119
 It is likely that as long as Somaliland will not be granted recognition, this 
discourse would keep on playing a considerable role in Somali issues.  
This kind of narrative can influence scholarly research. In particular, the 
studies concerned with Somali political history are susceptible to be forged by biased 
narratives and, as a consequence, to weigh into contemporary political disputes.  This 
can of course be problematic, especially when the disputes involve donors and aid 
agencies. For instance, there is a tendency among scholars and aid donors to be 
overoptimistic when discussing the performances of the Somaliland Government. 
Mark Bradbury’s recent book on the history and formation of the Republic of 
Somaliland, although a valid contribution to the topic, has been influenced by this 
trend and his narrative appears sometime apologetic on the collusion between 
Somaliland government and the previous regime.
120
 As a result, certain issues such 
as the reluctance of President Riyale to relinquish the power, the unmotivated and 
reiterated postponement of the elections, the violent repression of opposition, has 
been overlooked by aid donors, media and scholars.
121
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 The name ‘Somaliland’ is itself a colonial invention. 
117 Hoehne, ‘Political Identity,’ p. 403. 
118 Interview with Anthony Scawin, 4th December 2008, Wadebridge. Scawin was a former District 
Commissioner in Somaliland and member of the UK delegation to Somaliland . See also the narrative 
adopted in: John Drysdale ‘Reflections 1943-63’, in Hoehne, Luling (eds.), Milk and Peace. 
119 The 2010 elections were held on 26th June, the 50th anniversary of Somaliland’s independence from 
the British. The date 26th June holds a great symbolic value in Somaliland especially with regard to 
the issue of international recognition as Somaliland became independent five days before Somalia. 
Fieldwork notes, Hargeysa, August 2009.  
120 Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland. 
121 Due in September 2009, after having already been postponed twice, the elections were called off 
by the government, the Parliament was shut down and the police repressed the people’s demo by 
killing at least three. For a series of circumstances, I was in the middle of the riots on 14th September 
2009, the last Friday of the Ramadan. The first presidential elections were scheduled for April 2008 
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In constructing a valid methodology for this research, the combination of oral 
and archival sources was necessary to counter-balance the different biases.
 122
 On the 
one hand, colonial sources were used to check the validity and accurateness of oral 
tradition. On the other, oral memories have been used to explore issues, such as 
Somali agencies in the formation of nationalist movements and everyday life 
personal experiences, that are usually omitted from colonial sources.   
  
1.7 Practical problems of the data collection  
In collecting primary sources for the research, practical problems arose during the 
data collection, in particular related to poor and limited access to materials at Italian 
Ministerial archives and to conducting fieldwork in Somaliland.  
 
1.7.1 ‘A matter of faith’: collecting documents at Italian 
Ministerial Archives 
The archives in which I conducted research have different access rules and facilities. 
The National Archives in London is perhaps the most well-organised and easy-to 
access. Similarly, the Rhodes House in Oxford provides good facilities for 
                                                                                                                                     
and later postponed for September 2009. As soon as I arrived in June 2009, it became readily apparent 
that the Somaliland Government had no intention to hold the elections. In August 2009, the ruling 
party decided to postpone the election using as a pretext the difficulty in completing the registration 
rolls. In the same occasion, the international organisation in charge of completing the electoral 
registers was blamed for the situation and two international agents, holding American citizenship, 
were literally taken from their hotel rooms in the morning and kicked out of the country. The 
opposition party, led by Sylahno who is today in power in Somaliland, organised a series of 
demonstration against the regime that were well-attended by political supporters. Rumours began to 
circulate that the ruling party was willing to rely on force to stop the demonstrations. Two days before 
the riots the political situation deteriorated. After an incident in the Parliament in which, it was said, a 
MP wave a pistol gun up in the air during the parliamentary session, the Somaliland president Rihyale 
decided to close down the Parliament. As a reaction, the opposition party organised another 
demonstration outside the parliament on Friday. Early in the morning, the police began to open fire in 
the air to push the crowd away from the parliamentary premises. The crowd constituted by hundreds 
of supporters took their protest down to the town centre. There, the police kept on shooting but, this 
time, it targeted some of the protesters who, in their turn, set a few cars on fire. The streets of the 
down town of Hargeysa were soon turned into warfare and the police kept on shooting for hours. 
Calm was restored only in the afternoon leaving at the least three political supporters shot dead by the 
police and tens injurers. The figures were never confirmed by the regime, neither by the international 
media that did not report any news of the riots. Most of the international personnel working for NGOs 
and UN agencies was eventually evacuated in the next few days. Fieldwork notes, Hargeysa, 12th, 13th 
and 14th September, 2009. 
122 Alagoa, ‘Oral tradition’, p. 10. 
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researchers. Differently, accessibility, facilities and availability of Italian archival 
documents are limited due to a fragmented documental collection of the wartime, 
restrictions to research facilities and a poor maintenance of the collections. 
Sometimes, I was told that the materials I was looking for was missing; other times, 
that it could not be found; other that it could not be reached. Once, when handing the 
request for a certain file, I was simply told to ‘have faith’.  
Due to the impact of the War, the collections of Italian Ministerial archives 
were damaged and several collection dispersed. In spite of a few attempts to restore 
the collections in the 1950s, colonial sources remained very fragmented. In the Horn 
of Africa, following the Italian defeat, several documents went lost or were 
deliberately destroyed by the Italians before the British occupation and other 
documents were misplaced or misused by the Allied. As an occupying military 
administration, the BMA was run on limited economic resources and paper to be 
used for official purposes was rare in Mogadishu. For this reason, Italian and British 
documents, believed to be of secondary importance, were recycled and reused for 
printing other documents. Hence, it is not unusual to find documents produced on 
recycled papers.  
The overall result is that archival sources of the time are very limited. For 
instance, the collection of Italian colonial sources kept at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in Rome for the period from the late 1930s to 1950 is fragmented: for the 
case of Somalia it has be argued that the Italian documents that had not been 
destroyed or moved somehow by the Italians before the British occupation, were 
eventually shipped by the British somewhere else.
123
 By contrast, the amount of 
British sources is slightly more conspicuous. In particular, the collection of the War 
Office, in charge of the administration of Somalia, offers a useful although very 
scanty picture of the time.
124
 
Physical access to Italian Ministerial archives is subject to special permission 
to be granted by the competent authorities. Although granted to anyone, the 
                                               
123 A discussion of Italian colonial sources is in Hess, Italian Colonialism, pp. 214-15. 
124 Similar problems have been discussed by Cedric Barnes. Barnes, ‘The Somali Youth League’, p. 
288. 
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procedures take a few weeks, if not months, to be processed. Moreover, the access to 
archival sources is constrained by a rather limited opening hours (mornings only, five 
days a week), limited places, and seasonal closures (besides the festivities, the 
archives remain closed for about a month during the summer). For this reason, 
booking a place in the consultation room needs to be planned long in advance, once 
permission has been granted. In particular, consultation of the collection at the Army 




Besides the practical constrains discussed above, more problems arose with 
regards to the consultation of sources. On a few occasions, consultation was not 
possible due to the lack of filed documents. In particular, this was the case of the 
archival collections of the Italian trusteeship (AFIS) in Somalia. In all the three 
ministerial archives consulted, the AFIS collections are mostly unfiled, randomly 
catalogued and poorly kept. At Archivio di Stato the collection on Somalia has not 
been fully catalogued and the one on AFIS not filed at all. The materials available 
are often randomly gathered in un-named folders. At the Archivio dell’Ufficio 
Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito Italiano the cataloguing of the AFIS 
collection is still in progress. While there, I explained my research to the archivists 
and was granted special permission to scrutinise some files related to AFIS. 
However, as the military officer in charge of the archive (the one who granted access 
to the materials) went on-leave soon after, I could not access the AFIS collection. I 
collected most of the archival materials at the Archivio Storico e Diplomatico del 
Ministero degli Affari Esteri. The collection on Somalia suffers from bad 
cataloguing. It is likely to find files that do not contain the folders indicated in the 
catalogue, or that comprise unnamed folders. The AFIS collection, in particular, is 
kept very poorly: the catalogue is uncompleted, the documents have been lying in the 
storage  rooms for decades, not properly stored, subject to the usage of time. I had 
enjoyed some special permission to view some of the AFIS collection in 2008 only. 
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Later in 2009 such permission was, for some reason, declined. When I complained 
about the circumstance, I was told in response that I had been ‘lucky’ once already. 
The sources consulted in the AFIS collection are of great value. However, 
they display considerable gaps: the sources are fragmented, often undated, kept in 
generic files (e.g. ‘Affari Politici’ literally ‘political affairs’), undated, and for the 
great part untitled. For instance, the thesis makes use of two files especially in which 
I found an array of documents of diverse nature. Conversely, other files did not 
contain what they were supposed to. Others were simply not found. The collection of 
the newspaper Il Corriere della Somalia is really incomplete. Moreover, the 
newspaper is kept very badly and when browsing the issues, the paper falls into 
pieces. Luckily, I had the possibility to consult the entire collection of the newspaper 
owned by professor Puglielli who purchased it at Porta Portese, a popular flea-
market in Rome a few years ago. The thesis relied on the consultation of rare books 
and official publications consulted at the Istituto Italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente 
(ISIAO). I had the opportunity to consult this collection before the ISIAO was forced 
to close down due to recent state-cuts.  
 
1.7.2 On fieldwork in Somaliland  
Conducting research fieldwork in Somaliland did not come without a few limitations. 
Originally, fieldwork for this research was planned for the spring 2009 due to the 
presidential elections on April 2009 which were later postponed. Unfortunately, a 
series of suicidal attacks at the Ethiopian Office and UN agencies in October 2008 in 
Hargeysa caused a postponement of the fieldwork. After the attacks, it became very 
difficult for independent researchers to travel to Somaliland since the regular air-
flight service run by the Ethiopian Airlines was interrupted. UN-run flights had 
regular service from Kenya to Somalia and Somaliland but they did not allow 
independent researchers to travel on board. For this reason, I travelled on board of a 
Somali-run flying company, Diallo Airlines, which flew regularly from Djibouti to 
Hargeysa, Mogadishu and other Somali cities. Lucky, I could fly to Somaliland in 
June 2009 and return in September 2009 before the company declared bankruptcy 
and shut down in 2010.  
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As the Republic of Somaliland is not officially recognised by the 
international community, different kinds of problems arose with issues concerning 
visas. Permits to stay are issued in London and Addis Ababa only. In Somaliland, 
there are no international representations, as consulates and diplomatic bodies, and 
this constitutes a further problem for independent researchers who are strongly 
advised to work in association with non-governmental organisations. Nevertheless, I 
have been able to travel and stay as an independent research.  
Following the terrorist attacks in 2008, the government of Somaliland 
imposed a series of limitations on independent researchers. Actually, since 
independent researchers were very few (I had not met any during my stay) I was told 
to follow the rules imposed on expatriates working for international agencies. First, 
expatriates were not allow to live independently or in private houses but had to stay 
either in hotels or pensions. This was due to security reasons that, nevertheless, made 
fieldwork very expensive. Second, a curfew was imposed at 6 pm after that 
expatriates were expected to remain indoors or to go out escorted by police officers. 
Third, moving around Hargeysa was also complicated as walking around the city was 
considered relatively dangerous. For this reason, expatriates were not allowed to use 
public transport but expected to rely on their own transports. Following the election 
of new government in June 2010, undertaking research in Somaliland is easier and 
attracting numerous researchers.  
 
1.8 Thesis outline 
The thesis is divided in six chapters and conclusion. The first is an introduction to the 
research problematic, as well as a discussion of the core themes of the thesis; it 
provides a review of the main historiographic trends in Somali studies, a rationale of 
the methodological approach and problems related to the collection of data. Chapter 
two explores the emergence of modern Somali nationalism by focusing on the 
Somali Youth League, the foremost political organisation at the time. In order to 
achieve a broader understanding of the aims, scopes and structures of the party, the 
chapter analyses the major trends and transformations that occurred in Mogadishu 
which constituted the framework in which the League was founded and operated. It 
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explores the main features of the horizontal national message (re)imagined by the 
League 
Chapter three analyses the effects of the extension of the British military 
occupation and the protraction of the UN debate in Somalia. In particular, the chapter 
investigates how the UN decision to send a special commission of investigation to 
survey local aspirations caused the enforcement of political competition between 
different groups. It is argued that within a context of organisational vacuum, the UN 
decision had the unforeseeable consequence to advantage the Italian community 
which possessed access to means of propaganda and financial support from the 
Italian government. An important issue addressed by the chapter is the question of 
Somali consent to former Italian rule. The chapter shows how consent to Italy was 
constructed through mustering dissent to the BMA. Finally, the chapter discusses the 
strategies adopted by the Italian government to construct some local backing which 
caused an increase of political divide.  
Chapter four explores the institutional patterns and structures that were 
established during the international mandate in Somalia. It highlights the ways in 
which these patterns contrasted with the features of the nationalism emerging in the 
1940s. It illustrates how the fixed terms and conditions imposed by the UN reduced 
the space for compromises and interactions between the trustee power and the 
demands coming from the communities under trusteeship. 
The last two chapters of the thesis are devoted to investigate the ways in 
which the structural framework imposed by the international trusteeship shaped the 
local political space. In particular, chapter five explores the phase of self-government 
during which two Somali-led national assemblies were elected. It is argued that the 
period coincided with the consolidation of the One-Party state system and the 
proliferation of ‘spoils politics’ in the trust territory. Chapter six looks at the ways in 
which the restricted political space being crafted during AFIS came to affect the 
process of unification of Somalia and Somaliland. It argues that the unification of the 
two regions needs to be understood within the context of insecurity over the borders, 
and in particular the late colonial adjustment of the Ogaden and Haud RA and the 
missed partition of the Ethiopian-Somali southern border. Moreover, the chapter 
contends that the plans for social, economic and political developments drafted in 
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Somalia Italiana contributed to increase attention over the trust territories from 
within the Somali-speaking regions. In this sense, the chapter shows that the 
unification of Somalia and Somaliland resulted in the extension of competition over 
the state and its structures of power. Finally, the chapter illustrates how the 
‘verticalisation’ of political space reached a culmination with the appropriation and 
manipulation of the collective project of Greater Somalia by the political leadership.    
In the conclusion, the thesis makes an attempt to assess the extent to which 
the imposition of the international trusteeship of the UN affected the development of 
national politics in Somalia. It discusses the major conclusions drawn from the thesis 
and their significance to broader debates in African and Somali studies.   
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Chapter 2:  ‘All the Somalis are equal and 
brothers’: The Somali Youth League, the 
promotion of horizontal nationalism and the 




Modern Somali nationalism has its origins in the impacts of and responses to the 
Second World War. Most notably, the establishment of the British Military 
Administration (BMA) in 1941 and the adoption of partially liberal policies that 
allowed freedom of association was met by the emergence of a series of socio-
political organisations and activities. Nationalist aspirations were raised by the 
possibility of self-government and independence following the expansionist policies 
of the Italians that led to the temporary unification of most of Somali-speaking 
regions, the preservation of these territorial settings during the BMA, and the 
development of an international debate, led by the UN on the administrative future of 
former Italian colonies. This chapter investigates the emergence of modern 
nationalism focusing on the Somali Youth League which is conventionally 
considered the most important nationalist party of the time. Founded in Mogadishu in 
1943 as a socially-oriented association, by 1946 the League became the foremost 
promoter of the national project of greater Somalia – i.e. the unification of i.e. the 
unification of Somalia Italiana, British Somaliland, Côte Française des Somalis, the 
Ogaden, the Haud and Reserved Areas (RA) and the Northern Frontier District of 
Kenya – managing to amass supporters across the Somali-speaking regions.
1
   
Despite the key role played by the party in post-war nationalist politics, very 
little is known about the ‘initial organisation spur’
2
 of the League and the ways in 
which, as a response to a change of regime, a powerful movement from below 
                                               
1 For general reference see Lewis, A Modern History, chapter 6.  
2 The initial spur is ‘the developmental phase… [in which parties] were more exciting, more 
enthusiastic, more bustling with activity’. Aristide R. Zolberg, Creating Political Order: The Party-
States in West Africa, (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1966), p. 34.   
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(re)imagined the Somali nation, appropriated certain cultural elements, and ideated 
new means for promoting the national agenda.
3
 This chapter attempts to reconstruct 
the features and characteristics of the nation imagined in the post-war period by 
providing more historically informed insights on factors and activities that 
characterised the formative years of the League. By relating the changing features 
and circumstances of the 1940s Mogadishu, the chapter argues that the 
characteristics of the League were shaped by the urban context in which it emerged 
and first operated. Moreover, by investigating the interrelations between the 
League’s agenda and the urban social and cultural environment, the chapter sheds 
light on the historical context in which the politics of nationalism and the process of 
decolonisation intertwined. Such investigation is important for understanding the 
kind of nation that was imagined in the 1940s and how it came to terms with the 
process of state-building imposed by trusteeship system of the United Nations in 
1950. 
First, the chapter explores the major transformations that occurred in 
Mogadishu in the 1940s, in particular looking at migratory trends, process of 
urbanisation and socioeconomic activities that proliferated during the BMA. It argues 
that these transformation promoted forms of solidarity and cooperation which shaped 
the features, aims and political line of the League. Second, the chapter deals with the 
composition, aims, policies and structures of the League arguing that through the 
articulation of a well-defined horizontal structure the League attempted to promote 
forms of solidarity and cooperation among Somali communities. Finally, the chapter 
discusses the support and popularity of the League and the project of Greater 
Somalia.  
 
                                               
3 Recently, lacunas concerning pre-independence Somali politics have begun to be addressed by 
researching oral tradition. See Cedric Barnes, ‘The Somali Youth League’; Cedric Barnes, ‘Gubo- 
Ogaadeen poetry and the aftermath of the Dervish wars’, in Cedric Barnes and Tim Carmichael (eds.), 
‘Language, Power and Society in North East Africa’, Journal of African Cultural Studies, 18:1 
(2006); Cedric Barnes, ‘The Political Economy of Somali Nationalism in Eastern Ethiopia circa 1941-
48’, in Kusow (ed.), Putting the Cart; Lidwien Kapteijns, ‘Discourse on Moral Womanhood in Somali 
Popular Songs, 1960-1990’, The Journal of African History, 50(2009); Mohamed Haji Mukthar, ‘The 
Emergence and Role of Political Parties in the Inter-River Regions of Somalia from 1947 to 1960’, 
Ufahamu, 17:2 (1989). 
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2.2 Socioeconomic transformations in 1940s 
Mogadishu  
The development of African nationalist movements was intertwined with the 
socioeconomic transformations of several African cities. Starting during the wartime, 
a series of migratory trends and an increasing process of urbanisation were 
significant. This included the expansion of urban areas, particularly through the 
settlements of migrants on a permanent basis which changed the urban environment 
dramatically. This led to the emergence of new patterns of social aggregation that 
were based on a sense of common belonging to the city. In 1956 when these 
processes were evolving, Thomas Hodgkin analysed the emergence of nationalist 
movements and noted how the urban contexts in which they operated ‘generate[d] a 
social life of their own’.
4
 In many ways, this sense of belonging was unique because 
it created new patterns of social aggregations that centred on the urban context 
without erasing or replacing old links.
5
  This evolving urban environment and new 
patterns of social aggregation contributed to the development of nationalisms by 
providing inspiration for the formulation of their political agenda. As summarised by 
Freund, it was in the cities that African men and women elaborated the tools for 
(re)imagining their national identities.
6
 This section discusses the development of 
such trends in the 1940s Mogadishu where the Somali Youth League was founded 
and operated first. 
Similar to many African cities, the population in Mogadishu, or Moqdisho,
7
 
the largest Somali town, increased considerably during wartime. The conflicts, the 
defeat of the Italians, and the establishment of a provisional BMA caused both 
migrations of job-seekers and movements of soldiers and Italian civilians. As shown 
                                               
4 Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa, (London: Frederick Muller,1956), p. 75. 
5 As noted by Wolpe for the case of Port Harcourt, this circumstance assumed a particular significance 
since the processes of urbanisation and expansion of the city did not abolish old identities but 
established a new range of identities that worked according to different social stratifications. Howard 
Wolpe, Urban Politics in Nigeria: A Study of Port Harcourt, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University 
of Californai Press, 1975), pp. 68-9 .  
6 Bill Freund, The African city: An History, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), chapter 
3. 
7 As many localities in Somalia, Mogadishu has different spellings: Mogadishu in English, Moqdisho 
in Somali, Mogadiscio in Italian; and an Arabic spelling too.  
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in table 2.1, these trends started in the 1930s following Italian imperialist plans to 
attack Ethiopia: the increase of military personnel was paralleled by an 
unprecedented number of Somali job-seekers who moved to Mogadishu attracted by 
occupational opportunities on offer at the time, as, for example, driving jobs 
opportunities. As a result, the population of Mogadishu rose exponentially rising 
from 30,000 in 1933 to 72,000 in 1939. This population growth changed the ethnic 
composition of the city. A colonial census of the urban population undertaken in 
1924, which did not include the Italians, indicated that the urban dwellers were 
formed by 14,000 Somalis (8,825 locals and 5,116 immigrants from northern 
regions), 2,410 Arab/Yemeni, circa 2,000 soldiers and their relatives and 200 
between Indians and Ethiopians. In 1930 the population of Mogadishu was estimated 
to be divided into three major groups of Arab/Yemeni, Italian and Somali 
communities, and in 1939 the estimated 72,000 inhabitants were composed of an 
increasing number of Somali migrants and new dwellers.
8
  
Mogadishu Population Growth 1924-1965 
1924 estimate 20,000 
1930  ‘‘ 30,000 
1936  ‘‘ 70,000 
1941  ‘‘ 72,000 
1944  ‘‘ 72,000 
1947  ‘‘ 73,000 
1950  ‘‘ 55,000 
1953  ‘‘ 63,000 
1956  ‘‘ 75,000 
1959  ‘‘ 104,332 
1962  ‘‘ 116,222 
1965 census 171,312 
Table 2.1 Compiled from Puzo, ‘Mogadishu, Somalia’, chapters 4, 6. 
                                               
8 William D. Puzo, ‘Mogadishu, Somalia: Geographic Aspects of its Evolution, Population, Functions 
and Morphology’, (University of California, Los Angeles, Ph.D. thesis, 1972), chapter 4. As noted by 
Puzo, this data is not accurate. The 1924 census in fact did not consider that only 68 per cent of the 
total population was constituted by permanent residents. 
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During the 1940s, these trends continued to be intense but assumed different 
features. On the one hand, the defeat of the Italians and the establishment of the 
BMA pushed more job-seekers and previous employees of the colonial 
administration and army to move to Mogadishu.
9
 On the other hand, the war, the 
defeat of the Italians and the establishment of the BMA facilitated movements of 
soldiers, colonial clerks and servants who travelled constantly from one region to 
another. For instance, soldiers of the British army, Ghanaian, Kenyan and Nigerian 
troops mainly,
10
 were stationed in the area and moved across the regions on a regular 
basis. Somali soldiers who had fought for the Italian army were disbanded and many 
moved towards the city seeking work. Soldiers of Italian nationality, who were made 
prisoners of war, were transferred to special camps by the British and, Italian 
civilians, especially from Ethiopia, were resettled into evacuation camps on the 
coasts in order to be evacuated to Italy. For many reasons, other groups of people 
moved ‘illegally’ within the Horn of Africa.
11
 Although the fragmented and 
diversified characters of these movements make them difficult to quantify, their 
effects should be not underestimated especially in the area of Mogadishu where, for 
instance, the number of Italians increased two-fold within two years only.
12
 
The rapidity with which these movements occurred affected the degree of 
urbanisation and expansion of the city. Following the defeat of the Italians in June 
1941, the BMA had to set up provisional compounds to accommodate soldiers, 
camps to evacuate civilians or to transfer prisoners. As the BMA was a temporary 
administration that lacked both financial and human resources, these activities were 
carried out with what was available at the time. The memoirs of a former British 
soldier, Mike Allcock, who was posted to Somalia Italiana in the 1940s, are in this 
sense telling. In 1947, he was sent to Mogadishu where he had to carry out multiple, 
                                               
9 The population estimates for the 1940s remained stable due to the British attempts to keep new 
migrants away from the city. Del Boca, La Caduta dell’Impero, p. 222. 
10 Ibid.. 
11 ‘Report on the Evacuation of Italian Civilians from Italian East Africa, 1941 to 1943’ Major Hon. 
Peter Rodd, Evacuation Office, Asmara, undated; T. Matthews ‘Miscellaneous reports on refuges and 
repatriates’, Bodleian Library of Commonwealth and African Studies at Rhodes House, Oxford, Mss. 
Brit. Emp. s. 360-362. 
12 In 1943, there were 12,000 Italians in Mogadishu and so double the 1941 figure, Ibid.. 
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although often undefined, tasks. As the BMA relied on limited resources, its 
personnel was excepted to manage both military and administrative duties:    
We reached Mogadishu on the nineteenth of March [1947], the termination point 
being the airfield which also housed a transit camp: the REME
13
 camp was 
situated beyond the southern end of the runway adjacent to a battalion of the 
Kings African Rifles with the sea to the east and desert everywhere. Our 
compound had been the Italian Garrison workshops and also housed RAOC
14
 
depot, such as it was. The staff were mainly senior NCOs
15
 and there was only 
one mess which we all shared: we were the managers of a civilian workforce of 
Italian and Somali workers, the workshop being mainly concerned with vehicle 
overhaul, having a sophisticated engine rebuilding facility, electricians shop, 
machine shop and tinsmithing/blacksmithing shop. Each of us had our own room 
and a personal servant to minister to our every need; they brought you morning 
tea, boiled up hot water for bathing, washed and ironed your clothes, made your 
bed and cleaned your kit. Out unit administered a small LAD
16
 in the town plus 
outpost detachments in Kismayu to the south, Belet Uen [i.e. Beledweyne] to the 
north and Segag in Ethiopia.
 17
 
As a result of administrative arrangements, the BMA personnel had to moved 
constantly across the area increasing the degree of mobility around Mogadishu: 
The town was about three mile away and transport was freely available. The 
Italian chief clerk was a guy called Fabri and he also owned a shop in town where 
we had our uniform tailored to an exact fit, shoes made to measure, bought 
watches, swimming trunks and even lounge suits. There was no excuse for 
wandering about in sartorial disorder here. The beach was superb, flanking a 
lagoon which was protected from shark infiltration at low tide by a reef some 
quarter of a mile out. Post swimming, it was essential to stop at Aragnino’s café 
in town for refreshment before returning to base. Beach to camp would be about 
four miles, so definitively a transport job and I landed up as the main driver.
18
  
Moreover, due to the restrictions on imported goods imposed by the war economy, 
that will be discussed below, frequent mobility across the regions became a 
necessity. In fact, any kind of mechanical equipment had to be repaired locally or 
                                               
13 Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers.  
14 Royal Army Ordnance Corps. 
15 Non-commissioned officers. 
16 Light Aid Detachment. As part of REME, it provides administration and support to regiment in the 
field. See http://www.army.mod.uk/signals/organisation/8788.aspx.  
17 Mike Allcock’s account of the time he spent in Somalia Italiana as a British soldier, unpublished, 
sent to me by e-mail, 4th December, 2007.  
18 Ibid.. 
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replaced within the Horn of Africa. For these reasons, the roads across the Somali-
speaking regions, Ethiopia and Eritrea were well-travelled by the BMA soldiers who 
were accompanied by Somalis drivers, servants or soldiers. As Mike Allcock recalls, 
mobility was a key feature of the work for the BMA: 
There was no instrument workshop or equipment but it was thought that a mobile 
unit was lurking in another workshop in Harge[y]sa, British Somaliland, some six 




From a more economic point of view, one of the immediate, and perhaps 
most striking, effects of the war was the sudden interruption of the colonial economic 
system and the self-help economic initiatives that followed. Since its establishment 




 Mogadishu had come 
to be, economically speaking, a centre for trading and commerce.
21
 Under colonial 
rule, this feature was strengthened by the Italians who retained monopolies over 
trading licences and control over most imports and exports.
22
 Once this system came 
to an end following the establishment of the BMA in 1941, economic dynamism 
mushroomed in the city: chiefly targeting trading. For instance, the requests for 
trading licences made to the BMA multiplied exponentially to the point that in one 
year, between 1941 and 1942, the number of trading licences increased ten-fold.
23
 
                                               
19 Allcock’s account. 
20 Known to Arab merchants since the 10th century, Mogadishu became an Arab city-state in the 13th 
century. In 14th century the chronicles of Ibn Battuta described Mogadishu as a florid commercial 
centre. The city became the battlefield of the competition between Portuguese traders and Arabs 
merchants: the Portuguese bombarded the city in the 16th century, stopped temporarily the Arab 
influence there and in the 17th century controlled the harbour. Eventually the city was at first re-
controlled by Arabs and then by the Sultan of Zanzibar who lent it to the Italians in 1889. Enrico 
Cerulli, Somalia: Scritti Vari e Inediti. I Storia della Somalia (a cura dell’ Amministrazione Fiduciaria 
Italiana della Somalia) (Roma: Istituto Poligrafica dello Stato, 1957), pp. 169-70. 
21 Puzo, ‘Mogadishu, Somalia’, pp. 68-9. 
22 The percentage of the total trade with Italy rose from 13% in 1920 to 60% in 1934. See Hess, 
Italian Colonialism, Appendix Four, p. 209. 
23 According to the BMA, 243 trading licences were issued in 1941 and 2609 in 1942: ‘There has been 
a fundamental change in the economic balance of the town. Formerly, all supplies came from Italy and 
employment was provided either directly by the State or by the great parastatal companies with a few 
important private firms. Now, employment by Government and the parastatal concerns has largely 
disappeared, as have the reserves of supplies from Italy. Instead, there are a crowd of small individual 
producing and selling firms who have built up their trade with considerable ingenuity, purely from 
local supplies.’ Lt General Sir William Platt, Untitled report, Political Branch, East African 
Command, March 1943, J/574/46/46; in ‘Eritrea and Italian Somaliland’, TNA, FO 371/35658. 
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Although this data does not indicate economic growth and, thus, it does not indicate 
an actual increase of trading and/or of the local production, it is indicative of the 
dynamic trend that followed the collapse of the colonial economic system.  
Economic dynamism was characterised by a series of self-help initiatives, 
networks of solidarity and cooperation as a response to wartime realities. This trend 
was not confined to former Italian Somalia but concerned African colonies more 
broadly. As pointed out by Killingray and Rathbone, the war restrictions on imported 
goods fostered local production in colonial Africa.
24
 In Somalia Italiana, the stress 
on local sources and production assumed a different feature due to the lack of 
development plans undertaken by the BMA until 1950. This spurred the emergence 
of more initiatives from below: it was, thus, local communities that promptly and 
creatively organised a self-help economy to face the war economic restrictions. As a 
response to the challenges of the time, precarious living conditions, shortage of food 
supply,
25
 corruption and black market over food supplies,
26
 new links and networks 
of solidarity and cooperation were established that centred on the urban context. 
In this way, the commodities that could no longer be imported were produced 
or replaced locally and small self-organised businesses were formed and produced 
whatever was needed. Private industry made up for the shortage of goods as they 
could: carpenters replaced glue with isinglass, posters were put up with bread flour 
and the latter in its turn was replaced by manioc flour. Prisoners, when not under the 
‘hard-work’ regime, produced brushes, brooms and sandals for the Somali 
                                               
24 David Killingray, Richard Rathbone ‘Introduction’, in David Killingray, Richard Rathbone (eds.), 
Africa and the Second World War, (London: Macmillan, 1986). 
25 Food supplies were very limited and often hidden by former colonial officials: ‘The present position 
is that the stocks of foodstuffs, both imported and locally produced, are approaching exhaustion. 
Imported food has been non-existent ... senior officials and the influential rich still have hidden stocks 
obtained by corruption. These are being sought out and will be requisitioned. The demand for local 
food, as a result of the cessation of imports, has exceeded the supply’. Bdr. D.C.P.O. (name 
unknown), Untitled report, Headquarters O.E.T.A., Southern Somaliland, Mogadishu, 12th April, 
1941; in ‘Somalia: Administrative Policy’, TNA WO 230/7. 
26 ‘One of our greatest difficulties lies in the incompetence and untrustworthiness of the Italian 
municipal officials. We are having to exercise the utmost vigilance to see that an undue proportion of 
the food does not find its way into the larders of the Mayor and his friends’. Ibid.. 
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In the 1940s, the new settlements of migrants radically transformed the urban 
social background and contributed to the rapid expansion of Mogadishu.
28
 New 
neighbourhoods were soon established in the urban outskirts populated by Somali 
migrants.
29
 Before the war, the urban population was already composed of 
communities of different settings and ethnicities.
30
 In 1914, Hamarwayne and 
Shungani constituted the oldest biggest neighbourhoods of the city,
 31
 the former 
being populated chiefly by Somalis, the latter by Arab merchants and shop-keepers. 
The series of migratory trends, increased mobility, expansion of the city and self-
help economic initiatives generated a special environment marked by social 
dynamism in Mogadishu. In an article based on memories of her childhood in the 
city, Maryan Musse Bogor sheds light on the ways in which this new environment 
shaped, influenced and enhanced social interactions. She underscores how a culture 
of solidarity, which characterised newly-formed neighbourhoods of Mogadishu, 
functioned as social cement for urban dwellers. Noticeably, it was in the newly-
established neighbourhoods that social dynamism and interaction was most 
prominent. As in the newly-formed and highly populated neighbourhood of Iskuran: 
…[it was a] densely built neighbo[u]rhood of wooden houses and closely 
connected residents…Here people were loud and outgoing, visiting with each 
                                               
27 In fact vehicles were not allowed to circulate during the war except under special permission. 
Gandar Dower ‘British Military Administration in Eritrea and Somalia’, TNA, FO, 371/41519. 
28
 5,978 Italians lived in Mogadishu at the end of the 1941; this number doubled in 1942. Untitled 
report, , Lt General Sir William Platt, Political Branch, East African Command, March 1943, 
J1574/46/46; TNA, FO, 371/35658. By the end of 1946, there were 3,464 and 3,058 at the end of 
1947 in Mogadishu. ‘Annual Report on the Administration of Somalia for the year ended 31 
December 1947’; in ‘Somalia: Annual Reports for 1947 and 1948 by the Chief Administrator’, 
TNA,WO, 230/251. 
29 Lidwien Kapteijns, Maryan Muuse Boqor, ‘Memories of a Mogadishu Childhood, 1940-1964: 
Maryan Muuse Boqor and the Women Who Inspired Her’, International Journal of African Historical 
Studies , 42:1 (2009), p. 110. 
30 On the ethnic background of the coastal towns of the Benaadir coast, see Scott S. Reese, ‘Urban 
Woes and Pious Remedies: Sufism in the Nineteenth Century Benaadir (Somalia)’, Africa Today 
43:3-4 (1999), pp. 172-3. 
31 Hamarweyne from Hamar which refers to a historic neighbourghood of the city. Often Hamar is 
used to indicate Mogadishu. See Cerulli, Somalia: Scritti Vari, p. 170.  
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other unannounced, sharing meals at the spur of the moment, and actively and 
unabashedly involving themselves in each other’s daily lives.
32
 
Traces of this vibrant urban environment are still present in oral tradition 
today. Many elderly Somalis I interviewed for this research shared fond memories of 
the 1940s and 1950s Mogadishu. A sense of nostalgia for that urban past was also 
noticeable from interviews conducted in Somaliland in spite of the country’s recent 
history of secession from Somalia Italiana. The overall perception of Mogadishu was 
a city with a welcoming environment which facilitated the integration of Somalis, as 
much for those coming from other regions as for those from the British Somaliland.
33
 
One of the interviewees openly confessed that the time he spent in Mogadishu in the 
1950s and 1960s was ‘the best time of …[his] life’.
34
  
Another interviewee, who was born and raised in Somalia Italiana, recalled 
enthusiastically the atmosphere of urban social and economic dynamism of those 
years despite the war and war restrictions. He grew up in the Afgooye catholic 
orphanage before moving, as a teenager in the early 1940s, to the Collegio, the 
catholic school in Mogadishu. Although he recalled his experience at the orphanage 
positively, once he moved to the new city he realised that Afgooye was ‘deadly dull 
and boring’ compared to Mogadishu where ‘everyday there were lots of things going 
on’. Although he was a very young boy in the 1940s, he took part in self-help 
economic initiatives. At the Catholic Mission, for example, he recalled that the 
schoolchildren were involved in the production of matches and bottle tops.
35
  
It was this environment which influenced the formulation of nationalist 
politics. The challenges of the wartime, as well as the socioeconomic opportunities 
that followed the establishment of the BMA contributed to shape a peculiar context 
in which, a powerful movement from below organised politically and (re)imagined 
an egalitarian, united Somali nation. As a former Somali politician put it, in the post-
war period it was the people of Mogadishu, as a collective group, who influenced the 
                                               
32 Kapteijns, Boqor, ‘Memories of a Mogadishu Childhood, 1940-1964’, p. 110. 
33 Interview with Sahara Abdulqadir Haji Ahmed, 22nd August 2009, Hargeysa. 
34 Interview with Mohammed Said Mohammed Gees, 3rd August 2009, Hargeysa.  
35 Interview with Benvenuto Francesco Isaaq 12th January 2011, Rome. Benvenuto Francesco Isaaq 
was one of the Somali children who attended school at the catholic Collegio. 
Imagining the Nation, Crafting the State 
‘All the Somalis are equal and brothers’  57 
developments of local politics rather than parties’ leaders.
36
 Mogadishu’s vibrant 
urban background and new mechanisms for social aggregation shaped the ways in 
which the League reimagined the Somali national future, as it will be discussed in the 
next section.  
 
2.3 The Somali Youth League: composition, policies 
and structure 
A Mogadishu-based organisation, originally formed on May 15, 1943 as the Somali 
Youth Club, the League was a small, self-help, socially-oriented, youth club whose 
membership was restricted to Somalis of 16-to-32 years old. Its main concerns were 
the protection of Somali economic interests especially in trading, the promotion of 
universal education, equality amongst Somalis, and the abolition of clan 
distinctions.
37
 In 1946 the club changed its name to the Somali Youth League and 
broadened its scope and purposes, the most important of which was the achievement 
of the project of Greater Somalia. From this point, the League began to militantly 
campaign in support of Somali territorial and social unification. From a local 
socially-oriented association whose activities were circumscribed to the area of 
Mogadishu, the League was transformed into a national mass party.
38
 In response to 
the power vacuum of the 1940s, the Somali Youth League elaborated a series of 
activities, associations with the aim to promote the construction of an egalitarian 
Somali society with no clan divisions.  
 
 
                                               
36 Interview with Mohamed Aden Sheikh, 24th April, 2009, Turin. 
37 The aims of the party were listed in article 4 of the League’s statute. The eradication of clan 
distinctions was the first aim: ‘To unite all Somalis generally and the youth especially, the repudiation 
of all harmful old prejudice as for instance – distinction of tribe, colour, religion etc.’ Author 
unknown, ‘Memorandum on Native Clubs in Somalia’ (undated, presumably March 1947); in  
‘O.T.A. Native Clubs in Somalia’, TNA, Colonial Office (CO) 537/3641.  
38 The definition of ‘mass party’ in here is based on Ruth Morgenthau’s classification in her study of 
the political associations in French West Africa. Accordingly, a mass party is a party which claims to 
represent all communities with no distinctions: ‘Mass parties generally sought the adherence of every 
single individual. They wanted to enrol each man, woman, and even child, and so they had to establish 
local branches with headquarters, regular meetings, and elections for branch leaders.’ Ruth S. 
Morgenthau, Political Parties in French-speaking West Africa, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), p. 
337.  
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2.3.1 The party’s leadership and membership 
In many ways, the features of the early membership of the Somali Youth League 
differed slightly from the ones of most nationalist parties in Africa.
39
 Where in West 
Africa for instance, nationalist leaders belonged to, broadly speaking, a western-
educated elite or to a consolidated urban class which possessed the skills and means 
for challenging colonialism within its own domain, in Somalia Italiana, where 
previous colonial rule did not enhance education and political associations were 
forbidden, there was no western-educated elite and no tradition of pre-war political 
organisations.
40
 For this reason, the League was founded and operated in a context of 
organisational vacuum. This circumstance contributed to make the party very popular 
at the time, but made its support subject to the spur of the moment. In fact, where 
other African nationalist movements, as in Zambia, relied on trade unions’ support or 
well-defined organisational structures,
41
 the popularity of the League came to be 
linked to the campaign for advancing the project of Greater Somalia which catalysed 
the support of various Somali communities under a single goal.  
Data available on the League’s membership provide some insights on the 
appeal of the party’s national agenda. At the end of 1946, it was estimated that the 
League had approximately 1,000 affiliates chiefly in Mogadishu. Within a few 
months in June 1947, after massive propaganda campaigns, the BMA estimated that 
the League’s membership counted 25-30,000 subscriptions.
42
 At the same time, the 
League expanded the range of its activities. Where until 1946 the party was 
predominantly active in Mogadishu and urban areas, by 1947 it was reported that the 
                                               
39
 See Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana, (London: Oxford University Press, 1964);Thomas Hodgkin, 
African Political Parties, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1961); Morgenthau, Political Parties. 
40 The few pupils who attended primary schools in Somalia Italiana were not allowed to pursue 
further education by colonial law. On the contrary, Koranic schools were well-attended but still 
comparatively few people attended education. See Alphonse A. Castagno, ‘Somali Republic’, in 
Helen Kitchen (ed.), The Educated African: A Country-by-Country Survey of Educational 
Development in Africa, (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 84-5.  
41 See Robert H. Bates, Union, Parties and Political Development: a Study of Mineworkers in Zambia, 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), especially chapter 2. 
42 In 1947, the BMA reported that: ‘The membership of the ‘Somali Youth Club, now renamed the 
Somali Youth League... until 1946 could boast not more than 1,000 members. In 1946 the 
membership sprang from approximately 1,000 to its present figure of between 25,000 and 30,000’. 
Author unknown, ‘A Note on Native Societies in the Somalilands’, 27th June 1947; in TNA, CO, 
537/3641. 
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party could rely on thirty active branches throughout the Somali-speaking regions: 
from Dire-Dawa in Ethiopia, to Hargeysa and Burco in the British Somaliland, in 
Jigjiga in the Reserved Areas.
43
 Further political activities were reported in the 
French colony and in the Northern Frontier District in Kenya where the party 
constituted a matter of concern to local authorities.
44
 Due to this widespread activity, 
the numbers of supporters continued to increase considerably to the point that in 
1948 it was estimated to be around 100,000 and so a hundred-fold the figure reported 
in 1946.
45
 While this data needs to be treated with caution and the extent to which 
these estimates correlate with actual support to the League is matter of debate,
46
 the 
rapid growth and the widespread diffusion of the League’s affiliates are indicative of 
the popularity of political activism at the time and support for the national project of 
Greater Somalia. 
The ‘initial spur’ of the League was the result of a collective effort and 
differently from histories of other nationalist movements in Africa, no universally-
recognised individuals emerged in the 1940s as leaders. On the contrary, oral 
memories evocatively associated the formative years of the League with its thirteen 
founding members who are spoken of as a whole.
47
 For this reason, the League is not 
linked to a specific persona, or ‘national hero’ as were Kwame Nkrumah leader of 
                                               
43 Author unknown, ‘A Note on Native Societies in the Somalilands’, 27th June 1947; in TNA, CO, 
537/3641. 
44 See E. R. Turton, ‘Somali Resistance to Colonial Rule and the Development of Somali Political 
Activities in Kenya, 1893-1960’, The Journal of African History, XII:1 (1972);  Nene Mburu, Bandits 
on the Border: The Last Frontier in Search for Somali Unity, (New Jersey: Red Sea Press, 2005); 
Anna Whittaker, ‘Pursing Pastoralists: the Stigma of Shifta during the ‘Shifta War’ in Kenya’, Eras 
Edition 10, 2008. 
45
 Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Libro Verde: L’Amministrazione Fiduciaria della Somalia e i 
Rapporti dell’Italia con la Repubblica Somala. Relazione Presentata al Parlamento Italiano dal 
Ministro per gli Affari Esteri on. Antonio Segni, (Rome: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1961) p. 21. 
46 The data indicates the number of supporters. It is not possible to establish how many Somalis were 
members of the League. In 1948 before the UN, the League claimed to have 93,000 members and 
300,000 followers. ‘Four Power Commission of Investigation for the Former Italian Colonies. Volume 
II Report on Somalia’, undated, produced in 1948; in ‘Four-Power Commission on Somalia: 
Disturbances in Mogadishu; Report of the Commission’, TNA, FO, 1015/29. Data reported by 
colonial sources are conflicting and tend to be conservative. Conversely, the data reported in here 
might look an exaggeration. Scholars tend to be more cautious estimating 30,000 party’s affiliates. 
However, it should be noted that official membership consisted of male members only. This is 
problematic because, although not included in the membership, women were very active in the party 
politics as discussed later on in this chapter.  
47 Research notes, March 2008, London. 
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the Ghanaian Convention People’s Party or Léopold Senghor of the Socialist Party of 
Senegal. This pattern explains why very little is known about the two leaders who are 
likely to have been the ideological inspirers of the League, Abdulqadir Saqawa Din 
and Yassin Haji Osman, perhaps due to the fact that they both died soon after the 
foundation of the party.
48
 The two leaders belonged to well-known local families. 
Abdulqadir Saqawa Din was a member of a religious family and was himself a 
‘prominent Mogadishu-based religious figure’ whose ‘prestige, networks and 
unassumingly leadership’ constituted the base for the grass-roots popularity of the 
League in Mogadishu.
49
 Yassin, the ideological force and the political inspirer of the 
League, was related to the well-known and prestigious family of the Kenedid that 
ruled the ancient sultanate of Hobyo; to the same family belonged Osman Yusuf 
Kenadid who created the first script version of the Somali language known as 




The early members of the League were brought together by sharing common 
experiences during the wartime. In particular, in Mogadishu the League appealed to 
an emerging ‘class’ of young Somalis, or a ‘better-off’ social segment that was 
involved or had some interests in trading and commerce. Additionally, the party 
appealed to young Somalis who, for different reasons, migrated to Mogadishu and 
had the opportunity to work for, or to be in contact with the Italian or the British 
administrations. In a discussion on Somali political leadership, Ahmed Samatar 
correctly pointed out that pre-independence nationalist politics were led by a distinct, 
and self-interested, urban bourgeoisie.
51
 However, this ‘urban class’ continued to 
                                               
48 Since they both died soon after the party was founded (sometimes between the late 1940s and the 
early 1950s), their memories is not linked with the experience of self-government or independence but 
rather with the formative years of the party. Although Yassin died in the late 1940s, his legacy proved 
to be crucial for the future of the party. It is remembered that before dying, Yassin nominated a very 
young member of the League, Abdullahi Issa, as the future leader of the party. Eventually, Abdullahi 
became the first Prime Minister of the 1956 Legislative Assembly. Research notes, April 2010, 
London. 
49 Hussein M. Adam, ‘Islam and Politics in Somalia’, Journal of Islamic Studies, 6:2 (1995), p. 197. 
50 B. W. Andrzejewski, S. Strelcyn, J. Tubiana, Somalia: The Writing of Somali, (Paris: UNESCO, 
1966), p. 7.  
51 Ahmed I. Samatar, Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric and Reality, (London and New Jersey: Zed, 1988), 
chapter 3. 
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evolve in the 1940s and its emergence was closely linked to the opportunities that 
arose following the collapse of the former colonial ruling system and the 
establishment of the BMA.  
The 1941 defeat of the Italians opened up a series of opportunities for the 
numerous job-seekers who migrated to Mogadishu. Although the BMA retained the 
majority of Italian colonial clerks, the new colonial administration still had a 
shortage of staff, in particular in need of clerks, translators, servants, and drivers.
52
 
Moreover, as the knowledge of the English language among the Italians was very 
limited,
53
 the BMA set up training and language courses that were open to Somalis 
who would eventually be employed by the administration. In particular, the 
establishment of the Somali Gendarmerie appears to have constitute the primary 
source of employment for young Somalis and recruitment of the League alike. After 
having dismissed the former colonial police, that was believed to be untrustworthy 
due to the links with the previous regime, the BMA instituted a new police force, the 
Gendarmerie, whose recruitment was carried out among the Somali youth 
exclusively.
54
 The League became very popular among the Somali Gendarmerie to 
the point that in 1947 it was estimated that circa 75% of the Somali Gendarmerie 
stationed in Mogadishu were also members of the Somali Youth League. This 
circumstance was remarkable because almost no one shared membership with other 
political organisations.
55
 In fact, Castagno suggested that there was a close 
connection between the BMA and League and that, at a certain point, the 
membership of the party became ‘a prerequisite to government employment.’
56
 
Connections between the BMA and the League became a matter of resentment for 
                                               
52 Lewis, A Modern History, p. 119. 
53 As the British put it: ‘Practically no English speaking Italians are available, and although there are 
Italian clerks to be had in Mogadishu, the fact that they cannot speak or read English renders them 
useless to us.’ Colonel Legal Adviser (name unknown), ‘Report on Visit to Italian Somaliland. From 
June 2nd to 11th 1941’, Nairobi, 12th June 1941; TNA, WO 230/7. 
54  Gandar Dower ‘British Military Administration in Eritrea and Somalia’, TNA, FO, 371/41519. 
55 So the BMA: ‘The considerable Somali Gendarmerie membership in the Somali Youth Club is 
disquieting, though it may be considered... that the inclusive nature of this Club is the best safeguard 
against its becoming anti-government front.’ ‘A Note on Native Societies in the Somalilands’; TNA, 
CO 537/3641. 
56 Castagno, ‘Somali Republic’ in Coleman, Rosberg (eds.), Political Parties, p. 523. 
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members of smaller political groups and contributed to increase political competition 
as discussed in the next chapter.  
In terms of ethnicity, the early membership of the League reflected the urban 
context in which it operated that, due to migratory trends discussed in the previous 
section, was highly diversified. In fact, the thirteen founding members of the League 
not only belonged to different clans but were representatives of most Somali clan 
families.
57
 A further contribution to this ‘super-clan’ feature was given by the solid 
participation of the Hamarweyne, the dwellers of the historical downtown of 
Mogadishu, conventionally considered outside the clan system.
58
 By 1947, the 
League began to recruit with a broader age-limit by including males from 16-to-60 
years old and a broader regional scale and in this way, its composition remained 
diversified. Simultaneously, the party became very popular among the employees of 
the BMA, as it was reported by the Colonial Office:  
[The League] largely represents a newly emerged “middle class” of Somalis 
made up mostly of the monthly salaried group and persons owing their own 
businesses. These include clerks, servants of Europeans, traders, medical 
dressers, members of the Somalia Gendarmerie, and recently certain Chiefs, 
Headmen and Notables have joined.
59
  
The story of Abdirazak Haji Hussein provides good insights on how the life 
trajectory of a young Somali intertwined with the series of opportunities constituted 
by the war, the establishment of the BMA and the formation of the Somali Youth 
League. Abdirazak Haji Hussein had been a long-standing member of the Somali 
Youth League which he joined in the mid-1940s becoming Prime Minister of the 
Somali Republic in 1964. Originally from Garoowe he grew up in Gaalkacyo, 
today’s Puntland. In the late 1930s, he and his brother were offered a lift to 
                                               
57 Out of the 13 League’s founding members, 4 were Daarood, 3 Rahanwiin and Digil, 3 Hamarwayne 
(Rer Hamar), 1 Isaaq. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy, p. 306. In the 1940s, the Hamarwayne played a 
key role in the formation of the League. Their contribution increased in 1946 when the Hamar Youth 
Club’s membership was of approximately 1,000. The BMA reported the League and the Hamar Youth 
Club shared common socio-political interests and activities, and sometimes members of the latter were 
sympathisers of the League or held a joined membership. Author unknown, ‘Memorandum on Native 
Clubs in Somalia’ (undated, presumably March 1947); TNA CO 537/3641. 
58 See also Cerulli, Somalia: Scritti Vari, pp. 169-170 
59 Author unknown, ‘Memorandum on Native Clubs in Somalia’ (undated, presumably March 1947); 
TNA CO 537/3641. 
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Mogadishu to visit their older brother by a Somali truck driver they met on the road. 
Once arrived in the city, however, they found out that their brother, a truck driver 
himself, had been employed by the Italians to carry supplies for troops in Ethiopia. 
Abdirazak decided to remain in Mogadishu working in a shop and attending primary 
education in a school run by Italian nuns. After the Italians were defeated and the 
BMA established, he and his brothers worked as drivers moving across the regions, 
then he returned to Mogadishu and found employment as a servant for a British 
Commissioner. Later he enrolled for military training, joining the Somali 
Gendarmerie. During this time, as a member of the armed forces, he took part into 
British expeditions against bands of disbanded soldiers that were engaging in looting 
activities in between southern Somalia and Ethiopia. Later, he was stationed in 
Qalaafo today’s Ethiopia
60
 where he came to know about the Somali Youth League 
and became a passionate member of the party. In between 1945 and 1948, as an 
employee of the BMA he continued to move across the regions. This mobility gave 
him the opportunity to get to know other colleagues who were also members of the 
League, as in Dire Dawa, Ethiopia. In this way, he contributed to open up a branch of 




The story of Abdirazak Haji Hussein illustrates the ways in which the war 
developments created some favourable circumstances for the Somali youth. In 
particular, the replacement of the former colonial police with the Somali 
Gendarmerie opened up various job opportunities. Significantly, not only the job 
opportunities offered at the time constituted fortunate circumstances for many young 
Somalis, but the mobility of these jobs, as the Somali Gendarmerie, contributed to 
the diffusion of the party outside the towns and across the Somali-speaking regions. 
In fact as the BMA relied on the Gendarmerie to exercise control over Somalia 
Italiana, the Ogaden and the RA, the League was able to make use of the links with 
the police in order to promote its political agenda. Although this circumstance 
                                               
60 Kelafo according to the Ethiopian spelling. 
61 A detailed account of Abdirazak Haji Hussein’s life based on his memories is in Abdi Ismail 
Samatar, Ahmed I. Samatar, ‘Somalis as Africa’s First Democrats: Premier Abdirazak H. Hussein and 
President Aden A. Osman’, Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies, 2(2002), pp. 8-17. 
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contributed to increase the popularity of the party, the politicised features of the 
Gendarmerie created some resentment among southern communities which had been 
heavily affected by the war and came to support pro-Italian associations, as discussed 
in the next chapter. 
 
2.3.2 Communist influences 
The early ideological line of the League was influenced by communist Italians who 
lived in Mogadishu. In fact, following the establishment of the BMA in 1941, the 
Italian community in Mogadishu was the first to politically (re)organise. The 
emergence of Italian political associations of different, often conflicting, interests 
and ideologies affected the development of the Somali political organisations in two 
key ways. First, the activities of fascist supporters increased Somali resentment for 
their former colonial masters. It was against the organisation and proliferation of 
these associations, which were led by locally well-known Italian fascists working 
with colonial clerks, that the League’s anti-colonial response was addressed to. 
Second, the formation of an Italian branch of the Communist Party in Mogadishu 
provided some ideological inspiration to the Somali Youth League.  
Although the majority of the Italians assumed a rather passive political 
attitude, some former colonial clerks and administrators became actively involved in 
local politics. The latter were roughly divided amongst the ones supportive of 
fascism and the ones in favour of or not opposed to the BMA. The political 
associations that emerged were the following: the fascists, the Free Italians, the 
Italian Communist Party, (Partito Comunista Italiano, PCI), and the Christian 
Democrats, (Democrazia Cristiana).
 62
 As former colonial clerks were in control of 
the press, the parties they supported, the fascists and the Free Italians, became more 
                                               
62 The BMA divided the Italian political associations between the fascist and anti-fascist parties. The 
Christian Democrats, the Free Italian and Communist parties were all included among the anti-fascist 
organisations. Little is known on the Free Italian: ‘A Free Italian Club was opened[…] on the 31st 
January [1942], and for the first time some persons of repute, such as Professor de Fabbris, were 
associated with it. Hitherto, the so-called “Free Italian” movement has been in the hands of petty, 
shady people who expressed opinions contrary to those of most Italians merely to serve their own 
commercial ends, hoping thus to obtain P.W.D. [Public Work Department]contracts and the like. ’ 
J.M.C. Major (name unknown), untitled, Military Administration, undated, (presumably early 1942); 
in ‘Internal Security: Notes on Situation in Kenya and Somalia’, TNA, WO, 230/319. 
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visible.
63
 By contrast, the members of the communist party were fewer, possibly c. 
thirty, and their activities and contacts with the Somali Youth League went mostly 
unnoticed to the BMA.
64
 Formed by anti-fascists who were forcefully exiled to 
Somalia Italiana during the fascist rule,
65
 this group opened up a PCI branch in 
Mogadishu by the early 1940s. However, because they were subject to physical 
threats by the fascists, their activities were low-profile and, instead of engaging in 
dialogue with the BMA, mainly addressed Somali communities.  
Based on a common opposition to fascism during the war and a common 
opposition to the Italian Republican Government after 1945, the connections between 
the PCI and the League proved productive.
66
 The leadership of the League had 
frequent contacts with members of the PCI paying visits to the PCI headquarters in 
Mogadishu throughout the 1940s.
67
 In particular, Yassin Haji Osman, one of the 
founding members and leaders of the party, was in close contact with the PCI. After 
having worked for the Italians as a driver and translator in the 1930s, he had made 
acquaintances amongst them. As a result, he had easy access to Italians newspapers, 
magazines and books.
68
 Among these Italians, he became friend with a communist 
                                               
63 Following the war developments and the creation of two governments in Italy one in favour of the 
Allied and another pro-Axis coalition, politically active Italians intensified their activities. In 
Mogadishu, a few Italian-owned bars transmitted pro-fascism propaganda broadcasting Radio Berlin 
out loud all day long as reported by the BMA: ‘the war news of the past week has exhilarated them 
and has resulted in a change of attitude on the part of the Fascist leaders ... The former have shown 
signs of activity in that they have threatened castor-oil treatment for the unfaithful and there have been 
unconfirmed reports of beatings administered to known anti-Fascists.’ Author unknown, Headquarters 
O.E.T.A., Mogadishu, 12th April 1941; TNA WO 230/7. 
64 During the 1940s, the BMA suspected that the League had some external influence and that some of 
its programmatic statements were written in complicity with some Italians. However, no evidence 
could be found. Author unknown, ‘Memorandum on Native Clubs in Somalia’ (undated, presumably 
March 1947); TNA CO 537/3641. 
65 During the fascist regime, some Italians, who were perceived as persona non grata, were exiled to 
Somalia Italiana. As a result, a few anti-fascists as well as a few ‘hard-core’ fascists lived in the 
colony. Del Boca, Gli Italiani in Africa Orientale: La Conquista dell’Impero, (Bari: Laterza, 1979), p. 
87. 
66 See Del Boca, Nostalgia delle Colonie, pp. 171-2. The links between the PCI and Somali politicians 
continued until Siad Barre’s regime. In the 1950s, the PCI, the foremost opposition party in Italy, 
backed the then Somali opposition parties before Italian parliament. These opposed the League’s 
leadership and Italian authority, as discussed in chapter five.   
67 Interview with Benvenuto Francesco Isaaq, 12th January 2011, Rome. See also Del Boca, Nostalgia 
delle Colonie, p.171. 
68 Author unknown, ‘Biographical notes on Somali political leaders’, undated (presumably mid-1949); 
in ‘Future of Italian Somaliland’, TNA, FO, 371/73851.The records of the BMA referred to Yassin 
Haji Osman as Yassin Ali Shermake. Accordingly, he would have left the Somali Youth League in 
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who worked as a driver in Mogadishu named Pivetti, and this friendship probably 
constituted the key link between the League and the PCI.
69
  
Communist influences can be traced in the rhetoric and symbols the party. 
For instance, although it was eventually changed to blue and red, the original colour 
of the League’s flag was red.
70
 Moreover, the logo of the party represents a half 
moon and a clover which might be associated symbolically to the communist 
hammer and sickle. These influences became a matter of concern to the British and 
Italian colonial authorities throughout the 1940s and 1950s. As they feared that the 
League would embrace the communist ideology at some point, Italian sources 
reported in 1949: 
Taking into consideration that the League represents the aspirations of the whole 
Somali people, it is important that the party would limit its activities within legal 
terms and clearly state its programme. The party has branches in the British 
Somaliland and Djibouti. Therefore, once its communist features are established, 




2.3.3 (Re)imagining the Somali nation: the construction of an 
egalitarian society 
One of the features that distinguished the League from other socio-political 
organisations was the attempt to construct an egalitarian society by eradicating clan 
                                                                                                                                     
1947, have been a delegate of pro-Italian political front in May 1949 in Lake Success, and joined the 
Somalia Progressive Mijertein League; it is further reported he was the brother of Abdirashid Ali 
Shemarke, member of the League and President of Somalia from 1967 to his assassination in 1969. I 
have not found confirmation of this circumstance.  
69 Interview with Abdulkadir Ali Bollay, 16th March, 2009, London. 
70
 The original flag of the Somali Youth League was red, while the flag of the Hamar Youth Club was 
blue. According to Ali Bollay, a member of the Hamarweyne community and mayor of Mogadishu in 
the 1980s, the League’s flag became red and blue, once the two clubs shared their membership, See 
also Abdulkadir Ali Bollay, ‘The Role of Banaadaris in Somali Society’, Journal of the Anglo-Somali 
Society, 45(2009). On a similar note, in 1947 the BMA believed the Hamar Youth Club to be ‘a 
brother club’ of the Somali Youth League; in fact, the secretary of the former, Dere Haji Dere, was 
among the founding members of the League. Author unknown, ‘Memorandum on Native Clubs in 
Somalia’ (undated, presumably March 1947); TNA CO 537/3641. 
71 Author unknown, Telegram to the Ministry of African Colonies in Rome, 19th February 1949, 
Mogadishu; Archivio Storico e Diplomatico del Ministero Affari Esteri (ASDMAE), carteggio AFIS, 
cassa 19, busta 11. The connections between the PCI and the Somali Youth League remained 
unknown to the BMA which, however noted that a number of the League’s members had been 
influenced by communist views. From Headquarters, B.M.A. Somalia to War Office, 6th December, 
1948, Ref. No. 4979; in ‘Communism in Somalia’, TNA, FO, 371/73778. 
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distinctions. Within the national project ideated by the League, this aim assumed 
special importance, in fact, it was the basic rule of the association:  
In this club neither difference of tribe nor difference of appointment will exist, 
but all the Somalis are equal and brothers.
72
 
This proposition addressed a core aspect of the clan system, that is the existence of 
inequalities and discrimination towards minority groups who were a subordinate part 
of it.
73
 In opposition to this, the party promoted links of solidarity and cooperation 
among Somalis regardless of kin affiliations. These aims were made clear by the 
League’s oath that had to be sworn by new affiliates:  
I swear by Almighty God that I will not take any action against any Somal. In 
trouble I promise to help the Somal. I will become the brother of all other 
members. I will not reveal the name of my tribe. In matters of marriage I will not 




During the first historiographic phase in Somalist studies, scholars tended to 
focus on what was seen as a tension between the modernist character of nationalism 
and the traditional features of Somali society. For instance, in the early 1960s 
Castagno contended that the League’s aims to eradicate clan-based divisions were at 
odds with the array of alliances and rivalries that characterised the clan system.
75
 
Although acknowledging the novelty of post-war nationalist politics, the issue of 
nationalism was approached through the lens of the traditional cleavages between the 
two genealogical groups which embrace Somali society, the Sab and Saamale. In 
particular, it was underscored how the Sab, which comprises the Rahaweyin and 
Digil clan families, came to be represented by clan-based parties, while the Saamale, 
consisting of Daarood, Dir, Hawiya and Isaaq clan families, came to be represented 
                                               
72 Author unknown, ‘Memorandum on Native Clubs in Somalia’ (undated, presumably March 1947); 
TNA CO 537/3641. 
73 See Ken Menkhaus, ‘Bantu Ethnic Identity in Somalia’, Annales d’Éthiopie, XIX(2003). 
74 Author unknown, ‘Memorandum on Native Clubs in Somalia’ (undated, presumably March 1947); 
TNA CO 537/3641. 
75 Castagno, ‘Somali Republic’ in Coleman, Rosberg (eds.), Political Parties, pp. 521-40. 
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by the Somali Youth League with the Daarood and Hawiya predomination.
76
 
Assessment of post-war nationalist politics remained overall sceptical and 
synthetized in 1963 by the pioneering and enthusiastic study on Somali nationalism 
by Saadia Touval who stated that ‘the most significant fact about Somali politics is 
its essentially tribal basis’.
77
  
Although these studies provided useful insights to understand the relations 
between clan affiliations and modern nationalism, they tended to gloss over the links 
between the League and the peculiar historical context in which it operated and the 
broader framework of anti-colonial nationalism in Africa. From this perspective, the 
goal of overcoming ethnic-based divisions and promoting a unifying struggle against 
colonialism represented a common feature of nationalist parties in colonial Africa. 
Examples of this trend are many: from the TANU movement in Tanganyika to the 
Nigerian Youth Movement which in 1938 included among its core objectives ‘the 
unification of the tribes of Nigeria through the encouragement of better 
understanding and cooperation to the end of creating a common ideal’.
78
 Coleman 
and Rosberg linked this trend to the One-Party-Dominant African states model 
influenced by Pan-Africanist and Pan-Arabist ideologies. This model was  
characterised as a revolutionary-centralising trend whose main aim was the 




The nationalist agenda of the Somali Youth League was similar to the 
programmes of African nationalists as it aimed to unite men and women beyond 
clans by promoting an anti-colonial (i.e. anti-Italian) struggle, national unity and 
independence. However, this programme was taken to extremes by the League. In 
fact, where the overall objective of African nationalist parties was to promote and 
                                               
76 Ioan M, Lewis, ‘Modern Political Movements in Somaliland. I’ Africa [London], 28:3 (1958) and 
‘Modern Political Movements in Somaliland. II’ Africa [London], 28:4 (1958);  Touval, Somali 
Nationalism, pp. 86-93. 
77 Touval, Somali Nationalism, p. 85. 
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achieve an alliance among different social groups or ‘tribes’, the League assumed a 
more radical position towards the clan system and called for its complete abolition 
proposing to replace it with a new, egalitarian, social structure.  
This radical stance needs to be understood within the socioeconomic context 
of the BMA, especially in relation to the impacts of the war and the British 
occupation. As will be discussed in chapter three, throughout the 1940s an increasing 
level of tension and social unrest affected certain rural areas. The collapse of colonial 
economy was coupled with shortage of food supplies, widespread looting and 
conflicts around access to resources among different clans. With the aim to restoring 
‘law and order’, the BMA implemented a policy of military commitment which 
caused more conflicts rather than ‘pacifying’ the regions. In this sense, the adoption 
of collective punishments to face raids and competition over resources proved to be 
very controversial. Largely in use during colonial rule in Africa,
80
 collective 
punishments were acts of reprisal addressed against clans or sub-clans blamed for 
looting. In studying similar measures adopted in colonial Southern Sudan, Robert 
Collins illustrated how these punishments often exacerbated divisions.
81
 As the next 
chapter discusses, the use of collective punishments had similar effects in the 
Somali-speaking regions under the BMA. It was against this background of clan-
based tension and conflicts over resources that the League formulated the policy to 
abolish the clan system as a whole. Accordingly, the League strongly opposed the 
adoption of collective punishments as testified by a 1947 ‘Letter to the Editor’ to the 
Manchester Guardian Weekly signed by Abdulqadir Saqawa Din, one of founding 
members and leaders of the party. The piece attacked the British use of collective 
punishments of increasing conflicts locally, of fostering the practice of looting, and, 
more generally, of using clan affiliations to target unarmed communities 
indiscriminately. The letter accused:   
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Collective punishment laws have been enacted and are enforced. For instance, 
some askaries [sic!] recently deserted. The livestock of their innocent tribesmen 
was seized. The criminals had not taken refuge with the tribesmen and the 
incident had taken place very many miles away from the tribal area. No livestock 
belonging to the deserters was in the hands of the tribesmen... Collective 
punishment is also the root cause of the majority of killings in Somaliland, for 
when the tribesmen get excited at such a tyrannical act and protest against it by 
stone-throwing or the futile brandishing of sticks they are shot down for rioting.
82
 
To hinder clan-based conflicts , the League proposed to formulate a new 
egalitarian social structure with no social distinctions. Records of the BMA tend to 
suggest that this proposition was successful in particular among the members of the 
League. As this policy impeded the administrative practice to register and classify 
Somali subjects according to tribal differentiations, the BMA viewed this trend 
negatively: 
It is noted here that the promise not to reveal their tribes is causing a certain 
amount of worry to the Civil Affairs Officers in their capacity as Judicial 
Officers, as it is necessary in Court cases to record the tribe of the accused and of 
the witnesses. When asked for their tribes, members of the S.Y.C. now state 
simply that they are Somals.
83
  
Although it remains difficult to establish the extent to which the League’s policy 
managed to amass supporters, that the BMA expressed some concern on the issue 
suggests the significance of these new trends.  
 
2.3.4 Horizontal comradeship and structure 
In promoting an egalitarian society that would replace the clan system and constitute 
the social cement for the Somali nation, the Somali Youth League developed a well-
articulated horizontal structure that contributed to a rapid diffusion and popularity of 
the party. The League relied on a centralised framework formed by a central 
committee of elected members who were in charge of organisational tasks. The party 
was headed by a secretary and under-secretary whose nominees were proposed by 
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the central committee and elected by the members. The political line was discussed 
by the committee in regular meetings and subsequently voted by the members. On a 
local level, the League’s branches were structured along similar lines: headed by an 
elected local committees that held a scheduled weekly meeting.
84
 By promoting 
active and universal participation to party politics locally, this well-defined 
organisational structure aimed at setting up a capillary diffusion of the League across 
the Somali-speaking regions.  
As instruments of political participation and mass mobilisation, the party’s 
structures, in particular its youth and women’s associations, played a critical role in 
the creation of a solid  supporting framework ‘from-below’. Known as the orsed,
85
 
the youth association constituted a sort of vanguard squad whose main task was 
propagandising the party’s political line and national aspirations. Similar to 
independent military units, the orsed were very small groups, formed by circa 
five/ten young party’s members wearing a red and blue cloth ( the party’s colours) 
around their necks. Due to this flexible composition, a former member recalled that 
the orsed were able to move easily and freely across regions and cities providing the 
party with essential mobility to link communities through the League’s messages.
86
  
Known as the Sisters, the women’s association was extremely active in the 
formative years of the party and their activities are vividly remembered today.
87
 In 
the 1940s, the Sisters were led by the well-known Halimo Godane and had the 
fundamental task of providing the party with funds and means of support. Since the 
League was a self-funded organisation, the Sisters not only collected money among 
sympathisers but promoted private donations by propagandising the party’s national 
programme. Oral testimonies suggest that the Sisters’ initiatives obtained frequent 
donations from local communities. Sometimes, donations were exceptionally 
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generous, as the case of a woman from Mogadishu who is remembered to have sold 
all her jewellery, giving the proceeds to the party.
88
  
Recent research conducted by Safia Aidid on the role played by women in the 
formative years of the Somali Youth League shed lights on the Sisters’ contribution 
to the proliferation of nationalist feelings. In collecting oral memories among women 
members of the League, the author underscored how poetry, ‘a platform for women’s 
grievances and self-expression’, became a politicised tool for propagandising 
nationalist agenda and for promoting political mobilisation.
89
 On a similar note, 
Lidwien Kapteijns argued that starting from the 1940s Somali nationalist discourse 
made a key use of poetry in order to construct a solid national identity combining 
elements of the past with post-war political agenda. Due to very low literacy rates 
and limited access to newspapers and magazines, oral poetry became the principal 
and most popular vehicle to let nationalist propaganda spread far and wide.
90
  Some 
of the poems composed by the Sisters became so popular that were remembered in 
oral tradition today. These poems dwelled on various subjects. Some celebrated the 
activities of the Sisters and their contribution to the national cause:    
At the time we were fighting for our flag  
Sisters, we chanted and we clapped  
Till our hands and jaws got sore  
Sisters, we sold our jewellery  
Depriving ourselves  




Others engaged more directly with the public urging the masses to join the League’s 
struggle: 
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Men are dying of sleeplessness, as they don’t come home anymore.  
They are working all night so that we succeed.  
We decided to stand by their side.  
So, Somali girls, tighten up your skirts.  
Don’t let us divide and let the gaalo buy us.  
Until we hit the target, we must not rest.
92
 
A further task that contributed to the popularity of the Sisters and, as a 
consequence, of the League was their social service to the community, especially the 
technical and supportive assistance provided to the party’s members and their 
families.
93
 This service proved to be crucial in the 1940s when local communities 
were hit by the restrictions and challenges imposed by the war economy. Besides 
funding political activities, money collected through tuition fees, private donations, 
language courses, and theatrical plays were used to support the poor, to finance 
funerals and to assist prisoners’ families and the ones in need. In setting up a welfare 
system that was supplied also with juridical and police organs,
94
 the party’s aim was 
two-fold. First, by replicating and reimagining these specific features of the Somali 
society and Islamic religion, as the social service, the juridical assistance and 
provision of help, the League publicised its nationalist political programme. Second, 
by fostering links of solidarity and cooperation among the communities, the League 
created bonds that centred on party membership rather than clan or religious 
affiliations. 
 Within the analytic framework of dual nationalism conceptualised by 
Chatterjee and discussed in chapter one, it is clear that the League began to imagine 
its national message within the ‘inner’ domain by appropriating elements of Somali 
religion and culture. At the same time, the League prepared a solid organisational 
structure to challenge colonial dominion in the ‘outer’ domain. The language policies 
promoted by the League are, in this sense, striking as they constituted a mix of 
features taken from both ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ domains. From one point of view, in 
pursuing universal education, the Somali Youth League promoted the use of the 
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Somali language especially through radio and theatre plays. It also organised 
language courses for the teaching of Osmanya, a script version of the Somali 
language created by Kenadiin Osman.
95
 From another point of view, the League 
encouraged the teaching of colonial languages English and Italian and as well as of 
Arabic.
 96
 In doing so, the League fostered a dual nationalism which had specific 
cultural elements distinct from the colonial domain, but at the same time, that 
reflected knowledge of the institutionalised patterns in use by colonial rule.   
A further example of the national features imagined by the League is 
represented by the party’s economic concerns. Although in the 1940s, the manifesto 
of the League did not present a clear economic programme, there were multiple links 
between its political programme and war impacts on local economy. Similar links 
influenced the development of nationalist politics elsewhere in Africa. In Nigeria, for 
instance, the shortage of imported goods from Europe fostered the production of 
local goods, and the consequent increase in the urban labour became a source of 
inspiration for the activities of nationalists.
97
 Conversely, in Somalia Italiana the 
partial liberalisation of the economy, following the defeat of the Italians, boosted the 
emergence of an improvised class of entrepreneurs among Somali communities. This 
class came to compete with more established classes amongst Arabs and Italians, 
some of whom had already been involved in economic activities. In advancing their 
interests, these entrepreneurs found representation in the Somali Youth League 
which, in turn, promoted their economic interests by challenging Italian and Arab 
control of market supplies and by fostering the protection of Somali interest in 
trading and agriculture. 
Despite the collapse of Italian economic monopolies over trade and 
commerce, classes of Italians and Arabs continued to dominate the economic sector 
in the 1940s. For this reason, the economic features of the nation imagined by the 
League were the domain of Somali communities exclusively. In this sense, the party 
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proposed a ‘peaceful eviction’ of the Arab communities from the trade industry and 
imposed a racial restriction over its membership,
98
 precluding Arab and Italian 
communities from joining the club. This circumstance reflected a tension between 
some urban members of the League and the Arab traders and shop-keepers leading to 
violent riots in 1947 in which a few Arabs were killed.
99
 
Additionally, the party advanced Somali shares in the economy by calling 
Italian control of market supply and production into question. In opposition to this 
monopoly, the party fostered a series of economic initiatives in agriculture, the most 
profitable economic sector of the time. By engaging directly with colonial 
agricultural investments, the League set up new agricultural enterprises such as the 
co-operative Millebraccia, (literally ‘Thousand Arms’), which enhanced the active 
participation of Somali cultivators in business management and profit sharing, 
marking a completely opposite trend with respect to colonial enterprises.
100
 Once 
again, the creation of these enterprises is indicative of the ways in which the League 
made use of elements of Somali culture, elements taken from colonial economic rule, 
and transformed these into new initiatives. Agricultural enterprises promoted by the 
League resembled features of agricultural settlements based on a religious 
character,
101
 and at the same time of colonial agricultural enterprises. These 
initiatives in agriculture were also the party’s response to wartime necessities and the 
British occupation that, as it will be discussed in chapter three, heavily affected 
Somali agriculture and agricultural communities.  
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As discussed, the League developed a centralised, well-defined structural 
organisation that promoted and reimagined Somali cultural life and set up a solid 
framework to challenge foreign dominion within its own domain. In doing so, the 
party fostered horizontal relations by advancing activities of youth and women’s 
associations. In establishing constant participation and dialogue with the wider 
community, this type of party organisation sought and fostered support ‘from-
below’. Although this process was at an embryonic stage, appreciating the features of 
this imagined nation is important to understand its interaction with state-craft of the 
trusteeship system. As will be developed in chapter four, five and six, the 
decolonisation programme imposed institutional features that differed from the 1940s 
politics affecting the whole national project of the League.   
 
 
2.4 Support and popularity of the League: the 1940s 
campaigns for the project of Greater Somalia 
One of the striking features of Somali nationalist politics in the 1940s was the 
remarkable and widespread support that the Somali Youth League and the project of 
Greater Somalia managed to amass across the Somali-speaking regions within a few 
months. Originally drafted in 1941, although not publicised by the British 
government until 1946, the idea to create a Greater Somalia was advanced by the 
British who encouraged international community to maintain the modifications of the 
colonial settings made by the Italians during the war. After the occupation of 
Ethiopia in 1936 and of the British Somaliland in 1941, the Italians placed the 
Somali speaking regions of Ogaden, Haud, Reserved Areas (RA),
102
 and British 
Somaliland under the administration of Somalia Italiana, creating in this way a 
single centralised Somali-speaking region which they called the Grande Somalia, i.e. 
Greater Somalia. After the war, with the two-fold goal to hinder the restoration of 
Italian rule and to promote their interest in the Horn of Africa, the British encouraged 
the activities of the Somali Youth League. At least until 1947, the BMA and the 
League shared the same objective which was the achievement of Greater Somalia 
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under a British-led international trusteeship. Accordingly, the British advanced the 
creation of Greater Somalia during the international negotiations on the future of 
former Italian colonies, whilst in the Horn of Africa the Somali Youth League began 
to militantly propagandise the same goal.  
Due to the procrastinations of the UN debate on former colonies, the British 
administration kept control over the Ogaden until 1946 and over the Haud and RA 
until 1954 even if Ethiopian sovereignty over these regions was ratified by the 1944 
Anglo-Ethiopian agreement. The extension of the British rule in these regions led 
Somali nationalists and nationalist sympathisers believe that the UN would decide 
eventually for a united Greater Somalia under international administration even when 
it became clear that the British had ended their support for the plan.
103
 Most notably, 
in the Ogaden, RA and Haud large crowds of Ogaden Somalis frequently 
demonstrated against Ethiopia and in favour of the Great Somalia idea,
104
 with the 
slogan ‘Somali Hanolato Ethiopian Hadimto’, (‘long live Somalia, death to 
Ethiopia’).
105
 By 1946, the League had become very popular, with numerous sections 
in the regions aiming for nationalist propaganda to reach ‘each corner of the 
Ogaden’.
106
 Support to the idea of Greater Somalia was also mustered in the 
Northern Frontier District in Kenya,
107
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In understanding the rapid popularity of the League, scholars advanced 
different interpretations. The pioneering works on Somali politics by Lewis and 
Touval explained this support for the project of Greater Somalia in terms of ethnic 
homogeneity.
109
 More recent interpretations provided further insight on the issue. In 
particular, Cedric Barnes linked the expansion of the Somali Youth League in 
Ethiopian Somali-speaking regions to the emergence of a class of Somalis who 
benefited from the war developments. From the perspective argued in this chapter, 
the project of Greater Somalia managed to catalyse the aspirations of a group of 
Somalis that benefitted from the Italian occupation and supported the project of 
Greater Somalia to oppose the restoration of the Ethiopian rule.
110
 A similar 
perspective can be adopted to understand support to the League in Somalia Italiana, 
where an emerging class of entrepreneurs began to benefit from the collapse of 
Italian economic system, the establishment of the BMA and joined the League to 
advance and protect their interests. The discussion of the League’s membership 
provided in this chapter illustrated how party’s affiliates were brought together by 
the wartime experiences and the opportunities arisen following the change of regime. 
The fact that the administrative future of Somalia Italiana was pending further UN 
decisions contributed to increase the popularity of the party which called for a united 
Greater Somalia free from Italian rule.   
Although the project of unifying the Somali-speaking regions and irredentism 
came to be a distinct feature of post-independence politics, people’s support to 
Greater Somalia and to the League achieved a climax in the 1940s. This was linked 
to the development of the UN debate on former Italian colonies, which is matter of 
debate of the next chapter, and culminated with the UN decision to send a special 
commission, namely the Four Powers Commission, to investigate local aspirations in 
1947/48. On the occasion of the visit of the commission in Mogadishu in January 
1948, political activism and competition among different groups increased 
remarkably. During its visit, the Commission scheduled hearings with representatives 
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of local economic, social and political groups and encouraged parties to organise 
demonstrations to express their aspirations. However, as discussed in the next 
chapter, the encouragement of political activism by the Commission proved to be 
problematic in the area. In the 1940s Somalia, political activities bloomed but in a 
context of an organisational vacuum. Intensification of their activities in anticipation 
of the visit of the UN commission increased local competition between different 
groups. Within this context, Italian groups, represented by elements linked to the 
former colonial administration, took advantage of their privileged position and 
financial support from the Italian government to the detriment of the League.  
By the late 1947, the confrontation between pro-Italian groups and the 
League escalated in Somalia Italiana and in Mogadishu especially. From 1947, a 
group of Italian clerks working for or in collusion with the town council, under the 
leadership of the municipal secretary Vincenzo Calzia, contributed to increase local 
tension through propaganda. For instance, the local newspaper of the Italian 
Christian Democrats,  Il Popolo, published a series of articles which expressed 
admiration for the ‘achievements’ of the Italian colonial rule. This provoked violent 
reactions: in December 1947 a series of attacks targeted members of Italian 
community involved in the propaganda: a hand-grenade was thrown at the catholic 
printing house (where Il Popolo was printed); further hand-grenades targeted public 
places attended by Italians.
111
  
The tension culminated in January 1948 when the two groups clashed 
violently. On 11
th
 January, the last day of the commission’s visit in Mogadishu, the 
Somali Youth League planned to organise their largest demonstration to date in 
favour of the project of Greater Somalia and to express opposition to Italian rule. In 
order to make a good impression on the Commission and to overshadow the 
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demonstrations that were held by pro-Italian groups in the previous days, the party 
mobilised supporters from Mogadishu and areas nearby the city. Pro-Italian groups 
decided to organise a counter-demonstration in order to hinder the success of the 
League. Possibly due to some misunderstanding between the BMA and the 
Commission,
112
 large crowds supporting different groups gathered in Mogadishu and 
clashed violently. Within an hour, 70 people were killed (53 Italians and 17 Somalis 
of which 5 or 6 among the League’s supporters and 11 or 12 among the pro-Italian 
supporters, 1 Arab/Yemeni), and hundreds were injured. Italian-owned properties 
were systematically looted together with shops owned by Arab/Yemeni community. 
Reconstructing the Mogadishu Riots is a difficult task. The surviving BMA 
records offer conflicting and unclear versions; whilst Italian documents of the Riots 
are virtually non-existent. Soon after the Riots, special commissions of inquiry were 
formed by the BMA and the Italian government. Further investigations were carried 
out by the UN Commission which was stationed in the area. However, the BMA did 
not manage to determine what happened that day, nor was it possible to ascertain 
responsibilities, direct and indirect, of the Riots. As a result, scholarly accounts are 
limited by a lack of historically grounded research of the event.
113
 Despite the 
paucity of reliable information on the event, looking at the memories of the 
Mogadishu Riots is useful for achieving a broader understanding of the political 
tension and activism that characterised Mogadishu in 1948.  
Two unpublished eyewitness accounts of the Riots have been collected for 
this research providing useful insights on the event. The first account was reported 
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by Mike Allcock, a soldier of the BMA who was stationed in Mogadishu. From this 
account, it appears that, the BMA did not expect an escalation of violence: many 
soldiers were not even on duty on that (Sunday) morning. As the local police force, 
the Somali Gendarmerie were predominantly supporters of the League, the BMA 
proved to be structurally unable to deal with the conflict between the League and 
other groups. The Gendarmerie not only proved to be inadequate to stop the riots but 
some policemen took active part in the looting and killing. Another element to 
consider is the degree of social tension that characterised Mogadishu at the time 
which was a matter of concern for the Italians and British soldiers alike: 
Tensions continued to rise as a date for a UN referendum [the visit of the Four 
Powers Commission] was set. The Somali population of Mogadishu began to 
swell as tribal groups came in to make their feelings known. One Sunday 
morning [January, 11], which we invariably spent on the beach and swimming, a 
young Somali boy came up to me and said that there was big trouble in the town. 
The Somalis had started to massacre their former colonial masters and loot their 
homes[…]As we approached the built up area, there was a crowd of rioters on 
one side of the road and a truck load of gendarmerie driving down the other who 
promptly opened fire across our front as they drew near. We were sandwiched in 
the middle and how we got through without taking a hit I will never know.  
[…W]e headed home to be armed and stood to for self-defence while the 
gendarmerie tried to regain control of the situation but being too close to the 
politics did not manage too well. The KAR, being Kenyan stock, could and 
would have stopped the riot much quicker but were held back. Some of the 
surviving Italians started to arrive at the workshop and we opened up unused 
buildings to make a refugee camp, after a few days as things quietened down we 
escorted small groups back to their former homes to try to recover any 
possessions not looted but it was a pretty hopeless task. Some of the males had 




From a Somalian perspective, Benvenuto Francesco Issaq’s memories of the 
event provide more insights on the Riots. Benvenuto was seventeen at the time. He 
attended the Collegio in Mogadishu, worked for the catholic printing house and, 
despite being close to the Italian community, he was a passionate supporter of the 
League. His story tells us about the expectations of the League’s supporters who 
                                               
114 Allcock’s account.  
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worked hard to prepare a large and spectacular demonstration which would parade 
before the UN Commission. Supporters saw the rally as offering an opportunity for 
the League to make their voices heard to the international community. From this 
account, it appears that tension and fears were palpable and it was anticipated that the 
two opposing fronts - pro-Italian and the League- were about to clash. Moreover, 
Benvenuto recalls the frustration political activists felt when their opponents, the pro-
Italian supporters, spoiled the League’s plans. As it appears, the reaction of the 
League’s supporters was rapid and furious: 
Following the arrival of the UN Commission, demonstrations were organised in 
the town. For four consecutive days in the afternoons, lorries loaded with Somalis 
and Italians demonstrated with big tricolore flags [i.e. Italian flags] asking for the 
return of Italian rule in Somalia. It went on in this way until Saturday. 
Demonstrations took place freely without any incidents. 
[…] The Somali Youth League demanded permission to hold demonstration only 
one day, the Sunday (which was the last day for the Commission in 
Mogadishu)[…] In this way the League had enough time to prepare its own 
demonstration and made thousands of members from the hinterlands to pour in 
Mogadishu. Everything was ready that Sunday morning. The organisers intended 
to arrange a spectacular demonstration which would cast shadow over the 
previous demonstrations. 
[…]Early that Sunday morning, followers of the League gathered in the large 
open court outside the city, just before the Italian cemetery. From there, they 
were supposed to leave at nine o’ clock and to head towards the city. Several 
thousands of people were meant to parade along the streets of the city carrying 
the party flags which were also tied around their necks and their left wrists. 
[…]Pro-Italian members attacked the headquarters of the League which were, at 
the moment, unattended, killing five or six members, including a woman,
115
 and 
setting the place on fire. Two members escaped from the attack and rushed to the 
rally to inform of the assault the people who had gathered there. Soon after, the 
attackers reached the rally with bows and arrows and made a few injured before 
running away. Once the injured were taken away, people at the rally headed 
towards the headquarters of the League. There, they saw the building on fire and 
the dead on the ground. They got blinded by rage. The possibility to set a big 
demonstration-show, that had been organised with a great deal of effort and 
money, vanished. Thus, they decided to get revenge. They said: let’s not attack 
                                               
115 Hawa Osman Taako. During Siad Barre’s regime a monument was erected to rember her death. On 
the ways in which she is remerbered today see Adid, ‘Haweenku Wa Garab’. 
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our Somali opponents who are mercenaries; instead, let’s attack their clients, let’s 
hit the Italians who paid and instigated them to do what they did. The mass 
flowed into the city. Many were armed with daggers and sticks (Somali civilians 
did not possess fire guns) [sic!] and began to attack every Italian they met on the 
street. Instead, the Italians were completely oblivious of what was going on and 
moved along freely dressed up for the festivity [i.e. Sunday mass]. They sought 
escape too late. Many sheltered in their own houses; others found refuge in the 
churches, schools [and other public buildings]… the attackers with the blue and 
red flag around their necks and wrists, knives and sticks entered bars, restaurants, 
clubs and other places owned by the Italians, killing and injuring the ones who 
were inside. Whole families were slaughtered which is contrary to the Somali 
custom according to which women and children must be spared in the event of 
conflict. A few places were looted by hungry people. That evening, the hospitals 
De Martino and Rava were full of injured and dead. British military authorities 
did nothing or very little to restore order and to stop the massacre and looting. No 
gunshots were heard. This made us believe that the police had not been deployed 




The Mogadishu Riots represented a turning point in the development of local 
and international politics. As the Italians had been heavily hit during the riots, the 
UN Commission assumed a more sympathetic attitude towards them during the 
hearings.
117
 Due to the active role played by the Somali Gendarmerie during the 
riots, the BMA started to deal with the members of the Somali Youth League with 
caution. At the same time, the British and Italian governments decided to work 
together to improve their diplomatic relations.
118
 Conversely, the reputation of the 
Somali Youth League was tarnished in the eyes of the international community, as 
they were seen as responsible the massacre. The unforeseen consequence of the 
eruption of violence during the visit of the UN Commission was that the Italian 
                                               
116 Benvenuto Francesco Issaq’s account. For an Italian eyewitness account of the Riots see 
Gianfranco Fazzini, ‘Parla un Testimone a 50 Anni dalla Strage: Mogadiscio 11 Gennaio 1948: La 
Caccia agli Italiani’, Studi Piacentini, 22(1997). 
117So the comments of the Chief Civil Affairs Officer: ‘The Court is of the opinion that many officers 
[i.e. the BMA] have been more sympathetic to Somali than Italian aspirations. On the other hand, the 
Court, influenced no doubt by the sufferings of the Italians, shows a distinct sympathy for the Italian 
minority and antipathy towards the Somalis.’ D.C. Cumming, ‘Comments on the Proceedings in the 
Court of Inquiry to Investigate the Mogadishu Disturbances of January 11th 1948’, 11th March 1948; 
TNA, FO, 1015/12.   
118 ‘Our relation with Italy has now changed [i.e. is improving] but under colonial conditions it is 
expecting too much to suppose that the relations of administrative officers in close personal touch 
with the people they administer, will change as quickly.’, Ibid.. 
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position with the UN was promoted and the Commission eventually decided to re-
establish Italian rule in Somalia. 
Despite the wave of repression that followed the Mogadishu Riots, the 
League was able to mobilise supporters on subsequent occasions, particularly in 
Mogadishu. Less known but more significant with respect to the political 
involvement of the League’s supporters, riots took place in Mogadishu in October 
1949 following the provision of the final UN decisions on the administrative future 
of Somalia Italiana. Although by 1948 it became readily apparent that the UN were 
going to decide for an Italian administration, the delays in the UN debate kept 
nationalists’ hopes alive. Political supporters and sympathisers anxiously awaited the 
final decision, for example, many gathered together to follow the news on the 
radio.
119
 Once the UN decisions were broadcasted and the restoration of Italian rule 
under trusteeship administration announced, two thousand League supporters 
gathered in the outskirt of Mogadishu to protest against the resolutions. By doing so, 
the protesters broke the curfew imposed by the BMA that required local communities 
to remain indoors after 7 pm and this was used to justify the repression of the 
demonstration. The riots sparked a harsh confrontation between the political 
supporters of the League and the BMA during which the protesters refused to 
terminate demonstrations and the BMA ordered the police to open fire against the 
crowd. In this way, the protesters broke and reformed their ranks a few times before 




Following the wave of repression against Somali nationalist activities, the 
idea of Great Somalia was temporarily put aside. Although gradually all political 
parties included the nationalist idea in their final aims, political demonstrations 
linked to the explicit goal of Greater Somalia became sporadic. Following the 
restoration of Italian rule, political organisations were denied access to the political 
                                               
119 Maryan Muuse Boqor’s memories recalled the moment vividly: ‘In the house in Hamarweyne, the 
men would gather downstairs in the courtyard to listen to the radio news, while the women were 
upstairs at windows overlooking this space’, Kapteijns, Muuse Boqor, ‘Memories of a Mogadishu 
Childhood’, p. 113. 
120 Mr Gamble, Telegram n. 87 from Mogadishu to the Foreign Office, 5th October, 1949; in ‘Political 
Situation in Somalia’, TNA, FO, 371/73795. 
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arena and were allowed a very limited representation in the exercise of governance. 
Any power was limited to local and bureaucratic matters. Irredentism remained the 
final goal of political parties but the nationalist campaign was put aside and revived 
in 1954, as will be discussed in chapter six, when the project of Greater Somalia 
became the spur to the unification of Somalia Italiana and British Somaliland.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
By investigating the historical developments that concerned former Somalia Italiana 
during the wartime, the chapter examined the emergence of Somali nationalism 
looking at the Somali Youth League. The main argument suggested that affiliations 
to the League were based on a common sense of belonging and by sharing common 
experiences during wartime. Particular importance was given to the socioeconomic 
context of Mogadishu and it was argued that the period was characterised by a series 
of possibilities and restrictions dictated by the military occupation and the wartime 
economy that fostered private initiatives and economic activities enhancing urban 
social cohesion. This context influenced the make up of the membership and the 
policies of the League.  
Moreover, the chapter argued that the establishment of the League marked 
the emergence of a new way of conceiving nationalist politics. With reference to 
Chatterjee’s formulation of dyadic nationalism, the chapter showed that the League 
promoted a certain kind of nationalism which had specific elements of the Somali 
‘inner’ domain. In doing so, the League created a series of horizontal structures that 
were created to enhance the party’s popularity. The ‘youth’ character of the League’s 
formative years influenced the conceptualisation of the party politics constituting a 
revolutionary attitude and a new way of conceiving nationalist politics. From this 
perspective, where the early anti-colonial politics resisted colonial domination in the 
‘inner’ domain by imagining, preserving and reforming its own cultural identity,
121
 
                                               
121 Sayid Maxamed Cabdhulle Xasan’s 21-year long struggle against colonial occupation is perhaps 
the most well-known. See Robert L. Hess, ‘The Poor Man of God. Muhammad Abdullah Hassan’ in 
Norman R. Bennett (ed.) Leadership Eastern Africa. Six Political Biographies, (Boston: Boston 
University Press, 1968); G. Nicolosi, Imperialismo e Resistenza in Corno d’Africa: Mohammed 
Abdullah Hassan e il Derviscismo somalo 1899-1920, (Catanzaro: Rubettino, 2002); A. Sheik-Abdi 
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nationalist movements engaged directly with the foreign rule within its own 
framework or ‘outer’ domain. In this way, by assimilating the ‘outer’ domain, 
nationalists were prepared to questioning the Italian claims of dominion formally. As 
discussed, at first the League’s (re)imagined a new ‘inner’ domain by making use of 
Somali language or religious elements.  
Although the political trends analysed in the chapter were still taking shape in 
the 1940s, appreciating their characteristics is important to understand how these 
features were shaped by the politics of decolonisation and especially in relation to the 
institutional framework implemented during the trusteeship administrations. As it 
will be argued in chapter four, this framework was characterised by vertical 
structures that were opposed to the horizontal features and structures promoted by 
the League in the 1940s. The ‘verticalisation’ of Somali political space affected the 
project of Greater Somalia and of Somali unification which would lose its inclusive 
character and become the domain of a restricted political leadership. In the short-
term, the transformation of nationalism into a vertical structure of power led to 
neglecting the needs of southern regions that were in a minority position. As the next 
chapter argues, in the 1940s for these communities the significant impact of the war 
and British occupation led them in a different direction to that of the supporters of 
the League so that some decided to back pro-Italian political organisations 
 
                                                                                                                                     
Divine Madness. Mohammed Abdulle Hassan (1856-1920), (London: Zed Books Ldt., 1993); Sais S. 
Samatar, Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism. The case of Sayyid Mahammad ‘Abdille Hasan. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
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Chapter 3: Enforcing political competition:  
the UN commission of investigation, the 
consolidation of the ‘pro-Italia’ and 
radicalisation of political conflicts 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter investigated features of Somali nationalism which emerged in 
responses to the Second World War. It was argued that the establishment of the 
BMA was followed by socio-economic dynamism in Mogadishu which influenced 
the political ideology, aims and structure of the Somali Youth League. The 
development of an international debate, led by the UN on the administrative future of 
former Italian colonies, raised nationalist aspirations and possibilities of territorial 
unification of the Somali-speaking regions – i.e. the idea of Greater Somalia. This 
chapter discusses how the protraction of the international debate and the extension of 
the British military administration caused the radicalisation of conflicts among 
different groups and the consolidation of a political front which successfully backed 
Italian rule before the UN. In exploring these issues, the chapter reveals the dynamics 
behind the restoration of Italian rule and how these shaped Somali political space 
thereafter. 
Firstly, the chapter discusses the main features of the UN debate and argues 
that the delays of the international community coupled with their decision to send a 
special commission of investigation into the area urged local communities to 
organise politically. The approach adopted by the UN forced local communities to 
choose between an Italian or British trusteeship. This restricted choice led some 
southern and agriculturist communities to join the pro-Italian political front. In order 
to appreciate their political stance, the chapter discusses the socioeconomic impacts 
of the war and of an extended military occupation. It is maintained that some policies 
adopted by the BMA proved to be inadequate when faced with the collapse of the 
colonial economy; the unrest that followed the war created strong dissent to British 
rule. Subsequently, the chapter explores Italian strategies at constructing local 
Imagining the Nation, Crafting the State 
Enforcing political competition  88 
backing by making use of dissent to the BMA. As a result, Italian policies increased 
and radicalised conflicts among different groups in Somalia Italiana, in particular 
between the pro-Italian political front and the Somali Youth League. This division 
affected the development of Somali politics in the 1950s and after independence.  
 
3.2 The UN debate and the ‘pro-Italia’ political front 
There have been intertwined relations between the UN debate on former Italian 
colonies and the development of local politics in Somalia Italiana. Starting at the 
Peace Conference in 1945, the UN debate took longer than excepted, only reaching a 
final decision in November 1949. The delay of discussions was mainly due to the 
inability of the Great Powers, Britain, France, Soviet Union and United States, to 
agree upon the issue.
1
 The conflicting interests of the Cold War led their official 
positions to change radically over the time period. At a first stage, there was a 
general consensus that no colonies would be returned to Italy under any form of 
mandate. However, as soon as the British proposed a trusteeship administration of 
Greater Somalia in 1946, other powers became more concerned with preventing 
British interests in the area. Additionally, Cold War alliances caused a general 
improvement of international relations with the Italian government, which had by 
1946 assumed pro-Western features.
2
 Further issues arose around the possibility of 
communist influences in the region in the event of Soviet Union-led administration. 
                                               
1 For an account of the international debate on former Italian colonies see Gianluigi Rossi, ‘Le 
Colonie Italiane alla Conferenza di Potsdam (Luglio-Agosto 1945)’, Africa[Rome], XXVIII:4 (1973); 
Gianluigi Rossi, ‘Guerra Fredda e Questione delle ex Colonie Italiane nel 1947’, Africa[Rome], 
XXXIII:4 (1978); Gianluigi Rossi, L’Africa Italiana verso l’Indipendenza (1941-1949), (Milan: 
Giuffrè, 1980); Saul Kelly, Cold War in the Desert: Britain, the United States and the Italian 
Colonies, 1945-52, (London: Macmillan, 2000); Saul Kelly, ‘Britain, the United States, and the End 
of the Italian Empire in Africa, 1940-52’, in Kent Fedorowich, Martin Thomas (eds), International 
Diplomacy and Colonial Retreat, (London and Portland: Frank Cass, 2001). 
2 These improvements led to the agreements between Italy and Britain, the Bevin-Sforza plan. See 
Gat, Britain and Italy; Count Sforza, Cinque Anni a Palazzo Chigi. La Politica Estera Italiana dal 
1947 al 1951, (Rome: Atlante, 1952); Gian Paolo Calchi Novati, ‘La Sistemazione delle Colonie 
Italiane dell’Africa Orientale e i Condizionamenti della Guerra Fredda’, in Angelo Del Boca, Le 
Guerre Coloniali del Fascismo, (Bari: Laterza, 1991). 
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For all these reasons, opposition to Italy became weaker within the UN and the 
prospect of returning colonies to Italy more solid if not necessary.
3
 
In many ways, the delays of the UN negotiations and the Powers’ shifting 
attitudes had negative effects in Somalia and Eritrea alike. In particular, the 1947 
decision of the UN to form a special commission, the Four Powers Commission, 
which would visit the colonies and investigate on the political aspirations of local 
communities, increased competitions locally.
4
 In late 1947, the Commission travelled 
to the Horn of Africa and remained in the area until January 1948. During this time, 
hearings were planned with communities’ representatives who were asked to express 
their political aspirations before the commission. In spite of this democratic approach 
to pursuing a resolution by taking into consideration local aspirations, the decision to 
send a special commission had major effects on the development of local politics in 
former Italian colonies. In scheduling hearings with representatives of economic, 
political and social groups, the UN urged local communities to organise politically. 
This, however, became problematic due to the organisational vacuum that 
characterised former Italian colonies. Where, as argued in the last chapter, socio-
economic and political dynamism mushroomed following the Italian defeat, this 
process was still consolidating in the 1940s. The immediate result of enforcing 
political competition was that groups that possessed more resources, that held key 
positions in economic productive sectors, or that had access to means of propaganda, 
became necessarily more visible. Among these groups, the Italians were able to 
secure a restoration of their rule by supporting an umbrella association, namely the 
Conferenza per la Somalia. The next paragraphs present the main characteristics of 




                                               
3 Despite the initial plans of the UN, by 1948 the prospect of returning colonial possessions to Italy 
seemed the only way to overcome the international impasse. Out of  former Italian colonies, Somalia 
was the poorest and where international interests were less predominant. 
4 On Eritrea see Iyob, The Eritrean Struggle; Lloyd Ellingson, ‘The Emergence of Political Parties in 
Eritrea, 1941-1950’, The Journal of African History, XVIII:2 (1977). 
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3.2.1 The ‘pro-Italia’ 
The ‘pro-Italia’
5
 were members of the umbrella association, namely Conferenza per 
la Somalia, that had been founded by the Italians in 1947 to back their return before 
the Four Power Commission of investigation. The organisations which joined the 
Conferenza were social-oriented groups which emerged in the mid-1940s in Somalia 
Italiana, especially in the riverine agriculturist regions and Banaadir coast. Among 
these associations which had no defined political programme, there were the Patriotic 
Benefit Union, also known as Jumiya, founded on June, 6, 1943 in Mogadishu with 
some generous donations of the Arab/Yemeni community, the Hizbia Digil and 
Mirifle founded in 1946, and the Abgal Youth Association, Hidaiet al Islam Shdle e 
Mobilen, and Bimal Union.
6
 They shared certain socially-oriented concerns, as for 
instance they encouraged assistance for the poor, and promoted the interests and 
protection of local communities with special regard to the agricultural sector, trade 
and commerce. Their activities were localised to the southern agriculturist regions, in 
particular, they had active branches in Afgooye, Wanla Weyn, Bur Hakaba,  
Baydhabo, Jowhar and Mahadaay Weyn.
7
  
The emergence of the Conferenza was the result of a joint effort between 
former colonial masters, the Italian government and members of the above 
mentioned associations. In the 1940s Italian economic interests lied in Somali 
agriculture, in particular in the production of sugar and the banana plantations 
controlled by Italian settlers or concessionaries. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, 
these settlers, perhaps a hundred families, enjoyed financial support from the 
metropole which imposed a monopoly according to which bananas had to be 
imported from Italian plantations in Somalia exclusively.
8
 As Ernesto Rossi, an 
Italian journalist, emphasised in the late 1940s, although the Italian settlers in 
Somalia were numerically few, they constituted a powerful economic lobby that 
                                               
5 So they are referred to in oral memories. Research notes, March 2009, London. 
6 Author unknown, ‘Memorandum on Native Clubs in Somalia’ (undated, presumably March 1947); 
in TNA, CO, 537/3641. 
7 By 1947, the membership of the Union and Hizbia, for instance, was estimated to be of 
approximately 1,000 subscriptions each in Mogadishu. Ibid.. 
8 Hess, Italian Colonialism, p. 165. 
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influenced the policies of post-war Italian governments.
9
 As discussed later in this 
chapter, the presence of these economic interests led the Italian government to 
finance ‘pro-Italia’ propaganda and the creation of a political front.
10
 In this way, by 
the end of 1947, the Conferenza managed to complete a 23-point programme for the 
UN commission that called for a 30-year international administration under Italy. 






Map.3.1. Southern Somalia, the Lower Shabeelle Valley. Source: Cassanelli, 
The Shaping of Somali Society, p. 184.  
 
Assessing the reasons why certain Somali associations joined the Conferenza 
and backed Italy before the UN is a difficult task. First, very little is known about 
                                               
9 Before the war, there were 38 concessionaries along the Juba river (1,500 hectares under 
cultivation); 143 concessionaries in Jaanale (4,000 hectares under cultivation); 25 agricultural 
enterprises in Afgooye cultivating bananas. Ernesto Rossi, Settimo: Non Rubare. Le Scorribande dei 
Potentati Economici e le Connivenze Politico-Affaristiche nell’Italia del primo Dopoguerra (Milan: 
KAOS Edizioni, 2002), p. 453. 
10 Del Boca, Nostalgia delle Colonie, pp. 168-79. 
11 Bullotta, La Somalia Sotto Due Bandiere, p. 183. 
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these associations due to the paucity of first-hand research conducted on this political 
front by an early generation of scholars who, instead, focused on the majority party, 
the Somali Youth League. This trend was not confined to Somalia but concerned the 
study of African nationalist politics at the time. As underscored by Aristide Zolberg 
in a 1966 study of the party-states in West Africa, there was a tendency among 
scholars of African politics to concentrate on large and dominant political 
organisations and to conform their views ‘through the eyes of the winners’. For this 
reason, scholarly accounts of African politics have often underestimated the 




On a different level, accounts of the ‘pro-Italia’ political front have been 
influenced by biases related to the Allied campaign and propaganda against fascism. 
As highlighted in chapter one, these biases were characterised by a narrative which 
simplified the differences between ‘enemies’ and ‘winners’, the ‘bad’ and ‘good’ 
side, and correspondingly, between former Italian rule and the BMA. This discourse 
affected the documents that were produced on Somali socio-political organisations. 
Within this context, the ‘pro-Italia’ belonged to the ‘bad’ side and their political 
stance and claims were therefore ridiculed. Moreover, as their activities and support 
was localised to certain area and communities, their aspirations were discarded. 
Accordingly, the BMA often described the ‘pro-Italia’ as ‘tribal’ and ‘badly 
organised’ in opposition to the League which was instead depicted as a ‘national’, 
‘modern’, and ‘progressive’ organisation.
13
 This discourse had a long-lasting 
influence on scholarly production. For instance, while compiling an account on the 
dispositions of former Italian colonies in the 1950s, Silvya Pankhurst, dedicated little 
attention to this political front whose claims were discredited as being ‘naive’, whose 
accusations against the BMA were reported as ‘exaggerations’, whose statements on 




                                               
12 Zolberg, Creating Political Order, p. 9. 
13 Author unknown, ‘Memorandum on Native Clubs in Somalia’ (undated, presumably March 1947); 
TNA CO 537/3641. 
14 Pankhurst, Ex-Italian Somaliland, pp. 238-9. 
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Furthermore, the political aspirations of the ‘pro-Italia’ had been discarded by 
an early generation of scholars who had approached their political activism in terms 
of the traditional cleavages between Sab and Saamale. From this perspective, the Sab 
communities comprised the majority of the Somali Youth League, and Saamale 
sedentary communities came to be associated with the Conferenza. This perspective 
led some scholars to suggest that the ‘pro-Italia’ political stance had to be understood 
as a clan-based reaction to the ideals and aims of the League.
15
 Despite the fact that 
during the last two decades in which historiographies on Somali studies have been 
widely revised, blind spots remain on the ‘pro-Italia’. Recently, Somali author 
Mukthar investigated the development of pre-independence politics among southern 
communities, however he glossed over the support of certain associations for Italian 
rule.
16
 This neglect is problematic because certain biases still characterise scholarly 
literature in which the ‘pro-Italia’ bear the stigma of having favoured the return of 
Somalia to Italy. For instance, Prunier’s recent comparative essay on British and 
Italian colonial rule in Somalia and Somaliland deals with the ‘pro-Italia’ supporters 
in terms of bribes, corruption and as the result of Italian muddling: 
Italian agents, working undercover within the framework of the Four Powers 
Commission, organised pro-Italian groups in the loosely-coordinated Conferenza 
and also helped start the Hizbil Digil Mirifle Somali (HDMS)
17
, a clanic party 
based on the southern Rahaweyn (Digil Mirifle) clans… [In order to advance its 
own interests, the Italian government] kept selecting and backing tribes – that is, 
clans or sub-clans – which were filoitaliani (‘pro-Italian’). These included the 
                                               
15 So Alphonse Castagno: ‘the basic reasons for their formation stemmed from clan issues and the fear 
of SYL [Somali Youth League] radicalism’, Castagno, ‘Somali Republic’, in Coleman, Rosberg 
(eds.), Political Parties, pp. 523-4. 
16
 In investigating issues related to resistance to colonialism among riverine communities, the author 
makes important contribution to Somalist debates. However, he does not deal with the issue of the 
‘pro-Italia’. In fact, his study on the Hizbia Digil & Mirifle rules out the possibility that the party 
played an active role among the ‘pro-Italia’: ‘The Hizbia Dighil Mirifle initially supported the 
Somalia conference, but soon denounced it and requested the Trusteeship of any government chosen 
by Four Powers… Though we cannot exclude Hizbia from the pro-Italian tendency, it never 
advocated the return of the Italians.’ Mukthar, ‘The Emergence and Role of Political Parties’, p. 78. 
See also his account of pre-independence politics in the area: Mohamed Haji Mukthar, ‘The Plight of 
the Agro-Pastoral Society of Somalia’, Review of African Political Economy, 23:70 (1996), p. 548. 
17 In fact, Prunier mistakes the name of the party. In 1946, it was called the Hizbia Digil & Mirifle 
(HDM). As it will be discussed in chapter five, due to special legislation adopted by the first 
Legislative Assembly in 1956 which forbade the use of clannish nomenclatures for political 
organisations, the party became  Hizbia Dastur Mustakil Somali (HDMS), the Somali Independent 
Constitutional Party. 
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Rahanweyn of the HDMS of course, but also the Somali Bantu, various small 
coastal clans like the Biimaal and, among the larger clan families, those like the 
Marrexaan among the Darood or several Abgal groups among the Hawiye who 
proved open to blandishments, often of a financial nature.
18
  
By stressing the ‘loosely-coordinated’ features of the ‘pro-Italia’ and their ‘openness’ 
to Italian bribing, this discourse ridiculed the political front without engaging with 
the reasons behind its political stance. In order to shed light on the human agency of 
the ‘pro-Italia’ there is need to take into account the historical framework represented 
by the British military occupation, the development of the UN debate and the options 
that were on offer at the time.   
 
 
3.2.2 ‘Choosing between the devil and the deep blue sea’: the 
BMA and Italian rule 
The democratic approach of the UN to the issue of former Italian colonies was, in 
fact, very limited. The Four Powers Commission urged local representatives to 
express their aspirations by reducing these to two, or at best three, choices: federation 
with Ethiopia or international trusteeship (either under Italy or Britain) in Eritrea; 
international trusteeship under Britain or Italy in Somalia Italiana.
19
  As far as the 
latter is concerned, the reports of the commission divided political organisations 
between two main fronts: the Somali Youth League, the foremost local organisation, 
which proposed an international trusteeship for Somalia excluding categorically a 
restoration of Italian rule; and the Conferenza per la Somalia, which instead 
advanced an Italian trusteeship. The restrictive choice represented by the visit of the 
commission had the consequence of radicalising the division between different 
groups and to reduce it to two groups with long-lasting effects. In fact, an analysis of 
the UN reports reveals that the major concern of the Commission was not to 
                                               
18 Gerald Prunier, ‘Benign Neglect Versus La Grande Somalia: The Colonial Legacy and the Post-
Colonial Somali State’, in Hoehne, Luling (eds.), Milk and Peace, pp. 44-5. 
19 By the end of 1947, the prospect of a British trusteeship in Somalia Italiana shifted to a joined 
administration of the Four Powers. See Touval Somali Nationalism, pp. 77-83. 
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investigate the aspirations of Somali communities but rather to establish the extent to 
which a restoration of Italian rule would have faced local opposition.
20
  
During the hearings with the Four Powers Commission, problems related to 
the restrictive choice offered by the UN were expressed by representatives of local 
communities. For instance, Islau Mahadalle, the representative of the Conferenza 
before the UN, attended hearings to discuss the Conferenza 23-point programme and 
advanced Italian rule in January 1948. During the discussions, the representatives of 
the Conferenza explained the reasons behind the pro-Italian stance of the association 
and its members in these terms: 
We were hating the Italian government, and were saying ‘May God bring the 
British Administration!’ We were hearing that the British administration was a 
justice giver and peace maker… [but today under the BMA] there is not any 
Somali in this territory who has not been looted or killed… [at least] under the 
Italians there was freedom of work and of agriculture.
21
 
Although aiming at backing Italian rule and thus biased, this quote reveals 
information regarding the presence of regional interests in Somalia Italiana. The 
agriculturist regions of southern Somalia represented the ‘breadbasket’ of the 
country.
22
 In the 1940s, the leaders of southern socio-political associations were 
representatives of the most-profitable sector of Somali economy, the same  sector 
that had been targeted by Italian colonial interventions. Moreover, the quote 
summarised the problematic socioeconomic conditions affecting Somalia Italiana, 
                                               
20 The findings of the Commission are published in: Four Power Commission, Report of the Four 
Power Commission of Investigation. Former Italian Colonies. Report on Somalia, (New York; UN, 
1948). 
21
 The minutes of the hearings between the Conferenza and the Commission are collected in: 
‘C.F.M./D/I/4/I.C.COM Sixteenth Hearing in Italian Somaliland’, 4th February, 1948, author 
unknown; ‘Four-Power Commission on Somalia: Disturbances in Mogadishu; Report of the 
Commission’, TNA, FO, 1015/28. I have decided to use the same quotes used by Pankhurst who, due 
to the biases of Allied propaganda discussed in chapter 1, gives a very different perspective. See 
Pankhurst, Ex-Italian Somaliland, pp.238-9. 
According to biographical information collected by the BMA, Islao Mahadalle Mohamed, 
president of the Conferenza, had worked for a colonial Judge in Mogadishu for 19 years. He was 
believed to be ‘the most important native “cog” in the Italian political machine’; following the 1948 
riots in Mogadishu, he was arrested by the BMA for having played ‘a very provocative part in the 
events’ and eventually released. Author unknown, ‘Biographical notes on Somali political leaders’, 
undated (presumably mid-1949); TNA, FO, 371/73851. 
22 Lee V. Cassanelli, ‘Explaining the Somali Crisis’, in Cassanelli, Besteman, The Struggle for Land, 
p. 15. 
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and in particular the riverine regions. Procrastinations within the UN debate caused 
almost a decade of direct British military administration, which implemented no 
major reforms or plans and received little support from the metropole. This, coupled 
with the economic impacts of war efforts, pressurised local agricultural production 
which had already been shaken by the war and the collapse of colonial economy. 
Within this context, the options offered at the time by the UN were reduced to a 
choice between former colonial masters and the BMA. In order to shed light on this 
context, the next section discusses colonial initiatives and systems of agricultural 
production, and policies implemented by the BMA. 
 
 
3.3 The war-time, colonial economy and British 
policies 
It is conventionally maintained that the Second World War had tremendous impacts 
on Africa as, due to the war efforts, African commodities assumed great importance 
during the war affecting every aspects of African economic and social life. In this 
way, African colonies were transformed into a systematic source of both military and 
civilian labour to supply the war effort.
23
 Since the mid-1930s Somalia Italiana came 
also to play a subordinate role within Italian plans to attack Ethiopia. However by 
1941, this process assumed a different significance due to the collapse of colonial 
economy, the direct British military administration and the general socioeconomic 
impoverishment that followed. As the BMA was run on a very limited budget, no 
major reforms were undertaken to boost local economy, in particular the agricultural 
sector. As a result of the war and military occupation, fertile regions were subject to 
fierce competition over resources. This section argues that the measures adopted by 
the BMA to face this situation proved to be controversial and inadequate and caused 
resentment among some local communities. It looks at the features of the BMA, the 
colonial investments in agriculture and system of productions, how the collapse of 
                                               
23 David Killingray, ‘Labour Mobilisation in British Colonial Africa for the War Effort, 1939-46’, in 
Killingray, Rathbone, Africa and the Second World War.  
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this system was faced by the BMA, the measures adopted to restore law and order, 
and local perceptions of the BMA. 
 
 
3.3.1 The BMA  
Although the BMA was conceived as a provisory administration to last until the end 
of the war, its military administration was extended by the protraction of the UN 
debate on former Italian colonies. For this reason, the BMA ruled former Somalia 
Italiana for almost a decade, from 1941 until 1950, during which, at least until the 
end of the war, the BMA played the role of occupying power and made use of the 
infrastructures that had been set up by the Italians to its own advantages. 
Accordingly, what had been established by the former colonial rule, as economic 
services, industries, and facilities, were dismantled by the British. For instance, the 
only railway of the colony, a 100 kilometres rail system that linked the sugar factory 
in Johwar to Mogadishu and Afgooye, was broken down into pieces and shipped to 
Kenya.  Similarly, locomotives, trucks, vehicles and all the infrastructures that could 
be removed and re-utilised elsewhere were broke into parts and replaced within the 
borders of the British Empire.
24
 
In many ways, the BMA assumed a distinct exploitative character. As it was a 
provisory administration, the BMA received little support from the metropole and its 
sustenance had to be based on local resources. This point was made very clear from 
the beginning: the exclusive aims of the administration were to ‘maintain law and 
order, and harness the resources of the country to the Allied war effort’; for this 
reason, the BMA ‘was required to function at the minimum of cost and had no 
mandate to introduce large-scale reforms or innovations’.
25
 This circumstance had 
major consequences locally and proved to be critical to the Somali economy. In fact, 
                                               
24 In December 1942, 3,000 Somalis circa were employed by the BMA to dismantling the railway. 
Additionally, the oil bulk storage and the Marka oil plant were dismantled and shipped abroad. 
Untitled report, , Lt General Sir William Platt, Political Branch, East African Command, March 1943, 
J1574/46/46; TNA, FO, 371/35658. Further infrastructures were dismantled during the BMA: the 
metal bridge in Afgooye; the sea salt production in the Xaafuun peninsula; and few mines were closed 
down. Del Boca, Nostalgia delle Colonie, p. 170. 
25 J.C. Gray, L. Silberman, The Fate of Italy’s Colonies: A Report to the Fabian Colonial Bureau with 
Contributions by an Observer in Eritrea, (London: Fabian Publications and Gollancz, 1948), pp. 24-5. 
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until 1949 the administrative future of Somalia Italiana was not certain but pending 
further UN decisions, and therefore the British did not implement any development 
programmes in the region at all. With this respect, while a series of reforms and 
development plans were drafted as a response to African demands in most colonies,
26
 
none of these plans was drafted in Somalia Italiana. On an ideological ground, this 
circumstance clashed with the Allied propaganda of freeing the Horn of Africa from 
fascist rule. As discussed in chapter one, while the BMA was established in 
opposition to the previous regime, the lack of clear plans generated confusion with 
regards to policy-making and especially in the context of the collapse of colonial 
economy and social unrest. Both issues were matters of great concern in Somalia 
Italiana. In order to understand the features of this economic crisis, it is necessary to 
investigate the main characteristics of colonial economic interventions under Italian 
rule.  
 
3.3.2 Colonial investments and systems of production in 
agriculture  
Starting in 1910 and consolidating in the 1920s, Italian colonial economic 
interventions centred on exploiting the local potential in agriculture. In this sense, 
initial efforts were made to appropriate the fertile land of southern Somalia in 1890s, 
which were increased in the 1920s, following the rise of the fascist rule in 1923. 
Colonial economic plans drafted investments and subsidies from the metropole to 
increase outputs of agricultural production for export. Large agricultural enterprises 
and private concessions were established, which adopted two different systems of 
production, and fostered the production of large-scale crops for exportation 
especially banana, cotton and sugar.
27
 Colonial rule established a monopoly over 
                                               
26 Cooper, Africa Since 1940, especially chapter 3. 
27 Between 1910 and 1918, an Italian agronomist, Romolo Onor, explored the agriculture potential in 
southern Somalia. His studies discouraged the establishment of private concessions and monoculture 
promoting local production. Despite this, colonial rule pushed for private and large enterprises starting 
from 1905 with scares results. In 1924, agricultural plans were revived by the new government which 
promoted a series of concessions that were distributed among private, mostly Italians, settlers. On 
Onor’s study see Hess Italian Colonialism, pp. 113-15, and Angelo Del Boca Gli Italiani in Africa 
Orientale: Dall’Unità alla Marcia su Roma, (Bari: Laterza, 1976), p. 830.  
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import-export and trading licenses chiefly dominated by trade with Italy.
28
 In the 
short-term all these factors contributed to make Somali economy quite dependent on 
Italy. Moreover, the promotion of the production of commercial plantations hindered 
the production of small and varied crops and led to a decrease in the competiveness 
of the small-holders, of local production, and reduced the diversification of the 
Somali economy.
29
 Additionally, the introduction of monoculture, chiefly banana 
whose production was linked to trade with Italy exclusively, in the long-term 
penalised the versatility of Somali agriculture that became subject to seasonal 
variations and market fluctuations.
30
 The next paragraph discusses the two major 
colonial investments in agriculture which eventually collapsed following the Italian 
defeat in 1941. 
Among the agricultural enterprises, the most important, successful, and, by 
far, the largest was the Società Agricola Italo-Somala
31
 (SAIS), a cotton plantation 
established in 1920 in Jowhar, a fertile area along the Juba River.
32
 By 1920, the 
Jowhar area was transformed into an industrialised agricultural enterprise. At first, 
the land was divided between pasture and cultivation areas. Subsequently a series of 
reclamation schemes, large-scale irrigation, and embankment works were undertaken 
along the river and affected the area under cultivation considerably.
33
 A further 
transformation was made in 1927 when SAIS switched the production from cotton to 
sugarcane, set up a sugar factory and built a railway system to transport the 
production of sugar from Jowhar to the harbour in Mogadishu.  
SAIS adopted a production system that was characterised by a division of 
labour modelled on the pre-colonial client-cultivators system. Before colonial 
occupation, agriculturalist communities enjoyed food self-sufficiency and produced 
                                               
28 On colonial agricultural policy during the fascist era see Hess, Italian Colonialism, chapter 7. 
29 Menkhaus, ‘From Feast to Famine’, p. 141. 
30 See Christian Webersik, ‘Fighting for the Plenty: the Banana Trade in Southern Somalia’, Oxford 
Development Studies, 33:1 (2005), pp. 83-4. 
31 Italo-Somali Agricultural Enterprise. 
32 The founder of SAIS, Price Luigi Amedeo Duke of Abbruzzi claimed to have reached agreements 
with the local populations in order to exploit 15,000 hectares -which later became 25,000- for a period 
of 99 years. Del Boca, La Conquista dell’Impero, p. 82. 
33 For more details see Hess, Italian Colonialism, pp. 163-4. 
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food surplus for trading,
34
 due to ‘diversified and productive system of agriculture’ 
which included the use of sophisticated techniques,
35
 and a system of food storage.
36
 
The local system of production included labourers, usually belonging to minority 
groups, holding position of clients. The relationship between clients and patrons was 
regulated through a social system in which the clients, labourers and minority groups 
became an integral part, although subordinated members, of the clan structure. 
Within this framework, landowners could possess a few slaves whose rights and 
obligations were regulated by the social system.
37
 
In establishing large agricultural enterprise, SAIS replicated this model. As 
argued by Cassanelli, this system established a series of regulations that provided 
labourers with a certain degree of protection and security and regulated the 
relationship between clients and masters. In this sense, the crop production system in 
use by SAIS was:  
a paternalistic system which managed workers by guaranteeing security of tenure, 
regulating social behaviour, and recognizing the reciprocal rights and obligations 
of both supervisors and workers.
38
 
Specifically, the production system at SAIS on the one hand was regularised 
land-tenure and secured labourers’ rights and obligations, but on the other, it allowed 
a certain degree of autonomy to labourers. Under SAIS, labourers were required to 
cultivate half their concession with a fixed crop to be sold at a fixed price to the 
enterprise, while the other half could be planted according to the labourers’ needs.
39
 
In this way, the system guaranteed a limited, degree of security to the labourers and 
their families,
 
and the enterprise did quite well in the 1920s and the 1930s.  
                                               
34 Menkhaus, ‘From Feast to Famine’, p. 137.  
35 See Luling Somali Sultanate, chapter 8. 
36 Early 1900s accounts of travels in the area by a commission of the Italian Anti Slavery Society 
provide useful information on the issue, food supplies were stored into pits called silò or got. L. 
Robecchi Bricchetti Dal Benadir. Lettere Illustrate alla Società Antischiavista D’Italia, (Milan 
,1934), p. 92. 
37 Lee V. Cassanelli, ‘The Ending of Slavery in Italian Somalia’, in Suzanne Miers, Richard Roberts 
(eds.), The End of Slavery in Africa, (Madison and London: The University of Wisconsin Press, 
1988), p. 314. 
38 Ibid., pp. 326-7. 
39 Ibid.. 
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In addition to this system of production, SAIS relied on coercive elements in 
order to establish a firm control over its labourers. Within this framework, the role 
played by the SAIS managers was central. For instance, even today, the founder of 
SAIS, a prince related to the then Italian royal family, is remembered for his strict 
authoritarianism. As one interviewee recalled, the founder of SAIS ‘was a proper 
fascista [not just ideologically but meaning an undemocratic, strict person, 
demanding obedience] until the day he died.’
40
 The autocratic features that 
characterised SAIS managers became even more evident in 1943 when the news of 
the fall of fascist government in Italy was followed by some enthusiasm among 
Somali communities. As a reaction, the Italians at SAIS threatened acts of violence 
and revenge upon the ones who expressed anti-fascist sympathies: 
Fascism at S.A.I.S. appears to be getting into full and open swing. Various recent 
and overt acts such as the reproving of employees for not giving the Fascist 
salute, and failure on the part of Italians to listen to any but Axis broadcasts, tent 
to confirm previous reports. There is also reason to believe that this Fascist cell 




Italian dominion at SAIS was not without problems as relations with the 
labourers remained very tense during the BMA. In spite of the fact that during the 
British occupation the SAIS was the only industry that managed to maintain its 
production to pre-war standards, the British reported high degrees of dissatisfaction 
among its labourers. Although no acts of sabotage were registered as they were in the 
private concessions, particular discontent was reported with regards to working 
conditions. For instance, in 1947, after a series of complaints, representatives of 
SAIS labourers were met by the local British authorities to negotiate improvements 
on working conditions. During the talks, the labourers ‘were embarrassingly out-
spoken in their remarks stating that they placed no reliance on Italian promises and 
                                               
40 Interview, 15th March 2008. 
41 Author unknown, ‘Extract from Somalia Intelligence Summary No. 4 for Period Ending 12 Dec 43’, 
13th December 1943, ref. no. S/37A/15; TNA, WO, 230/319. 
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that they could see no evidence of a change of heart in Italian policy towards them’.
42
 
For this reason, they resorted to strikes as a form of protest against their masters. 
The personal position held by the Director of SAIS, a man with a particular 
‘grip of his labour’ according to the British records, proved critical for the enterprise 
to continue its business. In fact, labourers were likely to stop working when the 
Director of SAIS was away.  In this sense, the most successful strike organised by 
SAIS labourers, which lasted a week, happened when the Director was on leave.
43
 
Once the Director returned to work, he agreed to hold negotiation with the labourers’ 
representative for the improvement of working conditions on the ground that 
labourers returned to work. By mixing negotiation and coercion, SAIS managed to 




Conversely, Italian rule in the plantations, the second major investment in 
agriculture, resorted to more direct, systematic violence and ‘policing’ systems. 
Since the 1910s, a series of European private concessions was granted in Jannaale, a 
site nearby the Somali coastal town Marka, and along the Juba River. By 1922, the 
number of European concessions and the land under cultivation increased 
exponentially: if two concessions occupying an area of 1,500 hectares were 
functioning in Jannaale in the 1910s, there were one hundred thirty-eight concessions 
that occupied 26,500 hectares in 1940.
45
 The shift was mainly due to a new colonial 
policy adopted by the fascist governor. Appointed in 1923, the governor launched a 
programme for the ‘fascistisation’ of the arable land of southern Somalia thereby 
distributing agricultural concessions among militant fascists who had joined the 
colonial occupation of Somalia. In reward for taking part in the campaigns for 
colonial occupation, colonial authority issued a new regulation on land-ownership 
                                               
42 Chief Administrator, W. M. Donaldson, ‘Somalia Political Intelligence Report No. 4’, 14th October 
1947, ref no. 3046/II/74; ‘Somalia: Monthly Political Intelligence Summaries’, TNA WO 230/207. 
43 Ibid.. 
44 Ibid.. 
45 Nicola Labanca, Oltremare. Storia dell’Espansione Coloniale Italiana, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007), 
p. 319. 
Imagining the Nation, Crafting the State 
Enforcing political competition  103 
that made ‘unused lands’ property of the colonial state,
46
 and distributed slots of 
agricultural land among the concessionaires.
47
 By favouring monocultures, colonial 
investments pursued an industrialisation of agricultural production for export trade. 
As illustrated in Table 3.1, the area of land under colonial investments increased 






Cultivation in the 
early1920s 
 (in hectares) 
Cultivation in 1930  
(in hectares) 
Cotton 100 9850 
Castor oil 73 3391 
Maize 320 11372 
Sugarcane 2 651 
Bananas 45 1235 
 
Table. 3.1 The actual production of bananas increased from 447 quintals in 
1928 to 16884 quintals in 1931. Data compiled from De Vecchi di Val Cismon, 
Orizzonti D’Impero, pp. 324-25. 
 
During colonial rule, forms of forced labour were introduced in order to 
overcome the scarcity of labour that affected cultivation. In Somalia Italiana, as 
private concessions struggled to recruit labourers, colonial government drafted new 
forms of contract with the aim to legalise the recruitment of labourers for the 
plantations in 1929.
49
 By regulating the hiring process, these contracts promoted 
forced labour through a system of ‘quota’ which prescribed that each community 
                                               
46 See Marco G. Guadagni, ‘Colonial Origins of the Public Domain in Southern Somalia (1892-
1912),’ Journal of African Law, 22, (1978). 
47 Del Boca, La conquista dell’impero, pp. 62-67. 
48 Cesare Maria De Vecchi di Val Cismon Orizzonti D’Impero. Cinque Anni in Somalia, (Milan: 
Mondadori, 1935), pp. 324-5. 
49 Hess, Italian Colonialism, p. 166. On the issue of forced labour under colonial rule see findings 
published by the then secretary of the fascist party in Somalia: Marcello Serrazanetti, Considerazioni 
sulla Nostra Attività Coloniale in Somalia, (Bologna: Tip. La Rapida, 1933). Extracts of the report 
have been published in Giorgio Rochat, Il Colonialismo, (Turin: Loescher Editore, 1973), pp. 148-52. 
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living nearby the cultivation area had to supply a certain number of labourers who 
would move and serve in the plantations on either temporary or permanent terms.  
Modelled on similar structural patterns in use in the latifundia of southern 
Italy
50
 and in colonial plantations in Portuguese colonies, like Brazil or 
Mozambique,
51
 the division of labour in the Italian plantations centred on the role 
played by the concessionaires’ agents.
52
 Under the name of caporali in the Italian 
plantations (from Latin caput, i.e. boss), these agents guaranteed high levels of 
efficiency and productivity by managing the hiring process, the actual distribution of 
labour and the surveillance of the labourers. As they took a share of labourers’ 
remuneration which was based on the production, they were interested in achieving 
high standards of daily outputs.
53
 Where in colonial Mozambique these agents (the 
capitâo) were Mestiços or Portuguese, in Somalia Italiana they belonged to local 
communities and their position assumed particular importance in relation to the 
labour system in the Italian plantations. Due to the scarcity of manpower and the 
constant difficulty in recruiting labourers, local agents who were highly 
knowledgeable of the context and work production, became central in the recruiting 
process.
54
 In establishing coercive labour, as noted by Declich, Italians made good 
use of the inequalities of Somali society by targeting minority groups that held a 
subordinate role within the local social structure.
55
 Furthermore, by seeking the 
complicity of communities’ leaders, the populations of Bantu origins belonging to 
recent settlements or to settlements of slaves, came to be the ones who bore most of 




                                               
50 On contemporary form of caporalato in Italy see Alessandro Leogrande, Uomini e Caporali. 
Viaggio tra i Nuovi Schiavi nelle Campagne del Sud, (Milan: Mondadori, 2008). 
51 See Malyn Newitt, A History of Mozambique, (Bloomington: Indian University Press, 1995), 
especially chapters 16-17. 
52 Angelo Del Boca, ‘Un Agronomo all’Equatore’, Studi Piacentini, 35(2004), p. 220. 
53 Ibid..  
54 Ibid.. 
55 Francesca Declich, ‘Unfree Labour, Forced Labour and Resistance among the Zigula of the Lower 
Juba’, in Edward A. Alpers, Gwyn Campbell, Michael Salman (eds), Resisting Bondage in Indian 
Ocean Africa and Asia, (New York: Routledge, 2007).  
56 Cassanelli, ‘The Ending of Slavery’; Catherine Besteman, ‘The Invention of Gosha: Slavery, 
Colonialism and Stigma in Somali History’, in Ahmed (ed), The Invention of Somalia; Declich 
‘‘Gendered Narratives’’, Luling, Somali Sultanate, pp. 152-4.  
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3.3.3 The war impacts on agriculture and labour policy   
As a result of war developments, the local colonial economy collapsed in 1941 and 
this became a matter of great concern to the BMA which did not possess means and 
resources to implement alternative measures to this system. Additionally, following 
the defeat of Italians, labourers mutinied against the working regime. As this section 
discusses, the labour policies adopted by the BMA became very controversial. 
As highlighted in the previous section, the economic system centred on 
agricultural production that was characterised by Italian control over import-export 
and trading licenses, by dependency on subsidies from the metropole, and by a strong 
link to trade with Italy. This restricted and monopolised system of production came 
to an abrupt end with the war and so the immediate effects of the British occupation 
were dramatic: two-thirds of the cultivated land was abandoned and looted; trade and 
economic links with Italy interrupted; the system of subsidies from the metropole 
stopped. One of the first British reports drafted in 1941 captured this sudden 
situation:  
The whole economic structure of the colony was unsound to the extent of 
absurdity and the Government itself a mere façade. The country is quite incapable 
of supporting more than a fifth of the present population and it existed, at the 
expense of the Italian taxpayer, on subsidies of kind and cash from Rome.
57
 
In controlling the area, the BMA was required to make the region under 
occupation self-supportive. Plans were soon drafted to encourage agricultural outputs 
however this was made difficult by the dramatic conditions of colonial economy and 
by competition over resources that followed the war which eventually affected 
Somali cultivators and riverine communities the most. In facing these conflicts, the 
BMA adopted a policy of military commitment that will be discussed in the next 
section. Additionally, the BMA drafted measures that would make the colony self-
supporting by stimulating the outputs of agricultural sectors. This policy did not 
come without problems especially with regards to the labour system in the 
                                               
57 Author unknown, Headquarters O.E.T.A., Mogadishu, 12th April 1941; TNA, WO 230/7. 
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plantations. As soon as the British occupied Somalia Italiana, it became readily 
apparent that labour conditions, especially in the plantations, were of the most 
miserable kind:  
labour conditions in this area … were so vicious that it is difficult to understand 
how any civilised nation could support them.
58
  
Another problem was constituted by the fact that during the war farms had 
been looted systematically and agricultural infrastructures and system of production 
heavily damaged as a result. Moreover, once the BMA had been established in the 
area, labourers refused to go back to work in the fields due to the forceful labour 
system adopted by the Italians:  
The present position is that the local native population, from whom the labourers 




Despite these clear difficulties and in order to make the colony self-sufficient, 
the BMA pushed the agricultural sector to restart the production by introducing a 
wage-labour system commonly in use in other colonies at the time. As pointed out by 
Killingray and Rathbone, the increasing relevance of African raw materials to 
European economies during the war-time led colonial administrations to force 
thousands of peasants into state-regulated labour system.
60
 In Somalia, similar 
measures were taken to address both farm labourers and groups of ‘unemployed’ 
Somalis. Accordingly, on the one hand, forced measures were (re)introduced to 
induce labourers to return to the fields. As it emerges from the following quote, these 
implied an active, forceful British role: 
…[it might be possible] to resort to force to compel the labourers to return to 
work on the farms, urgent as is the need to get the farms working again during the 
present planting season which is now upon us…we should meet with more than 
passive resistance and should create an atmosphere of unrest which might spread 
and involve us in a military commitment…the political officers concerned [have 
                                               
58 Author unknown, Headquarters O.E.T.A., Mogadishu, 12th April 1941; TNA, WO 230/7. 
59 Ibid.. 
60 Killingray, Rathbone, ‘Introduction’, p. 12. 
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been instructed] to use all their influence and persuasive powers to get the 
labourers back on to the farms…
61
  
On the other hand, the labour policy applied to ‘unemployed’ Somalis of the urban 
area and in particular in Mogadishu: 
[As compelling labourers to go back to work in the field] will be a slow 
process…[it would be possible] to draft on to them some the 2000 or more 
unemployed artisans in Mogadishu. They are not farmers and never will be: but it 
is better for their morale that they should sweat in the fields and earn some 
portion of their daily bread than sit in the slums of Mogadishu.
62
  
Labour policies adopted by the BMA contributed to create a certain 
resentment of local agriculturist communities which by no means were given free 
labour choice. As the British labour policies were drafted on temporary terms, 
labourers’ status and conditions were not secured in any way. A certain sense of 
having been badly treated by the BMA clearly emerges from the report of the Four 
Powers Commission that met representatives of Somali communities in 1948 
especially among representative the pro-Italian political front. In this sense, the 
former colonial rule might have appeared more stable in terms of security and 
protection for cultivators. Accordingly, a sense of nostalgia for colonial time was 
recorded by Luling during her fieldwork in southern Somalia in the late 1960s.
63
 
Moreover, arbitrary measures adopted by the BMA to face social unrest in the area 
provoked further disagreement as next section illustrates.  
 
3.3.4 ‘Restoring law and order’: the pacification campaign in 
Somalia  
Despite the quick defeat of the Italian army and the British discourse of an ‘easy 
victory’ over Italians in the Horn of Africa, the British occupation of Somalia 
                                               
61 Author unknown, Headquarters O.E.T.A, Mogadishu, 12th April 1941; TNA, WO 230/7. 
62 Ibid.. 
63 The author refers to the area of Afgooye exclusively. A completely different situation was 
registered in Janaale where most of Italian concessions were situated: ‘The hatred of forced 
recruitment in the Afgooye area was not so much for local concessionaries, as for work at Jannaale 
(Genale), the much more important development 70 kilometres downstream. This reached its height 
during the fascist period…The workers there suffered appalling conditions…’ Luling, Somali 
Sultanate, p. 152. 
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Italiana did not come without problems. A matter of great concern to the BMA was 
the degree of tension and unrest throughout the Somali-speaking regions. Where the 
Italians were defeated in June 1941, some soldiers who had fought for the Italian 
army continued to resist the British occupation. Others, who had become suddenly 
unemployed, formed armed groups and began to loot farms and raid cattle.
 64
 These 
conflicts affected colonial possessions and more generally, all the farms and 
cultivations.  
In order to appreciate the features and scale of conflicts and their local 
effects, a comparison with recent events in Somalia may be useful. Following the 
collapse of the Somali state in 1991, the country has been hit by a series of civil 
conflicts that heavily targeted the agriculturalist clans and population living in 
between the Webi Shebelli and Juba rivers. Due to a concentration of economic 
agricultural resources in the area, thus the nickname ‘the bread-basket of Somalia’, 
and to a certain discrimination towards the local communities who are seen as the 
descendants of slaves, these regions have suffered the most from the war and from 
the struggle to control resources.
65
 In the 1940s, these regions were subject to similar 
patterns of violence.  
In 1941, ‘restoring law and order’ represented a difficult task to the BMA that 
lacked both practical and human resources to face conflicts effectively: 
[...] reports from all centres in the Mogadishu Division indicate that there is still a 
large number of rifles and even machine guns, and ammunition in the hands of 
deserters from the Italian forces. The native population generally is possessed of 
considerable quantities of materials and goods looted from Italian houses and 
farms and they are reluctant to restore this stolen property merely on an order 
from a Political officer unsupported by armed force. The areas involved are so 
large that the present garrisons of the places where Political Officers are stationed 
                                               
64 The BMA believed that disbanded soldiers constituted a matter of great concern: ‘A contributory 
factor to this discontent is the large number of young men, now unemployed, who formerly served in 
the Italian forces, now returned to their villages, they have spent their savings and see no means of 
obtaining future subsistence.’ Lieut. Colonel G.S.I., ‘Extract from 12 Div. Intelligence Summary No. 
32’, E.A. Command Headquarters, 12th May 1942, file no. IR/46/1/5; TNA WO 230/7. 
65 For the effects of the civil wars on southern Somalia see Cassanelli, Bestman, The Struggle for 
Land. 
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are quite insufficient to provide the patrols which are necessary to recover arms 
and ammunition and stolen property and generally to restore order.
 66
 
The collapse of the colonial economy, the temporary interruption of local 
trade and imposition of war economy, and the series of lootings caused a fierce 
competition over resources that rapidly spread throughout the region. In particular, 
the border area at the tri-junction between Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya was a matter 
of great concern to the BMA. Groups of armed bands became quite successful in 
these activities.
67
 Similar activities involved members of the Somali police as, for 
instance, in the British Somaliland some illalos, the local Somali police force, were 
reported to function regularly during the day and to carry out unofficial looting at 
night.
68
 Moreover, due to an easier access to war weapons that were left by or looted 
from the armies, conflicts assumed an intense degree that continued long after the 
defeat of the Italians in 1941.
69
 For instance, between 1948 and 1949, the BMA 
reported more than hundreds of people killed in inter-regional, or ‘tribal’, conflicts.
70
 
In part, the degree of regional violence was due to the British policy of 
military commitment to face conflicts. In particular, this policy resorted to acts of 
retaliation and collective punishments as a response to raids and lootings. Once the 
BMA identified the clan or sub-clan family of certain looters, it punished that clan 
section by confiscating their cattle, belongings and, in some cases, by setting villages 
on fire.
71
 As typical war measures in use by occupying powers, these policies had 
major consequences in the area. First, as looters were often disbanded soldiers, it was 
                                               
66 Deputy Chief Political Officer OETA (name unknown), ‘Headquarters, Advance Force’, 
Mogadishu, 24th March 1941; TNA, WO 230/7. 
67 The Chief Civil Affairs Officer (name unknown), ‘Border Patrols – Jubaland Frontier’, East Africa 
Command Headquarters, Nairobi, 9
th
 June, 1943; TNA, WO 230/7. 
68 Assistant A.P.O., W. H. Taylor, ‘Report on Safari to Chimer’, El Carre, 26th June 1942; TNA, WO 
230/7. 
69 The war brought accessibility to military weapons and the BMA accused the Italians of having 
deliberately distributed arms and ammunitions to Somalis before fleeing the region. Kenya 
Information Officer, (initials unknown) Davies, ‘Kenya Information Office’, 10th January 1942; TNA, 
WO 230/7. 
70 Author unknown, ‘Incidents in Somalia during 1948-1949’, undated, Appendix ‘B’ ref. no. 
EAX/CR/10235/28/9(OPS); TNA, WO, 230/319. 
71 These practices were widely in use in the British protectorate and under Italian colonial rule, see for 
instance John G. Drysdale, History of the Somaliland Camel Corps (unpublished, 1935), Bodleian 
Library of Commonwealth and African Studies at Rhodes House, Oxford, MSS. Afr. s. 552. Hanley’s 
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Warriors. Life and Death among the Somalis, (London: Eland, 1993). 
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very difficult to establish a connection between them and their clan leaving open the 
possibility of punishing groups that were not connected with the lootings. Second, 
collective punishments enforced a discourse based on clan according to which the 
clan family was made responsible of the acts of their members even when it did not 
have control over their actions. Third, it increased the level of discontent and tension 
rather than diminished it as these policies did not engage directly with the 
socioeconomic conditions upon which conflicts developed. 
Due to violent conflicts and responses, the BMA assumed an inherently 
military character that reflected the need for establishing control of the area. As 
argued by Anderson and Killingray, the police and more generally the armed forces 
played a key role in the colonial attempt to enforce forms of hegemony in colonial 
Africa.
72
 On a similar ground, one of the first concerns of the BMA was to create a 
police force, the Somali Gendarmerie which would replace the previous colonial 
force, and would be used to enforce British rule and to pacify the regions. The use of 
the Somali Gendarmerie for military purposes, however, contributed to increasing 
local resentment. As discussed in the previous chapter, once founded, the Somali 
Gendarmerie soon became a highly politicised force to the point that 75% of 
policemen stationed in Mogadishu were members of the Somali Youth League. In 
fact, scholars believe that the collusion between the police and the BMA was not 
casual but reflected a preferential policy adopted by the British according to which 
party membership became instrumental for employment within the administration.
73
 
Cassanelli takes this argument even further by stating that starting from the 1940s, 




The combination of an administration that relied heavily on armed forced and 
a police force that was highly politicised contributed to an increase in tension 
                                               
72 David M. Anderson, David Killingray, ‘Consent, coercion and colonial control: policing the empire, 
1830-1940’, David M. Anderson, David Killingray (eds.), Policing the Empire. Government, 
Authority and Control, 1830-1940, (Manchester: University Press, 1991). 
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between the Somali Youth League and the opposition parties representing 
agriculturist communities. The reports of the Four Powers Commission of 
investigation are useful in shedding light on this tension. For instance, one of the 
representatives of the Conferenza denounced to the UN that the BMA was working 
in collusion with the League: 
Wherever there is a British Officer, next to him is a Somali Youth League 




Another point to be made is in relation to the conflict over resources and the 
enforcement of political competition by the UN decision to send a special 
commission to decide upon the future of former Italian colonies. Recent studies on 
the interplay between ethnic conflicts, access to resources and state power in the 
Horn of Africa, have investigated the extent to which competition over scarce 
resources affects and shapes relations among groups across the regions.
76
 In 
particular, John Markakis has illustrated how competition over resources assumes a 
political significance due to the decisive role played by the state in resolving 
conflicts.
77
 Similarly, in Somalia Italiana conflicts over resources were brought into 
the political domain by the UN decision to investigate the ‘wishes’ of colonial 
subjects and thus, by forcing the formation of political representations. Moreover, the 
collusion between the state authority, i.e. the BMA, and one of the most important 
political associations of the time and competitor before the UN, i.e. the Somali Youth 
League, contributed to aggravate the degree of conflicts. The report of Four Powers 
Commission indicates that the major concerns of the ‘pro-Italia’ were in relation to 
land and agriculture as these represented the most profitable economic sectors of the 
time. By the end of the 1940s, these concerns had clearly become politicised as 
expressed by one of the representative of the ‘pro-Italia’ before the Commission: 
                                               
75 Quoted in Pankhurst, Ex-Italian Somaliland, p. 241. 
76 Katsuyoshi Fukui, John Markakis (eds.), Ethnicity & Conflict in the Horn of Africa, (London: James 
Currey, 1994).  
77 John Markakis, ‘Ethnic Conflict & the State in the Horn of Africa’, in Ibid., pp. 220-4. 
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‘Their own land [of the Somali Youth League] is not here; this land is our’.
78
 Within 
this context, the development of Italian propaganda exacerbated the tension between 
the Somali Youth League and the ‘pro-Italian’ as next section illustrates. 
 
3.4 Constructing consent by amassing dissent: 
Italian post-war propaganda and effects 
The previous section argued that aspects of the British policy adopted in Somalia 
Italiana proved to be not only inadequate in addressing the critical social and 
economic conditions of the region but that they also created some localised 
discontent. The decision to send a special commission of the UN to investigate local 
aspirations pushed local communities to organise politically. Among these 
communities, the Italians were more advantaged as they possessed means to advance 
their interests and had developed campaigns of propaganda with the aim to mobilise 
a political front that eventually backed Italy before the Four Powers Commission. 
The consolidation of the pro-Italian political front posits some questions regarding 
the strategies adopted by the Italians in order to promote consent. Recently, 
Gramsci’s notion of consent – the masses’ acquiescent attitude to the direction 
imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group which enjoys a 
hegemonic position in the system of production
79
 – has been adopted to investigate 
colonial rule in Africa and India. With this respect, the historians Engels and Marks 
have encouraged colonial historiography to work beyond the conventional duality of 
colonial dominion and resistance in order to shed light on the interaction between 
colonial strategies to amass consent and local responses to and/or usage of these 
strategies.
80
 By looking closely at these strategies, it is possible to explore the 
                                               
78 Abuker Hussein, vice-president of the Hidaita ul Islam (association member of the Conferenza), 
before the Four Power Commission. Quoted in Pankhurst, Ex-Italian Somaliland, p. 241. 
79 Antonio Gramsci, Quaderni del Carcere. Vol. 1: Quaderni 1(XVI)- 5(IX), (Turin: Edinaudi, 1975). 
80 Dagmar Engels, Shula Marks, ‘Introduction: Hegemony in a Colonial Context’, in Dagmar Engels, 
Shula Marks (eds.), Contesting Colonial Hegemony: State and Society in Africa and India (London: 
British Academic Press, 1994), pp.  1-7. 
Imagining the Nation, Crafting the State 
Enforcing political competition  113 
multiple means through which colonial dominion, or modern regimes,
81
 live and 
grow.  
In the 1940s, Italian strategies at constructing consent managed to amass and 
mobilise a political front at the time in which – during the British occupation of 
Somalia Italiana – Italian colonial power was, technically speaking, not hegemonic 
in the area. This circumstance raises questions regarding the features and motives 
behind this political front. In addressing these issues, this section discusses features 
of Italian propaganda. It is argues that by amassing dissent against the BMA, these 
strategies attempted to consolidate pro-Italian backing. They consisted of a series of 
promises regarding future administration, distribution of sums of money, and 
accusations against the BMA, revival of contacts with sections of Somali society that 
were set up during the colonial rule. The overall result of Italian propaganda was a 
radicalisation of the division between the Somali Youth League and the ‘pro-Italia’.  
 
3.4.1 Features of Italian propaganda and reactions 
In enhancing its colonial interests, the post-war Italian government drafted a 
politically-elaborate strategy that sought alliances with community leaders. 
Specifically, this policy aimed at the revival of pre-war ties between the Italians and 
the waged-leaders that constituted the base of the Italian system of dominion 
analysed by Hess.
82
 Sums of money, or so called ‘lucrative donations’, were 
distributed among pre-war waged-leaders and, in particular, among riverine 
communities that had been subject to looting during the war and British occupation.
83
 
By doing so, the Italian strategy was two-fold: on the one hand, it provided 
communities’ leaders with money at critical time; on the other hand, it attempted to 
buy off their support to the detriment of the BMA that was blamed for the 
impoverishment of socioeconomic conditions in the area.  
                                               
81 Sara Rich Dorman, ‘Inclusion and Exclusion: NGOs and Politics in Zimbabwe’ (Ph.D. thesis, St 
Antony’s College, 2001), pp. 18-21. 
82 Hess, Italian Colonialism, chapter 5. 
83 Telegram from Italian Foreign Office to Mogadishu, 11 September 1948, Rome; ASDMAE, 
carteggio AFIS, cassa19, busta 11. 
Imagining the Nation, Crafting the State 
Enforcing political competition  114 
In the late 1940s, the ways through which ‘lucrative donations’ were 
distributed followed a simple and defined structure. Every month, the Italian 
government allocated certain sums of money to be used by some high-rank colonial 
clerks or key figures such as the municipal secretary and commissariat of 
Mogadishu, the Chief Judge of the colony.
84
 In order to keep this policy confidential, 
money was sent to a private company, namely De Vincezi, which managed electrical 
power supply in the region. Under the government’s instructions, the company put 
the money at the Italian agents’ disposal and kept the books that were sent to the 
Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
85  
At the core of Italian strategies was the belief that the communities’ leaders 
held a solid hegemonic position locally. By reviving the pre-war wage-scheme, these 
strategies provided leaders with material means and reinforce their positions so that 
they would mobilise their communities in favour of the Italians: 
In spite of the war, the British occupation and the rise of new ideas [i.e. 
nationalism], the position of leaders and sheiks is still strong… in most cases, 
they support us. Our action has to provide balance, coordination and moderation 
and should by no means hinder the power of local leaders and sheiks.
 86
 
Another central theme of the Italian propaganda centred on the promise that 
the pre-war salary-scheme would be re-enforced and financial assistance to 
communities’ leaders increased in case of a restoration of Italian rule via 
international mandate.
87
 This constituted a crucial part of Italian propaganda: during 
the BMA, communities’ leaders who were suspected of insubordination or accused 
of looting were suspended from the salary-scheme.
88
 Further promises concerned the 
payment of colonial soldiers for their services under Italian army interrupted by the 
                                               
84 They were respectively: Calzia, Beritelli, Dell’Olio. Author unknown, ‘Report on Intensive Italian 
Propaganda within Somalia’, undated (presumably 1947/1948); ‘Disturbances in Somalia. Riots and 
Massacres at Mogadishu 1948’, TNA, FO 371/69414. 
85 Author unknown, ‘Telegram form the Italian Foreign Office to Mogadishu’, 11th September 1948 
Rome, ASDMAE, carteggio AFIS, cassa 19, busta 11. 
86 Ibid..  
87 The colonial institution of waged-leaders was fully restored and the salaries increased 3-fold. 
Castagno, ‘Somali Republic’, in Coleman, Rosberg (eds.), Political Parties, p. 525.  
88 This circumstance is recalled by the former Prime Minister Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke who served 
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British occupation.
89
 By stressing these themes, Italian propaganda attempted to 
compete directly with the BMA and to develop its strategies in opposition to British 
policies. This was mainly due to the fact that local communities were expected to 
make a choice between former colonial rule and BMA before the UN.   
The decision to send a special commission caused the development of 
political competition between different groups among which Italians were materially 
advantaged. This had the consequence of creating tension between the pro-Italia and 
the Somali Youth League and to radicalise the division between the two groups. The 
role played by managers of agricultural enterprises was central in developing Italian 
propaganda as they retained key positions within local system of production. In this 
way, the area around SAIS, the largest agricultural enterprise, became one of the 
headquarters of the pro-Italian political front which by 1947 was quite solid. Clashes 
between them and the Somali Youth League became frequent as reported by the 
BMA: 
In the Villabruzzi District [i.e. at SAIS], where there is no doubt that the 
P.B.U.[i.e. the Patriotic Benefit Union] receives a great deal of encouragement 
from the General Manager of S.A.I.S., much of the C.A.O.’s time is wasted by 
the constant bickering between the two parties [the Somali Youth League and the 
P.B.U.], particularly at the village of Hawadle.
90
 
On a different level, Italian propaganda could rely on links and alliances with 
local communities’ leaders that had been established before the war. The way pre-
colonial patron-client relations had been used and modified by colonial rule and 
eventually co-opted in post-independence African states, constitutes a well-studied 
research theme in African studies.
91
 In Somalia, Italian strategies made use of similar 
forms of patronage, whose nature varied according to circumstance, in provision of 
the visit of the Four Power Commission. For example, links between the Italians and 
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‘Italian Propaganda Directed to the Former Italian Colonies; Payments Made by the Italian 
Government to the Natives of Somalia’, TNA, FO 1015/31. 
90 Chief Administrator, W. M. Donaldson, ‘Somalia Political Intelligence Report – No. 3’, 31st July 
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Olol Dinle, leader or sultan of Qallafo, are well-known by oral tradition.
92
 These 
links dated back the 1920s and 1930s, when Italians provided arms and protection to 
Olol Dinle and his community and in turn, the Somali leader supported the Italian 
attack on Ethiopia and provided labourers supply for the colonial plantations.
93
 
During the war, the leader became very famous in Italy for his contribution to the 
attack and occupation of Ethiopia.
94
 The bond between the two became solid to the 
point that, once the Italians were defeated by the British, Olol Dinle continued to 




The close links between Olol Dinle and the Italians are perhaps exceptional 
but their nature reveals how similar connections were revived and reused in the 
1940s: on the one hand, Italian strategies attempted to increase support before the 
UN commission; on the other, by supporting the restoration of Italian rule, some 
communities’ leaders, who had fought together with Italian army, attempted to 
secure their position in the event of acts of revenge from Ethiopia or the BMA.
96
   
Once released from prison in 1947, Olol Dinle mobilised pro-Italian support 
in the region before the UN visit and, for this reason, had to face the opposition of 
the local branch of the Somali Youth League which had been set up in the area 
during his absence. Conflicts between the two political fronts became frequent. The 
following extract is a report on one of these clashes led respectively by the two 
leaders Olol Dinle, the president of the League, Mohamed Haji Hussein, who 
travelled all the way from Mogadishu to confront the situation in person: 
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 Research notes, March 2008, Rome. 
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Early in the morning a crowd numbering several hundreds marched into Callafo 
[i.e. Qelafo] from the River area. They had come to welcome the Sultan [Olol 
Dinle] back and were singing songs in his honour. They were well behaved and 
eventually sat down on the embankment just outside the town. An hour or so later 
another large crowd, this time of S.Y.L. supporters, was seen arriving from the 
River area. Both crowds were well armed with sticks, and it was seen that the 
second crowd would pass very near to the first crowd, and it was feared that a 
clash might occur, with the possibility of its developing into tribal fight on a large 
scale, with about 1,000 people involved… Sultan Olol Dinle and Mr. Haji 
Mohamed Hussein were sent for by the... [British Commissioner and he was] 
given direct orders to march their supporters by different routes… Four whole 
days were spent by the …[BMA] in fruitless discussions with the president of the 
S.Y.L….[it has been] agreed to their requests to open new Club Houses in the 
River Area on condition that they would do everything possible to keep the 
peace, and urge the tribesmen who were members of the S.Y.L. to obey orders of 
the Administration, which are issued through the medium of the Chiefs… It was 
then decided to hold an Administrative Enquire with a view to making the 





Another aspect of Italian propaganda was engaging directly with local socio-
political organisations. As mentioned, this engagement led to the creation and 
financial support of the pro-Italian umbrella association Conferenza per la Somalia. 
Italian funds were used to provide assistance to the political campaigns of the 
Conferenza and in particular, to supply associations with transport to move from one 
location to another.
98
 In this way, the Italians could lavish promises and spread their 
propaganda. This strategy assumed particular importance in the 1950s and reflected 
the goal of the Italian government to construct forms of consent among parties 
regardless of their political affiliations. As it will be discussed in chapter four, once 
Italian rule was restored in 1950, the Italian administration continued to provide 
financial support to the pro-Italian front ‘as a due reward of their past attitudes’, and 
at the same time it engaged in dialogue with the political leadership of the League.
99
 
In fact, Italian policy was not interested in the actual aims and purposes of political 
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parties but in the consolidation of some forms of backing that would work to its own 
advantages. This aim appeared well-defined when drafting colonial policies in the 
late 1940s already: 
The core question is to make the ‘green’ and ‘red’ parties converge towards one 
single goal: our interest.
100
 
In the short term, the distribution of ‘lucrative donations’ contributed to 
create tension between Somali Youth League and the organisations within the 
Conferenza. Where, as illustrated in chapter two, the League was a self-funded 
organisation and collected money through private donations and membership fees, 
the Conferenza could rely on relative more conspicuous funds that were obtained 
with less effort. This circumstance created resentment among the League especially 
when, in 1947, it became readily apparent that the Conferenza managed to amass 
consent in specific areas:  
In the Villabruzzi [i.e. at SAIS], Afgoi[i.e. Afgooye], Merca[i.e. Marka] and 
Kismayu District, except perhaps actually in the towns themselves, the S.Y.L. are 
now in a distinct minority, and two other Native Political Societies, the P.B.U. 
and the Hisbia Dighil and Meriffle, have each increased considerably in the past 
three months… This has led to vigorous attempts by the S.Y.L. to discredit their 
rivals, and to brand them as the tools of foreign influence. Charges and counter-
charges, petitions and counter-petitions, have been rife….
101
 
By the end of 1947, Italian policy of ‘lucrative donations’ and the revival of 
pre-war ties with communities’ leaders achieved satisfactory results according to the 
Italian agents in Mogadishu.
102
 Similar impressions were registered by the BMA:  
The Somali Youth League in their counter-propaganda make full use of the 
undoubted fact that their rivals have “foreign”, i.e. Italian and Arab, backing. 
This cannot, however, obscure the truth, quite apart from the current political 
controversy concerning the future of the territory, there is a hard core of 
opposition throughout the Province to the claims and ideas of the S.Y.L. Among 
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the riverine tribes in the Villabruzzi [i.e. at SAIS] and Kismayu Districts, and 
among the Bimal in the Merca [i.e. Marka] District this opposition is represented 
by the P.B.U. The Bimal Jumiya, which started as a separate Club, is now fully 
merged with the P.B.U. In the Afgoi [i.e. Afgooye] District and among the Dighil 
tribes of the Merca District, the opposition is mainly represented by the Hizbia 
Dighil and Meriffle. Dighil and Meriffle are the two main branches of the 
Rahanwein confederation, the former living in the Benadir province where they 




Apart from increasing the tension between the League and Conferenza, the 
Italian strategy increased the resentment of the League towards the Italian 
community as they proved to be pivotal for the restoration of former colonial rule. 
On the occasion of the visit of the Four Powers Commission, the Conferenza worked 
together with a committee of representatives from the Italian community to organise 
a series of pro-Italian demonstrations in which crowds of demonstrators were 
brought to Mogadishu from across the regions displaying Italian flags.
 104
 As it 
emerges from the report of the time, the Commission was impressed by these pro-
Italian demonstrations.
105
 In the long term, conflicts between the League and the 
‘pro-Italia’ became more intense, reaching a climax in the 1950s. The ways these 
conflicts affected the development of local politics and the establishment of self-
government is the object of analysis of chapter five. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
The chapter investigated the pro-Italian political front which backed restoration of 
Italian rule before the UN. It argued that the democratic approach of the UN in 
resolving the issue of former Italian colonies was in fact very limited as it expected 
local communities to make a choice between former colonial rule and the BMA. It 
was maintained that, in order to appreciate the reasons for local support for the 
                                               
103 Chief Administrator, W. M. Donaldson, ‘Somalia Political Intelligence Report – No. 3’; TNA, 
WO, 230/207. 
104 Del Boca, Nostalgie delle colonie, p. 174; See also, Bullotta La Somalia sotto Due Bandiere, 
p.183. 
105 For details see Four Power Commission, Report, Appendix I. 
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restoration of Italian rule, it is necessary to consider socioeconomic impacts of the 
war and military occupation. 
It was illustrated how wartime contingencies and, more generally, the local 
and global politics of the 1940s caused a period of unrest and violent conflict over 
resources which were spurred even further by some of the responses adopted by the 
military administration. Although the BMA introduced positive changes and liberal 
policies by allowing freedom of association and breaking down colonial monopolies 
on trade and commerce, it did very little to improve local socioeconomic conditions. 
Moreover, the inability of the BMA to exercise effective control on conflicts over 
resources and to improve economic conditions caused resentment among 
agriculturalist communities. 
This chapter argued that the procrastination of the UN and the extension of 
the British military administration deeply affected the development of local politics. 
In particular, the UN decision to send a special commission of investigation enforced 
political competition and contributed to increase division among different groups. It 
was also argued that due to the presence of the Italian community, this competition 
was marked by unfair features due to the fact that former colonialists relied on 
financial support from the Italian government. Moreover, the chapter approached the 
concept of consent to colonial rule by arguing that certain Italian groups made use of 
their privileged positions in order to catalyse support among sections of Somali 
communities which were affected by the war and the BMA, and by reviving pre-war 
ties with community leaders. From this perspective, Italian propaganda managed to 
construct consent by amassing the dissent to the BMA. In this sense, the return of 
Italian rule was presented as a restoration of security and economic stability. The 
overall result of the protraction of the UN debate, military occupation and the 
development of Italian propaganda was the radicalisation of conflicts among 
different groups which came to be a central theme of local politics in the 1950s and 
onwards. 
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Chapter 4:  ‘Abbiamo Fregato gli Indigeni 
Somali’ The Italian Trusteeship and the 
verticalisation of the Somali political space 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In his book on the ‘practice of everyday life’, Michel de Certeau explores the means 
through which individuals appropriate mass culture, in the form of language, 
traditions and symbols, transform it and make it their own.
1
 Over the past decades, 
Somali communities have appropriated and transformed colonial languages for 
multiple purposes. They have invented nicknames for each other and to mock the 
British and Italians alike.
2
 In this sense, one of the most creative appropriations of 
colonial language is, perhaps, the adaptation of the acronym AFIS from 
Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana della Somalia (Italian Trusteeship of Somalia) 




This joke does not only work extremely well in Italian but gets straight to the 
core of a multi-faceted problematic. The establishment of AFIS was, by all means, a 
reaffirmation of former colonial interests in Somalia. In spite of the UN rhetoric of 
freedom and self-determination and the Italian propaganda of the time, in 1950 these 
interests were still remarkable in the area. As the last chapter discussed, the presence 
of considerable economic investments and the strategies adopted by the Italian 
government to protect these positions contributed to the radicalisation and 
politicisation of conflicts among different communities. On a different level, the 
decolonisation plan imposed by the UN was a controversial solution, which on the 
one hand promoted the enhancement of democratisation and self-government, but on 
                                               
1 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, (Translated by Steven Rendall),(Berkeley, Los 
Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1988). 
2 For instance, I have been told of a Mogadishu-based loan officer nicknamed ‘Penna Facile’, literally 
‘Easy Pen’, since it was ‘easy’ to persuade him to approve and sign loans. Fieldwork notes, Hargeysa, 
2009. 
3 This information was kindly provided by Mohamed Trunji. Informal conversation, 1st July, London 
2008.  
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the other imposed the means through which to achieve it. It was an ‘all inclusive 
package’ whereby agreement imposed its own terms and conditions upon the Somali 
quest for independence. It promised an illusionary freedom guaranteeing 
independence on a fixed term but did not provide Somali communities with the 
freedom to decide, participate and negotiate how to get it. In fact, as independence 
had already been granted in 1949, AFIS became less susceptible to the pressures 
from Somali political organisations and supporters. In this sense, AFIS was, as the 
remake of the acronym captures, a rip-off. 
 
This chapter focuses on the institutional framework of the post-colonial state 
imposed during the 10-year Trusteeship System of the United Nations whose 
administration was given to Italy and which became known as AFIS. As discussed in 
chapter two, one of the most noticeable features of the decolonisation process in the 
Horn of Africa was represented by the power vacuum that followed the military 
defeat of the Italians and the development of an international debate over former 
Italian colonies. These circumstances were paralleled by the emergence of a 
powerful movement from below. Due to the adoption by the British Administration 
(BMA) of liberal policy on civil rights, socio-economic activities proliferated and the 
Somali nationalists developed a political programme that catalysed masses’ support 
on a super-clan and super-regional base. By looking at the Trusteeship System and 
its state crafting, the chapter aims to provide the context in which to assess the legacy 
of post-colonial state. By analysing the institutional features of AFIS, the chapter 
argues that the decolonisation process oppressed the progressive wave of nationalism 
of the 1940s, enclosing it in a vertical, hierarchical, autocratic and centralised 
structure.    
The chapter begins with a discussion of the concept of the Trusteeship 
System of the United Nations, whose administration was given to Italy. By 
establishing a series of representative organs and electoral procedures, the 
Trusteeship System set the institutional framework of the Somali Republic. The 
chapter argues that although the System was regarded as a progressive international 
attitude towards decolonisation, its institution was characterised by an ambiguity of 
scopes and purposes. Furthermore, the System was characterised by a series of 
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limitations that made it rather ineffective and tailored privileged position to the 
administrative powers. The chapter then looks at the implication and contradictions 
of the restoration of Italian rule in Somalia. It discusses the main aims of Italian 
policy that in restoring hegemony in the region relied on both consent and coercion. 
Finally, the chapter discusses the institutional framework established during the 
Trusteeship System specifically looking at the creation of representative councils and 
electoral procedures. It is argued that the institutional framework revived and 
reinforced traditional links to the detriment of political parties and sharpened the 
divide between political leadership and communities. 
 
4.2 The Trusteeship System of the United Nations 
A starting point for a discussion of the process of decolonisation in Somalia is 
tackling the concept of the Trusteeship System. The System was created by the 
United Nations at the post-war conference held in San Francisco in 1945. Its main 
purpose was to retain control over former enemies’ colonies lost during the conflict, 
and there to promote progressive policies of institutional, economic, social, and 
political development in the forms of self-government and independence. At the 
time, the Trusteeship System was regarded as a progressive attitude of the 
international community towards decolonisation. It was further believed that the 
System would have enhanced the end of colonial rule worldwide.
4
 In fact, the 
establishment of the System was paralleled with a new era within the drafting of 
colonial polices which began to consider a series of ambitious, though confusing, 
development plans for the colonies. However, as the scholarly debate on the 
decolonisation of British West Africa points out, in 1945 this did not reflect a clear 
plan toward the end of colonialism; among colonial policy-makers, very few, if any 
at all, considered plans for decolonisation in the short term.
5
 In this sense, the 
                                               
4 See for instance Ernst B. Haas, ‘The Attempt to Terminate Colonialism: Acceptance of the United 
Nations Trusteeship System’, International Organisation, 7:1 (1953). 
5 This is my own interpretation drawn from the debate. See Robert D. Pearce, The Turning-Point in 
Africa: British Colonial Policy, 1938-1948 (London: Frank Cass, 1982); Robert D. Pearce ‘The 
Colonial Office and Planned Decolonization in Africa’, African Affairs, 83:330, (1984); John E. Flint, 
‘The Failure of Planned Decolonisation in British Africa’, African Affairs, 82:328 (1983).  
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Trusteeship System was a progressive institution which paved the way towards the 
end of colonial dominion.  
Closely resembling Article 1 of the UN Charter, the aims of the Trusteeship 
System were as follows: 
a. to further international peace and security; 
b. to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of 
the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development 
towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the 
particular circumstances of each territory and its people and the freely 
expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the 
terms of each trusteeship agreement; 
c. to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage 
recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world; and 
d. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all 
Members of the United Nations and their nationals, and also equal treatment 
for the latter in the administration of justice, without prejudice to the 
attainment of the foregoing objectives and subject to the provisions of Article 
80. 
 
Despite the clarity of the aims of the Trusteeship System, the nature and 
forms of institutional development that were to be adopted remained undefined. At 
the end of the Second World War, the UN was pressed by a series of problems with 
respect to former enemies’ colonies that were influenced by the emerging features of 
the Cold War and by the interests of colonial powers, Britain and France. Already in 
1942, a subcommittee formed by members of the Allied Coalition pushed for the 
promotion of self-government in former enemies’ colonies but cautiously did not 
make any implications regarding the notion of independence that would have 
affected the British and French colonial empires.
6
 Similarly, the UN Charter 
remained ambiguous on the question of independence especially in relation to former 
enemies’ colonies. In fact, the stress on ‘self-government’ did not specify what forms 
of self-government had to be pursued.
7
  
                                               
6 The Subcommittee was influenced by the fact that French and British stances opposed any system 
which would have affected their own empires. James N. Murray, The United Nations Trusteeship 
System, (Urbana: Illinois U. P., 1957), p. 25. 
7 The Charter recognised the independence of those countries which were independent before the war 
and eventually invaded during the conflict; it promised to ‘preserve’ the wishes of those ‘people who 
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Affected by different and often conflicting international powers’ interests, the 
UN debate on former enemies’ colonies centred on who would control the regions 
rather that how. This meant, the discussion of the actual structure of the Trusteeship 
System became of secondary importance. As argued by Kelly and Rossi, the UN 
negotiations on former Italian colonies were negatively affected by the competing 
interests of the Cold War and by the impossibility of the Four Powers, France, Great 
Britain, USA and Soviet Union, to agree with each other on the trust administration. 
The final decision to give the trusteeship of Somalia to Italy was the result of long-
lasting diplomatic discussions, shifting alliances, and disagreement especially 
between France and Great Britain on the one side, and Soviet Union on the other. In 
the end, once British and French colonial interests in the area became less 
predominant and the position of Soviet Union marginalised, an Italian trusteeship in 




Procrastination during these negotiations penalised the actual discussions on 
forms and conditions of trusteeship that remained undefined. For instance, the fact 
that the final scope of the System remained ambiguously embedded between the 
notions of self-government and independence permitted the adoption of different 
dispositions for similar cases: independence via trusteeship was recommended for 
Libya and Somalia; while federation to Ethiopia was recommended for Eritrea. In 
fact the actual institution of the Trusteeship System did not result from the post-war 
international debate but was modelled on the Mandate System of the League of 
Nations created at the end of the First World War to control former German and 
Turkish colonies, with which it shared the core essence of its structure.
9
  
                                                                                                                                     
aspire to independence’ with no further clarifications. William Roger Louis, R. Robinson, ‘The U.S. 
and the End of British Empire in Tropical Africa’, in Gifford, Roger Louis (eds.), The Transfer of 
Power in Africa, p. 34. 
8 Kelly, Cold War in the Desert; Rossi, L’Africa Italiana. 
9 Although the concept of trusteeship was not a new one, as it was first used at the dawn of the British 
Empire, it has to be related to the concept of International Mandates instituted by the League of the 
Nations after the First World War. See K. Robinson, The Dilemmas of Trusteeship. Aspects of the 
British Colonial Policy between the Wars, (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), chapter 1. See 
also Michael D. Callahan, A Sacred Trust: the League of Nations and Africa, 1929-1946, (Brighton: 
Sussex Academic Press, 2004). 
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The Trusteeship System created at San Francisco was provided with new 
features that would have improved the quality of administration but, as this section 
argues, the effective power of the system remained limited. With respect to the 
Mandate System, the Trusteeship System had more control and supervision over the 
administration; it also had, at least theoretically, direct contact with the administrated 
subjects. However, its structure was characterised by a series of limitations that made 
the system powerful on a nominal level but rather ineffective on a practical level.  
The Trusteeship System was based on a mix of two criteria: accountability 
for the administration of trust areas, and international supervision of their 
administrations.
10
 It had a well-defined structure that entailed three different actors: 
the international community, represented by the UN; the administrative powers; and 
the administrated subjects. The Trusteeship System was the decision-making organ 
with deliberative power; it functioned through an appointed body, the Trusteeship 
Council (TC), which acted as supervisor over the administrations.
11
 The Trusteeship 
System had the ultimate control and responsibility for the administrations but it did 
not make any specific claims of sovereignty over the trustee regions. In fact the issue 
of sovereignty remained unresolved since it did not rest with the administrative 
powers nor with their subjects.
12
 Additionally, in order to make the supervision of the 
regions more effective, annual reports written by the administrative powers had to be 
submitted to the TC; petitions could be accepted and examined by the TC; and 
periodic visits of the TC to trust regions were considered.
13
 
Nonetheless, on an empirical level, the Trusteeship System had several 
limitations. Its framework tailored a powerful and privileged position for the 
administrative powers, which were left free to act. Where the Trusteeship Council 
held the role of decision-making, all the practical issues related to the everyday 
                                               
10 Murray, The United Nation, p.8. 
11 Charmian Edwards Toussaint, The Trusteeship System of the United Nations, (London: Praeger, 
1956), pp. 151-8. 
12 Francis B. Sayre, ‘Legal Problems Arising from the United Nations Trusteeship System’, The 
American Journal of International Law, 263(1948), pp. 270-2. 
13 Toussaint, The Trusteeship System, pp. 179-99. 
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administration were left with the administrative powers.
14
 Furthermore, the 
Trusteeship Council played the role of supervisor but its contacts with the 
administrated subjects were rather limited. The TC’s periodic visits were organised 
on fixed terms, and no measures were taken to ensure that communities’ petitions 
would not be censored by the administrative powers.
15
 The contacts between the 
Council and the administrative powers were scheduled on fixed and frequent terms 
and articulated via reports written by the administrative powers that unilaterally 
provided information on the progress of the administration.
16
 At the same time, the 
administrative powers enjoyed a privileged position within the system: they had 
effective control of the regions but not the overall responsibility for their 
administration, which rested with the Council. Moreover, the Trusteeship System 
made the administrative power accountable for the administration but were not 
compelled by the decisions of the Council.  
From this framework the limitations of the system are clear. In spite of the 
new features introduced at San Francisco to improve the quality of administration 
and the degree of international supervision, the Trusteeship System suffered from 
serious shortcomings.  Most notably, on the one hand, the administrative powers had 
no ultimate responsibility for their administration; on the other, in the case of 
irregularities in the administration, the Council had no effective power to rectify, 
invalidate, or terminate the trusteeship agreement. In fact, the Council had no power 





4.2.1 Ineffectiveness of the Trusteeship System: the 
unresolved border issue between Ethiopia and Somalia 
The restricted power of the Council limited the effectiveness of Trusteeship System 
especially in cases where the UN recommendations were not respected by the 
                                               
14 Victor Pungong, ‘The United States and the International Trusteeship System’, in David Ryan, 
Victor Pungong (eds.), The United States and Decolonization: Power and Freedom, (New York: 
Palgrave, 2000), p. 85.   
15 Toussaint, The Trusteeship System, pp. 179-99 
16 Ibid. 
17 Sayre, ‘Legal Problems Arising from the United Nations Trusteeship System’, pp. 277-8. 
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administrative power. The following example deals with the controversial case of the 
boundary dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia that eventually constituted the 
background to two wars between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1964 and 1977-78 
respectively. One of the conditions of the Trusteeship Agreement with Italy for the 
territory of former Somalia Italiana, prescribed the solution by international 
agreement of the un-delimitated boundaries of the trust territory.
18
 Despite several 
UN recommendations being adopted on the issue, the negotiations between Ethiopian 
and Italian governments were never accomplished and the settlement of the border 
issue was subject to a controversial procedure. Lacking compelling power, the UN 
recommendations and the Trusteeship System proved inadequate and did not 
contribute to the positive fulfilment of the question.  
The colonial partition of the Horn of Africa was characterised by a great deal 
of confusion around the colonial borders, especially between Somalia Italiana, 
British Somaliland and Ethiopia;
19
  this confusion was used as a pretext by the 
Italians for attacking and occupying Ethiopia.
20
 In January 1950, the Trusteeship 
Council urged Ethiopian, British and Italian governments to negotiate a settlement to 
the border dispute before the beginning of AFIS in April 1950. As this 
recommendation was not respected by the afore-mentioned powers, the BMA, in the 
hand-over of power to Italy, ‘unilaterally establish[ed] a provisional boundary’ 
between Ethiopia and Somalia Italiana.
21
 Although the provisional boundary was not 
meant to be critical for the setting of the boundary dispute,
22
 it eventually became the 
official border of the Somali Republic. Nonetheless, before the establishment of 
AFIS, the provisional border was considered controversial by the then Italian 
minister of Foreign Affairs who raised the issue to the Trusteeship Council as 
follows:  
                                               
18 See article 1 of the trusteeship agreement in Libro Verde, p. 141. 
19 See for instance John J. Drysdale The Somali Dispute, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964). For an 
Ethiopian view on the matter: Mesfin Wolde Mariam, ‘The Background of Ethio-Somali Boundary 
Dispute’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 2 (1964). 
20 Prassitele Piccinini, Breve Storia del Conflitto Italo-Etiopico Attraverso i Documenti, (Milan: 
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1936), pp. 57-65. 
21 Letter sent by the British representative at UN permanent Council to the Trusteeship Council in 
March 1950 with regard to the provisional boundary. Quoted in ‘Il problema dei confini tra Somalia 
ed Etiopia’, ‘Relazioni Internazionali’, Milan, (XIV), 15, p. 220. 
22 Ibid.. 
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The Italian Government wants to emphasize the fact that the provisional 
boundary was established without its consent; furthermore… it wants to raise 
objections on the juridical aspects as well as on the practical inconveniences that 
could emerge from a such-conceived boundary. For instance, along the Webi 
Shebelle River [i.e. Webi Shabeelle], the provisional frontier turned 30 
kilometres inwards if compared to the previous frontier… A similar circumstance 
happened in between the regions of Webi Shebelle and British Somaliland... there 
is the urgent need to regulate the question of pastures and wells to which the vital 
interests of the populations of that region are dependant.
23
   
The ways in which the Trusteeship Council attempted to resolve this border 
issues is indicative of the limited nature of international power and limited 
obligations of trust power towards the Council. As AFIS did not respect the given 
recommendations, the Council proved to be unable to guarantee their enforcement. 
Considering the settlement of the boundary dispute of great importance, the 
Trusteeship Council gave the following recommendation to Ethiopia, Great Britain 
and Italy regarding the boundary issue: 
The portion of its [of Somalia Italiana] boundaries with British Somaliland, as 
well as with Ethiopia, not already delimited by international agreement [should] 
be delimited by bilateral negotiations between United Kingdom Government and 
the Administering Authority, in respect of the boundaries with British 
Somaliland, and between the Ethiopian Government and the Administer 
Authority in respect of the boundaries with Ethiopia
24
 
However, the international negotiations were only partially carried out by the 




Urging Ethiopian and Italian governments to proceed with the negotiations, 
the Trusteeship Council and the UN resorted to the ‘force of persuasion’ via a series 
of resolutions that were adopted by the UN General Assembly throughout the 
                                               
23 Communication of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sforza to the Trusteeship Council, 15th March 
1950, ‘Il problema dei confini tra Somalia ed Etiopia’, ‘Relazioni Internazionali’, Milan, (XIV), 15, p. 
220. 
24 UN Resolution 392 (V) December 15, in Foreign Relations of the United States, ‘Somalia: United 
States Interest in a Peaceful Resolution of the Border Dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia’, 
XVIII(1955-1957), p. 609. 
25 The negotiations between Ethiopian and Italian governments were meant to begin in 1951 but the 
procedures started in 1955 only. Due to disagreements on the limitations of the southern border, the 
negotiations stopped immediately. Pier Giacomo Magri, La Politica Estera Etiopica e le Questioni 
Eritrea e Somala 1941-1960, (Milan: Giuffrè 1980), p. 94. 
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1950s.
26
 However,  the ‘persuasive’ force of these resolutions did not prevent the 
negotiations from stopping completely in 1957.
27
 Consequently, the UN decided to 
set the dispute through the procedure of arbitration that prescribed the nomination by 
the Ethiopian and Italian governments of three super-partes judges
.
 as solution-
seekers to the dispute.
28
 Once again, the UN recommendations were not respected 
and no agreement was reached among the Ethiopian and Italian governments and, as 




The UN resolutions proved to be ineffective because they lacked compelling 
power. As this example testifies, in spite of reiterative UN warnings, the negotiations 
never developed and the delimitations of the Ethiopian-Somali boundary were settled 
through the procedure of arbitration, just a few months before Somalia became 
independent. The process of arbitration confirmed the provisional border set by 
BMA as official border of the Somali Republic. One of the immediate effects of this 
international failure was an increase sense of insecurity with regards to border issues 
that fostered the process of unification of Somalia and Somaliland in 1960 that is 
subject of analysis of chapter six. 
 
4.3 ‘Carrot and stick’: restoring Italian rule  
On November 21, 1949, the UN General Assembly resolution 289 (IV) 
recommended that former Somalia Italiana should become independent after a 10-
                                               
26 UN Resolution 854 (IX) December 14, 1954; UN Resolution 947 (X), December  15, 1955; UN 
Resolution 1068 (VI) February 26, 1957, in Foreign Relations of the United States, ‘Somalia’, pp. 
608-23. 
27
 According to Italian diplomats in Addis Ababa, the Ethiopia government aimed at maintaining  the 
border adjustments delimitated by the BMA. So the Ethiopian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Yilma 
Deressa, to the Italian Ambassador in Ethiopia, ‘making any concessions to the Somalis would be 
pointless because that would foster more aspirations [Somali irredentist claims]’. (Author unknown), 
Italian Embassy  ‘Telegram to AFIS’, 23rd September 1959, Addis Ababa. ASDMAE, carteggio AFIS, 
cassa 9, busta 2. 
28 So the Trusteeship Agreement: ‘In order to resolve any and all differences arising in the course of 
such negotiations, the respective parties to each bilateral negotiation agree, on the request of either 
party, to a procedure of mediation by a United Nations Mediator to be appointed by the Secretary-
parties to accept recommendations of the Mediator, to a procedure of arbitration; Recommends, 
further, that, with respect to any other boundaries not delimited by international agreement, the parties 
concerned seek to reach agreement by negotiation or by arbitration.’ Libro Verde, p. 45. 
29 UN Resolution 1213 (XII) 14th December 1957. Quoted in Catherine Hoskyns (ed.), The Ethiopia 
Somali-Kenya dispute, (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1969), Appendix. 
Imagining the Nation, Crafting the State 
‘Abbiamo fregato gli indigeni somali’  131 
year trusteeship under the Italian Administration. The Italian Administration, AFIS, 
became effective on April 1950 when full executive and legislative power was 
transferred from the BMA to Italy. Within a period of 10 years until December 1960, 
which was brought forward to July 1960, AFIS was required to promote political, 
social and economic development, to urge self-government and prepare the country 
for independence. It was a rather ambitious programme that required the 
establishment, of a series of institutional infrastructures in a limited period of time, 
such as in the field of education and of representative councils, which were mostly 
neglected during the colonial period.  
The UN Resolution was final and did not leave room for objections: in 
seeking a solution to the issue of former colonies, the UN acted as a third, allegedly 
‘neutral’, party that mediated between the former colonial subjects – i.e. the Somali 
communities – and Italian (colonial) interests. During the debate, nationalists relied 
upon the UN, testified before the UN Special Commission of Investigation and thus 
implicitly accepted and recognised the role of the UN as legitimate solution-seeker to 
the question. Consequently, nationalists were bound to accept and to recognise as 
legitimate the UN decisions regardless of the conditions that were offered. The 
remake of AFIS by Somali popular culture, from which this chapter draws its title, 
accused the international promises of freedom and self-determination of ripping-off 
local communities. This section discusses the theoretical and practical contradictions 
of the restoration of Italian administration in the region and how Italian policy of 
creating consent was drafted accordingly.  
The establishment of an Italian administration in Somalia Italiana was 
inherently embedded in a series of contradictions that reflected the tension that 
characterised the institution of the Trusteeship System. On a practical level, AFIS 
represented a revival of Italian rule under different terms but it also implied 
discontinuity with the British administration. For this reason, AFIS as a 
representative of the UN, was progressive and reactionary at the same time: on the 
one hand, the Italian government claimed to promote freedom and democracy and to 
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embody ‘the paladin of African nations.’
30
 However, on the other, it re-imposed 
former colonial administrators, deliberately oblivious of the social-political changes 
taking place across the regions.
31
 On a different level, the restoration of Italian rule in 
Somalia under an international mandate generated a series of questions that 
challenged the very same principles of the UN. For instance, on what basis was a 
non-UN member state, as the Italian Government, qualified to represent the UN in 
Somalia?
32
 On what basis was a democracy recently emerging from two decades of 
fascism, like Italy, entitled to represent the UN’s liberal principles formulated in 
opposition to fascism in 1945? Finally, to what extent were the UN principles 
opposed to fascism if the same principles allowed the restoration of former Italian 
rule in Somalia? Overcoming these inherent contradictions became the principal 
objective of the Italian government with respect to the trusteeship administration in 
Somalia. Accordingly, it drafted a policy whose main purposes were seeking 
international prestige and consensus within international Western community, 




On a more empirical nature, issues of consent for colonial rule – the 
Gramscian notion of the masses’ acquiescent attitude to the ‘direction imposed on 
social life by the dominant fundamental group’ which enjoys a hegemonic position in 
the system of production 
34
- needed to be addressed. Apart from retaining key 
positions in the agricultural industry, Italy did not hold a position of hegemony in the 
region, nor did it have the backing of the majority of Somali communities. With the 
                                               
30
 This rhetoric became a commonplace feature of Italian politics. See, for instance, the memoir of the 
then Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs: Count Sforza, Cinque Anni a Palazzo Chigi, p. 171. See also 
the inaugural speech of the Italian Administrator in Mogadishu Il Corriere della Somalia, 2nd April, 
1950.  
31 The choice of the administrators for AFIS became very controversial. In particular, the nomination 
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took part in the attack of Ethiopia and served as Italian administrator during the occupation. Following 
the critiques, his nomination had to be withdrawn. See Del Boca, Nostalgia delle Colonie, pp. 57-61. 
32 Italy became member of the UN in 1955. The possibility to have a non-UN member state as 
administrative authority was not considered at the San Francisco Conference in 1945. Special 
arrangements were eventually made in that sense. Toussaint, The Trusteeship System, p. 206. 
33 See Morone, L’ultima Colonia, pp. 45-9. 
34 Gramsci, Quaderni del Carcere. 
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aim to controlling the state apparatus in its political, institutional, juridical forms and 
promoting forms of consent among the subjects, Italian policy evolved through a mix 
of consent and coercion. As discussed in chapter three starting from the late 1940s, 
strategies to amass consent were drafted by the Italian government by attempting to 
muster the forms of discontent among Somali communities towards the BMA. By 
1950, these policies became more elaborated: on the one hand, the ties set up during 
the Italian colonial rule with sections of Somali society, mostly communities’ 
leaders, were revived while attempts were made to link up with the political 
leadership; on the other hand, political activities were repressed.   
A first matter of concern for AFIS was dealing with a certain hostility from 
local communities. As the UN Commission reported, sections of Somali 
communities, which mainly found expression in the Somali Youth League, bitterly 
opposed the restoration of Italian rule. However, the official position of the 
international community and of the Italian government expressed enthusiasm for the 
successful accomplishment of the trusteeship administration. The Italian government 
confidently claimed to rely on both the ‘collaboration of the administrated people’,
35
 
and of the Somali Youth League.36 International press echoed a similar optimistic 
attitude: the New York Times for instance, clearly excluded the possibility of any 
confrontation between AFIS and Somali nationalists.
37
  Despite the degree of 
enthusiasm, the diplomatic exchanges between the BMA and AFIS clearly testified 
great concerns with regards to the Somali Youth League and its hostile attitude 
towards AFIS. Rumours of ‘secret plans’ to oppose the restoration of Italian rule 
were commonplace within diplomatic circles;
38
 ‘extreme caution’ was recommended 
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by the BMA in the occasion of the hand-over of power,
39
 due to the presence of 




To counter this opposition and in order to establish its rule, AFIS adopted a 
rather coercive policy. By 1950, the political activities of all parties, the ones 
opposed to or not opposed to AFIS began to be repressed.
41
 Restrictive measures to 
regulate political activities were implemented by AFIS between 1950 and 1953. For 
instance, political parties were allowed to hold meetings once per week only on pre-
arranged days.
42
 Simultaneously, a wave of arrests targeted political supporters to the 
point that the number of prisoners held in Mogadishu increased threefold within the 
first two months of AFIS.
43
 Political repression was met by disapproval and 
systematic resistance. Hundreds of petitions were sent to the UN by all political 
organisations, in particular by the Somali Youth League. The general claim was that 
a ‘cold war’ between AFIS and political parties had been established in Somalia; the 
petitions denounced AFIS as ‘by all means against the League’.
44
 However, the 
petitions, which were supposed to play an essential role within the exchange of 
communication between communities under trusteeship and the UN, were ignored.   
Riots and protests against AFIS, mostly organised by the League, became 
frequent and widespread in the trust region.
45
 The confrontation between the League 
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41 So the Italian General Secretary, Benardelli in a telegram to the Italian commissioner in Kismaayo: 
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44 The Somali Youth League, Afmadow branch, ‘Petition to the UN’, 2nd November 1950, Afmadow.  
A limited collections of the petitions sent to the UN by Somali political parties is stored in  an 
unnamed folder in ASDMAE, carteggio AFIS, cassa 9, busta 2. 
45 For instance, within 2 months, from August 1950 until October 1950, six telegrams were sent from 
local district administrations to AFIS in Mogadishu to report violent protests; as a response, members 
and supporters of the League were arrested. To be more precise, on 5th October 1950, three Somalis 
were killed and many arrested in Gaalkacyo during riots between local communities and police. 
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and AFIS reached its climax when in 1952, as a response to protests, Italian police 
raided the League headquarters in Mogadishu, forced it to a temporarily close down 
and made arrests among its members.
46
 Thereafter, the attitude of the leadership of 
the League gradually changed and by mid-1950s became one of cooperation with 
AFIS. Arguably, this shifting attitude was caused by the repressive policies adopted 
by the administrative power. However this also needs to be understood within the 
Italian aim to create consent and to allure Somali political leadership. 
A more politically-nuanced aspect of the Italian policy was the creation of 
consent among traditional and political leadership. As argued in chapter three, Italian 
policy by the late 1940s aimed at the construction of a pro-Italian Somali front that 
would testify before the UN in favour of Italy. Accordingly, so called ‘lucrative 
donations’ were distributed among community’s leaders and members of the 
Conferenza per la Somalia with the aim of buying off their favour and support; this 
policy was pivotal for the restoration of Italian rule.
47
 In 1950, AFIS decided to 
continue financially supporting the pro-Italian front ‘as a due reward of their past 
attitudes’.
48
 Additionally, this policy aimed at the revival of pre-war ties between the 
Italians and the waged-leaders that constituted the base of Italian system of dominion 
analysed by Hess.
49
 In this sense, one of the first measures adopted by AFIS was the 
full reinstitution of the colonial system of waged-leaders in place before the war and 
the increase of their monthly salaries.
50
  
At the same time, Italian administrators attempted to engage in dialogue with 
the political leadership of the Somali Youth League, to moderate its ‘radical’ trend, 
and establish links with  AFIS: 
                                                                                                                                     
Regional Commissioner (name unknown), Telegram to AFIS in Mogadishu, 5th October 1950, 
Gaalkacyo; ASDMAE, carteggio AFIS, cassa 9, busta 2. In 1951 more riots were reported during a 
demonstration in favour of the return to Mogadishu after a propaganda trip to Nairobi of one of the 
League’s leaders Abdullahi Issa Mahamud, eventually Prime Minister in 1956. Further riots were 
reported in Bardheere on 18th February 1952. 
46 The League was allowed to reopen five days later. 
47 For details see Four Power Commission, Report, Appendix I. 
48 Consul Manzini, ‘Telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome’, 6th October 1948, 
Mogadishu; ASDMAE, carteggio AFIS, cassa 19, busta 11. 
49 Hess, Italian Colonialism, chapter 5.  
50 The colonial institution of waged-leaders was fully restored and the salaries increased 3-fold. 
Castagno, ‘Somali Republic’, in Coleman, Rosberg (eds.), Political Parties, p. 525.  
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We certainly support the idea to allure the S.Y.L., in order to make it our 
instrument so that it [the League] could back us and … eventually testify before 
the UN and international public opinion in our favour.
51
 
This policy ‘discretely and totally indirectly’ favoured and increased the number of 
pro-Italian ‘agents’ within the affiliates of the League,
52
 and had already given ‘good 
results’ in 1949.
53
 The choice to engage directly with the League reflected the wide-
held belief within AFIS that the party was the most important association of the 
region. Proof of the League’s credibility was given by the fact that previous attempts 
to bribe its leadership were unsuccessful: 
[N]otwithstanding its faults, [the League] is the sole political organization worthy 
of this name in today Somalia. Evidence of that is the fact that it is mainly funded 
by the membership subscription fees and the leadership, and the fact that the ones 




As discussed in chapter three, the main aim of these policies was to promote 
Italian interests exclusively; local political needs, aspirations and agendas were 
discarded. In many ways, the attitude adopted by the Italian government resembled 
the mind-set which characterised the institution of the Trusteeship System. As the 
previous section highlighted, the System was designed to achieve self-government 
and independence without discussing the ways through which these goals would be 
fulfilled. In a similar way, AFIS was eager to construct some forms of backing 
locally regardless of their political affiliations. In this sense, while in the 1940s 
Italian strategies were able to catalyse forms of dissents towards the BMA, plans 
were already drafted to engage in dialogue with the Somali Youth League due to its 
increasing importance in the area. For this reason and despite the repressive policies, 
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AFIS did not aim to hindering the proliferation of nationalism and of the Somali 
Youth League; it rather aimed at using Somali nationalism to its own advantages. So, 
colonial plans were drafted as early as 1948: 
Nationalism, with all its pros and cons, is the prominent political factor in today 
Somalia. Our administration-to-be cannot neglect or, worst, repress this. In fact, it 
was such nationalism that for instance prevented the collusion between the 
League and Ethiopia to our detriment… It is evident that once Somali nationalism 
will be accommodated and allied to our cause it will constitute clear opportunities 




4.3.1 Constructing consent: the role of education and 
scholarships 
A key role within Italian strategies of constructing consent among political 
leadership was played by education and the institutions of scholarship and training 
programmes. As this section highlights, these strategies represented a turning point in 
shaping the relations between political leadership and AFIS. Given the poor status of 
education, a field that had been almost entirely neglected by previous Italian colonial 
administration,
56
 the decolonisation plan considered development policies in 
education to be of great importance. Although some education programmes were set 
up by the BMA, the achievements remained modest.
57
 Therefore, in accordance with 
the development programme imposed by the trusteeship, AFIS agreed to enhance 
education facilities and programmes that would provide Somali communities with at 
least some basic primary education.
58
  While the results of this programme remained 
limited in the short term, they set long-lasting links between Italy and Somalia that 
were consolidated by the foundation of National University in Mogadishu, sponsored 
by Italian government and provided with Italian academics.
59
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In her contribution to the critical discussion on colonial hegemony in Africa 
and India, Dagmar Engels analysed how scholarships and university education 
represented the means through which colonial rule attempted to establish hegemony, 
based on the current notion that ‘knowledge is power’. These efforts were marked by 
a dialectical tension between colonial rule and colonial subjects in which the latter 
made use of education to assimilate forms and structures of the colonial domain and 
use these structures to access power.
60
 Similarly, the implementation of scholarship 
programmes that would provide training and high-level qualification for the potential 
institutional and administrative leadership assumed a critical significance in shaping 
the relations between AFIS and political leadership.  
These programmes meant to address political leaders and transform them into 
a governing intelligentsia.
61
 This constituted a completely new trend because, as 
argued in chapter two, the Somali Youth League emerged as a collective effort and 
was not led by western-educated elites or a well-defined urban class. From this 
perspective, the process of formation of a political intelligentsia was shaped through 
the programme of scholarships set up by AFIS. In particular, this process gained 
momentum following the establishment of a training school in Politics and 
Administration in Mogadishu. Throughout the 1950s, it became readily apparent that 
Somali political leaders had to access the scholarship programmes in order to 
appropriate the institutional domain of AFIS and, subsequently, to enter the state. 
Due to the hegemonic power of AFIS in this domain – i.e. AFIS held the power to 
appoint scholarship-holders – political leaders had to conform to the expectations and 
requirements of AFIS.  
Within the broader plan of democratisation and ‘Somalisation’, the position 
of power held by AFIS should not be underestimated. Through this programme, 
AFIS maintained the facility to appoint scholarship-holders whose qualifications 
would be instrumental for accessing institutional posts. At the time, there was a great 
demand of skilled personnel due to the paucity of qualified Somalis; the highly 
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bureaucratised state being crafted by the Italians opened up numerous job 
opportunities which increased following the progressive replacement of Italians by 
Somalis. Within this process, AFIS held a position of predominance that could be 
hardly challenged. Consequently, the political leaders were forced to accept AFIS 
conditions in order to get access to the state and, ultimately, structures of power.  
The extent to which appointing scholarships to political leaders modified 
their political stance is difficult to estimate. It is a fact that many members of the 
League made use of these scholarships and pursued education in Italy.
62
 As Tripodi 
suggests, there are interconnected links between the programme of scholarships and 
the shifting attitude of the League’s leadership that by mid-1905s became closer to 
AFIS.
63
 At least at an official level, the attitude of political leadership changed 
radically. So did, for example, the attitude of Abdullahi Issa, secretary-general of the 
League in 1949 and Prime Minister of the Legislative Assembly in 1956. In the 
1940s, he was among the strong opponents to the restoration of Italian rule. For 
instance, during a trip to the United States in 1949 in provision of the UN final 
decisions on former Italian Somalia, Abdullahi Issa regularly broadcasted speeches 
from New York to the Horn of Africa which were firmly against the restoration of 
Italian rule: 
It would be better to fight two or three hundred years than to be under Italian 
dominion. It would be better for all Somalis to be killed than to have the Italians 




Within a few years, Abdullahi Issa’s personal stance toward AFIS changed radically. 
In 1955, on the occasion of the twelfth anniversary of the League, the Somali leader 
expressed gratitude to Italian rule for the progress in the administration and 
confirmed total collaboration with AFIS.
65
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Somali political leadership should not take the whole responsibility for this 
shift. As pointed out by Chatterjee, in order to bring colonial rule to a formal end, 
nationalists would be ready to challenge colonialists within their own domain only 
after having assimilated the features of their structures and domain.
66
 This condition 
was made very clear by AFIS which would appoint Somalis at institutional posts on 
the condition that they attended and fulfilled the qualifications that were established 
by AFIS. 
 
4.4 Crafting the post-colonial state 
The trusteeship administration can be divided in two administrative phases. The first 
phase (1950-56) was characterised by Italian effective and legislative power and 
came to an end with the election of the first Legislative Assembly in 1956. The 
second phase (1956-60) corresponded with the period of self-government where 
ultimate control of the trust region rested with the administrative power, yet the 
legislative, administrative and constitutional power rested with Somali-led 
governments. This section deals with the first phase of AFIS (1950-6) which was 
considered crucial for the crafting of the post-colonial state and specifically, it 
focuses on the establishment of representative councils and of electoral procedures.  
A partial consensus among scholars indicates that state structures inherited by 
colonial rule in Somalia constituted an alien, Western-like, highly centralised ruling 
system which was oblivious of local culture and space, and alienated the highly 
decentralised pastoral society.
67
 Studies with a closer focus on AFIS by Tripodi and 
Morone maintained similar positions. For instance, in studying the economic and 
political relations between the Italian government and Somalia, Paolo Tripodi 
contended that the work of AFIS produced rather weak achievements especially in 
the political field. This was attributable to the fact that the political model imposed 
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by AFIS was too ‘Western’ to be successful in Somalia Italiana. In fact, this model 
bore little consideration for ‘Somali traditional structure’.
68
  
Conversely, the argument developed in this section suggests that within the 
process of state-craft, a constant tension arose between the ‘Western’ objectives of 
the trusteeship system and the constant reliance on ‘traditional’ patterns by AFIS to 
fulfil the task. This led to the establishment of governing bodies and procedures, both 
at central and local levels, which ambivalently mixed traditional and modern 
elements. Theorizations of Chatterjee and Mamdani on colonial rule are important to 
appreciate this tension. Chatterjee addressed the core contradictions of colonial rule 
expressed by tensions between modernising mission and traditional ruling practice. 
He argues that in spite of colonial plans, the political and institutional ways in which 
colonial rule developed were affected by an unresolved conflict between theory and 
practice. In this sense, colonial rule maintained dual features that bore a ‘modern’ 
outlook, scope and aims but resorted to ‘tradition’ when building its governing 
structures. The appropriation of what was taken as ‘traditional’ was thus central to 
the attempts to construct colonial rule.
69
  
The works of Mamdani on the features and legacies of the colonial state 
further investigated how this tension between modernist and traditionalist elements 
was met by colonial ruling strategies. In moving beyond the dual variant of direct 
and indirect rule, Mamdani suggests that dominion was exercised through a 
decentralised despotism which divided urban and rural domains, and civic and ethnic 
ties. In this way, it established a ‘bifurcated state’ with dual governing bodies, a 
tribally organised local authority and a distinct division between ‘tribal’ and 
‘modern’, and ‘subjects’ and ‘citizens’. By exacerbating ethnic cleavages and urban-
rural divisions, this system of dominion negatively affected post-colonial 
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Mamdani’s concept of a ‘bifurcated state’ provides a useful tool to investigate 
the process of state-craft during AFIS. In pursuing a demanding plan of 
modernisation, AFIS established a duality of features within the institutional 
structures, governing bodies and decision-making processes. Where the final aim of 
AFIS was the construction of a democratic, western nation-state, the means through 
which this was achieved were embedded into a mix of ‘traditional’, or what was 
considered to be ‘traditional’, and modern patterns. This tension was reflected when 
establishing the representative councils, decision-making bodies and when drafting 
the criteria for conducting electoral procedures.  
In addition to this, the institution of representative councils was marked by a 
conservative policy that favoured the predominance of traditional representation to 
the detriment of political parties. The establishment of the electoral procedures was 
instead characterised by the choice of arbitrary methods and by a clear-cut divide 
between rural and urban areas. These methods introduced a political discourse based 
on clan-belonging when competing in national elections. Moreover, the electoral 
system inaugurated a dualist electoral system that was clan-based at the bottom level, 
and centralised at the top. Appreciating the characterisations of the decision-making 
bodies established during this phase is important because their features strictly 
resembled the developments of post-independence electoral politics. 
 
4.4.1 Representative organs: Territorial, District and 
Municipal Councils 
One of the first actions undertaken by the administrative power in accordance with 
the trusteeship agreement was the creation of consultative and representative organs 
both at national and local level: the Territorial Council; the District Councils; the 
Municipal Councils. These institutions functioned as the consultative organs in 
dialogue with the administrative power from 1950 until 1956 when the election of 
the first Legislative Assembly inaugurated self-government and replaced the 
Territorial Council. The composition of these consultative institutions favoured 
community leaders and limited the representation of political parties. The 
establishment of representative institutions was marked by a reactionary policy that 
neglected the political developments of the regions in the 1940s. Whereas the 
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remarkable character of nationalism imagined by the Somali Youth League went 
beyond clan and regional affiliations, the representative organs established by AFIS 
stressed traditional, clan-based or local-based, ties. Furthermore, the representative 
bodies were enclosed into a centralised and autocratic state structure.  
In 1950 a Territorial Council was established to provide consultative 
assistance to AFIS in the exercise of the legislative power. The Council was also 
created as a representative organ of Somali communities and as an advisory and 
intermediate body between communities and the administrative power. However, the 
relationship between the Council and AFIS was not on based on equal terms and 
conditions. In fact, the Administrator held the power to select the communities’ 
representatives for the Council in 1950. In order to balance the power between the 
two, in 1951 it was decided that the Council should be elected, however, this did not 
happen before 1955, just a year before the introduction of self-government.
71
 
In 1950 the Council constituted of 35 seats and distributed as follows: 
twenty-one clan leaders; seven representatives of the political parties; two 
representatives of the commercial class; two representatives of the Italian 
community; two representatives of the Arab/Yemeni community; one representative 
of the Indo-Pakistani community.
72
 The representatives of political parties were 
constituted by four members of the Somali Conference, the pro-Italian umbrella 
political association, and three members of the Somali Youth League. The proportion 
of political representation within the Territorial Council remained very small 
compared to the number of clan leaders. The representation of political parties within 
the Territorial Council increased gradually but overall remained limited.  In 1950 and 
1951 political representation constituted one-fifth of the Territorial Council (7 out of 
35 seats); in 1952 political representation represented one-quarter of the Council (11 
out of 44 seats).
73
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Similar structures were replicated at a local level where councils were 
established in districts and municipalities of the trust territory. These councils were 
characterised by a highly centralised and autocratic structure, the key positioning of 
the communities’ representatives, and by a clear-cut divide between the ‘rural’ and 
‘urban’ communities.
74
 The District Councils, Consigli di Residenza, were formed in 
the non-municipal areas and comprised mainly communities’ leaders appointed by 
AFIS. They functioned as consultative organ for the District Commissioners, 
representative of AFIS in the local administration. However their task mainly 
involved dealing with issues related to what was referred to as ‘customary law’, 
meaning especially the settlement of local disputes. Through the institution of local 
councils, the state delegated the responsibilities to communities’ leaders to deal with 
local disputes marking a detachment of the central institutions from local issues.  
The function of the District Councils was overseen over by district officers 
and mobile police who were entitled to resort to both persuasion and force in cases of 
‘growing tension’ among local communities.
75
 The twenty-seven Municipal Councils 
were instituted in urban areas and had consultative power on a variety of local issues. 
The Municipal Councils were modelled on the Mogadishu Council instituted in the 
1940s by the British.
76
 By 1956, the Municipal Councils fell under the authority of 
the Minister of Interior, who had the power to dissolve the councils and their mayors; 
the Councils’ power was further limited by regional Prefects.
77
 It is worth 
mentioning that while similar representative bodies were in used elsewhere in 
colonial Africa, they constituted a new institution in Somalia Italiana, with the 
exception of brief attempts during the fascist rule.
78
 
A few considerations must be emphasised in relation to the representative 
bodies established by AFIS. First, these institutional structures were oblivious of 
political changes taking place across the regions in the 1940s. The super-clan and 
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super-regional feature of Somali nationalism, discussed in chapter two, was rejected 
in favour of a rather tight structure that stressed local and clan affiliations. Second, 
the political parties, which had been recognised by the Italian government as the 
prominent feature of the time, were given limited representation in the councils. The 
composition of the councils was particularly adverse to the Somali Youth League, 
which had made the abolition of regional and clan distinctions its main aim. 
Furthermore, although the League was recognised as the foremost political party of 
the regions it was give less representation than the pro-Italian party. Furthemore, 
clan-leaders assumed an important role within the advisory and consultative work of 
the trusteeship. On a different level, the representative councils were invested with a 
good deal of effective power on local issues, such as the appointment of salaries for 
council members.
79
 More importantly, the Territorial Council, the most important 
organ of representation for Somali communities, came to be mainly composed of 
clan-leaders who had the task to assist AFIS legislation until 1956. As discussed later 
on in this chapter, the cooperation between AFIS and the Territorial Council resulted 
in the draft of arbitrary electoral procedures.   
The governing structures established by AFIS were very different from the 
horizontal features of the 1940s nationalist politics. Although the overall structure of 
the League was highly centralised, its composition was marked by participation from 
below, which allowed members to elect the leadership and to contribute to the 
drafting of the party’s political line. Conversely, the institutional structures of the 
post-colonial were highly verticalised. The system introduced top-down hierarchies 
in which the ones on the top held the power to select  appointees for official positions 
and, thus, to control institutional bodies. On a different level, this governing system 
was also extremely gendered. As discussed in chapter two, the League relied upon 
women’s organisations that carried out fundamental tasks for the party. By contrast, 
the post-colonial state being crafted by AFIS was restricted to male representation. 
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A final point to consider is in relation to the effects of the dual tribal/modern 
feature of the governing bodies on the management of local conflicts over resources. 
In this sense, Markakis contended that confrontation among groups’ interests in the 
Horn of Africa is necessarily a political issue due to the key role played by the state 
in mediating between the various contenders. These conflicts have remained 
characterised and shaped by ethnicity as the state, which takes part in the process, is 
an ethno-state.
80
 By appointing communities’ leaders with local authorities and by 
delegating issues related to local disputes to these authorities, AFIS brought local 
conflicts officially into the political realm.  
 
4.4.2 The electoral procedures 
In preparing for self-government and independence, four elections were scheduled by 
AFIS, two at municipal and two at national levels within five years. During the first 
phase of the trusteeship a municipal election was held in 1954 and a national election 
in 1956 based on universal male suffrage. However, the establishment of elections 
and electoral procedures did not come without problems, in particular issues arose in 
relation to the preparation of electoral rolls. As it will be discussed, AFIS adopted a 
dual strategy that mixed traditional elements with some modern patterns causing an 
increase of competition among different groups and producing distorted electoral 
results. The 1956 national consultation elected the first Legislative Assembly that 
replaced the Territorial Council and inaugurated the phase of self-government. 
During self-government, a municipal election was held in 1958 and a national 
election in 1959 when a second Legislative Assembly was elected to lead the country 
to independence and to produce the Somali constitution. The following is a 
discussion of the electoral system implemented during the trusteeship administration 
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In provision of the first election, AFIS had to deal with a series of practical 
questions that arose around the establishment of the electoral procedures. The core 
problematic was in relation to the census of the communities under trusteeship. A 
census of urban population was carried out in 1953 and provided the data for the 
1954 municipal election held in 27 towns, or municipalities.
82
 Subsequently, in 
preparation of the election of the Legislative Assembly in 1956, an administrative 
program was launched that scheduled the complete census of those communities not 
included in the municipalities to be undertaken before the 1956 election. However, 
the plans for the national-scale census were never completed and in order to integrate 
the data provided by the 1953 census of urban areas, alternative measures were 
taken. Accordingly, in each district, local colonial authorities delegated the tasks of 
carrying out surveys to gather personal data (rilevazione anagrafica) to local leaders. 
However, this proved to be problematic as the surveys generated competition among 
communities whose leaders provided exaggerated estimates. Thus, the data gathered 
in this way was considered extremely unreliable.
83
 
To overcome the shortage of reliable data on the electorate, the administrative 
power in consultation with the Territorial Council drafted a provisional electoral law 
to serve for the election of the 1956 Legislative Assembly. The law legislated for a 
two-step national election via the use of direct method for the municipalities and 
indirect methods, through the use of communities’ council, or shir, in the rural 
districts. At the time, the shir was considered by AFIS as ‘customary’ councils to 
which male members belonging to the same clan could attend in order to deal with 
matters of common interests.
84
  
The electoral law decided to rely on the shir for the purpose of indirect 
elections and, consequently, different shir were recognised officially and given 
elective power by the Territorial Council. Once invested with elective power, the shir 
gathered before the Election Day electing up to five electoral representatives, or 
                                               
82 The results were published by AFIS. Istituto Centrale di Statistica, Censimento della Popolazione 
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83 Costanzo, Problemi Costituzionali della Somalia, p. 26. 
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Greater Electors, who were considered depositary of the number of votes received 
during the shir. Subsequently, the Greater Electors were asked to participate to the 
direct election in the municipalities where they represented the number of votes 
which they claimed to have received during the shir and their electoral preference. 
Simultaneously, all the qualified voters registered at municipalities were expected to 
participate to direct election. It is important to note that the two different methods, 
indirect and direct, were given equal electoral weight.
85
 For instance, 200 votes 
obtained through direct elections of qualified voters registered in the municipalities 
were equal to the vote of a single Greater Elector who claimed to cast ballots for 200 
members of the shir where he was elected.  
By investing the shir with elective power and the Greater Electors with the 
power to decide and claim a certain share in the decision-making process, this system 
altered some of the basic principles of the electoral procedures of modern 
representative democracies. By giving more importance to the number of votes 
represented by the Greater Electors, the system downplayed the single electoral 
preferences which necessarily came to be reduced to a few variables. Moreover, this 
particular usage of indirect voting methods introduced a distorted approach to 
electoral competition which did not take place among political parties but rather 
among different communities. From a different point of view, this system introduced 
an attitude to democratic and governing processes that centred on the exclusive 
investment and importance given to the Greater Electors. This exclusive feature 
reflected the ruling attitude that characterised AFIS as a whole, as it has been 
discussed throughout the chapter.  
Because no reliable data on the regional composition of the electorate was 
available, the distribution of seats within the Legislative Assembly was, at this time, 
not fixed but subject to electoral results. That is, the Districts with more resulting 
number of votes were considered to be the most densely populated and thus given 
more representation in the Legislative Assembly. It appears evident that the whole 
electoral system focused on the resulting number of votes; the ‘number’ therefore 
became central within the political competition especially in the process of indirect 
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elections where figures of electorate were essentially non-existent. The system was 
therefore susceptible to electoral tampering that, unsurprisingly, happened. The 
records of AFIS for the 1956 national election reported a general trend of 
exaggeration of the number of votes represented by the Greater Electors and so for 
each districts. This trend was already registered during the surveys to gather personal 
data before the elections where paradoxically, the total number of ballots resulting 
from the surveys not only exceeded the estimated number of qualified voters based 
on universal male suffrage, but it also exceeded the number of population estimates, 
which was 1.2 million, that included those social sections, women and children, who 
were not qualified to vote.
86
 Similarly, the electoral results were thus considered very 
unsatisfactory: 
It became evident that the electoral results produced by the communities living 
outside the urban areas, which constitute most of the electorate, was distorted: for 
instance the consuetudinary assemblies [sic!]
87
, the shir, where indirect elections 
were held in order to choose the Greater Electors («electoral representatives») 
artificially exaggerated the number of votes for the [1956] election.
88
 
Given these unsatisfactory results, the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations 
recommended the drafting a new electoral law in case no national census of Somali 
communities was undertaken: in that eventuality, the Trusteeship Council 
recommended that ‘a new electoral law is to be taken under examination as soon as 
possible to guarantee the free election of the Legislative Assembly so that the state 
structure will be ready by December 1960.’
89
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Apart from the electoral tampering, the electoral procedures had several 
deficiencies. The recognition of the elective shir was subject to an arbitrary process 
that gave the power to qualify the shir with elective character to the Territorial 
Council, whose majority was composed by clan leaders. Further concerns related to 
the representativeness claimed by the shir: the shir was not only a gendered organ of 
representation but its composition was not representative of the whole male 
population. Instead, it was conventionally constituted by all men belonging to the 
same clan or sub-clan considered ‘able to fight’.
90
  
A further deficiency of the indirect voting methods was in relation to the 
representation of minority groups. Several minority or low-status groups, especially 
in the agriculturist regions, were bound to a client-status relation with Somali clans 
and did not enjoy fair representation within the ‘customary’ councils.
91
 The electoral 
law allowed minority groups to take part in the shir held by bigger groups. However, 
the patterns according which this process happened, if it did at all, remained 
undefined and left space for the possibility that certain minority groups went 
unrepresented.
92
 Moreover, as the system of indirect voting centred on clan 
belonging, individuals with different belongings but within the same community 
were excluded from taking part to the shir.
93
 The shir, conventionally considered at 
the base of pastoral democracy, was an essentially spontaneous institution that 
gathered when there was the need to discuss local issues.
94
 Instead, the electoral law 
formalised the institutions of shir and co-opted its system into a pre-defined and 
over-imposed structure that was directed to a vertical and national scope.   
Furthermore, the electoral system centred on local clan and the role of 
communities’ leaders. This circumstance forced political parties to address their 
propaganda to community leaders in contrast to the practices developed in the 1940s. 
Moreover, because the system introduced a duality of practices, the political 
propaganda had to adopt different strategies. Somali political space was encapsulated 
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in a centralised structure with a well-defined vertical hierarchy that reinforced the 
clan-links as means to access power and control of the state. Post-independence 
Somali politics were characterised by a dualist feature clan/local-base at the bottom 
level and national/unitary at the top level. Mamdani links a similar fragmentation of 
politics along ethnic/kin lines to the features of colonial legacy for the cases of 
Uganda and South Africa.
95
 In Somalia, similar trends are traceable following the 
first national elections conducted on 29 February 1956, the introduction of self-
government and formation of Legislative Assembly, as it will be analysed in the next 
chapter.  
Appreciating the decentralised character of the state-system crafted by AFIS 
is important for a broader understanding of the historical trajectory of the post-
colonial state. Such analysis makes a contribution to those studies that are concerned 
with the predominance of a clan-based discourse in Somali politics. Self-government 
marked the beginning of a short-lived multi-party system during which five elected 
governments came to power and the number of political parties proliferated. The 
democracy that was eventually replaced by Siad Barre’s military coup in 1969
96
 has 
been described as a very fragile institution incapable of overcoming the primordialist 
divisions of Somali society.
 97
 Accordingly, attempts at nation-building by successive 
Somali governments were constantly challenged by the centrifugal forces of kinship 
that eventually overwhelmed the democracy.
98
 The governments were subject to ‘the 
logic of kinship’ and the problematic policy of balancing clan representation within 
the Assembly did not hinder the consolidation of political factionalism.
99
 In the 
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1960s, the political competition of an increasing number of clan-based parties - 64 
parties presented 1,002 candidates to compete for 123 parliamentary seats in 1969 - 
tore apart the national and social fabric while the political elites were deeply 
absorbed in pursuing their private interests.
100
 Historical patterns leading to politics 
fragmentation must be at least partially traced back to the electoral procedures 
adopted by AFIS that imposed a local clan-based fragmented consultation to cast 
ballots and access national politics. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter dealt with the process of ‘verticalisation’ of the Somali political space 
by looking at the democratising programmes carried out by AFIS. As underscored in 
chapter two, one of the distinctive features of Somali politics in the 1940s was the 
emergence and proliferation of nationalist movements as a response to the vacuum of 
power following the Italian defeat and the adoption of partially liberal policies on 
civil rights. Due to the challenges and opportunities offered by wartime, the British 
military rule, and by the international debate over former Italian colonies, Somali 
nationalism promoted a horizontal structure characterised by super-regional and 
super-clan features. The immediate outcome of the imposition of a 10-year 
international trusteeship was the centralisation of national politics at a state level and 
the revival of pre-war links between the former colonial masters and certain 
segments of Somali society. As discussed throughout the chapter, the state-
construction during AFIS imposed a series of institutional patterns that separated the 
elites from the masses, thus creating two different social categories. It revived the 
importance of clan-based and region-focused authority while also introducing a 
clear-cut distinction between rural and urban areas. In this way, the state emerging 
under trusteeship administration came to be in stark contrast with the features of the 
nation imagined by modern nationalism in the 1940s.  
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In exploring the particular trajectory of the decolonisation process in Somalia, 
the chapter examined the concept and structure of the Trusteeship System of the UN. 
The System granted the creation of self-government and independence for Somalia 
promoting a progressive international policy towards decolonisation. It further 
provided guidelines, supervision and support to both the trust power and 
administered communities. As a political system, however, it had several 
shortcomings. Despite the clarity of the aims of the System, the UN did not develop a 
debate on what forms of self-government to promote and what kind of independent 
state to establish. Moreover the System came to be subject to the conflicting interests 
of the Cold War leading to restoration of former Italian rule under different terms. 
Within this context, Somali nationalists were forced to accept the UN decisions the 
conditions imposed by the Trusteeship System. Consequentially and despite 
representing a progressive attitude of international community towards colonial rule, 
the implementation of the trusteeship in Somalia was characterised by distinctively  
reactionary features.   
By exploring the ways in which the Trusteeship System was structured, it was 
argued that the UN had, in fact, very limited contact with the administrated 
communities. The Trusteeship System entailed a privileged position to the 
administrative power, which had effective control over the trust region but not the 
ultimate responsibility for its administration and was not obliged to adopt the UN’s 
recommendations. As noted by Pungong, the conservative policy-making that 
affected the institution of the Trusteeship System after the Second World War, 
created a system which ‘left the administrating power such a free hand…[and] 
seriously blur[red] the distinction between Trust territory and ordinary colonies’.
101
 
As a result, the Somali state that emerged from the trusteeship did not differ from 
other post-colonial states in Africa and bore similar autocratic, centralised features of 
post-colonial states.  
On a different level, the chapter has argued that the plan of democratisation 
carried out by AFIS was characterised by a constant tension between its modernising 
scopes and the ‘traditional’ practices in use. From this perspective, the chapter 
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challenged previous interpretations that claimed the state system imposed by AFIS to 
be too ‘Western’ to be effective in Somalia. Conversely, the chapter underscored 
how plans to establish a modern, democratic regime took shape through the 
institution of governing structures that were ambivalently clan-based, or ‘traditional’, 
at the bottom level and ‘modern’ at the top level. In this sense, the duality of the state 
crafted by AFIS resembled Mamdani’s theorisation of decentralised despotism 
inherited by the post-colonial state, thus alienating the majority of the population 
from the state, its institutions and power.  
 Finally the chapter investigated the attitude to power adopted by the Italian 
authority during the trusteeship. Due to the limitations of the Trusteeship Council 
and the ambiguities of the System, the trust power held a powerful position which 
implied unaccountable freedom to act and to establish modes and patterns of the 
administration. As explored in the case of the institution of representative councils, 
this power included the faculty to decide who would be included and who excluded 
from key state positions. In this way, top hierarchies were invested with the exclusive 
power to include. This faculty proved to be crucial within the process of formation of 
political leadership (as seen in the case of scholarship programmes) and the 
‘Somalisation’ of the state. As next chapter discusses, this attitude to power was 
inherited by Somali-led government following the introduction of self-government in 
1956. From this moment onwards, Somali governments would lead the process of 
state-craft and the appointment of Somalis to institutional posts in replacing Italians. 
This legacy had major effects on the process of state-building and as chapter six 
argues, on the process of 1960 Somali unification.  
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Chapter 5:  ‘This is political immaturity’:  
Introducing self-government, curbing dissent 
and establishing the ‘Monocolore’ State  
 
5.1 Introduction 
In exploring the features of the governing bodies established by the trust power 
(AFIS), the previous chapter discussed how, within the process of democratisation, 
great emphasis was placed on issues such as elections, electoral procedures, and 
quantification of the electorate. The peculiar ways through which these processes 
were carried out enhanced competition among different groups rather than political 
parties. A tension was highlighted between the modernist aims of the trusteeship and 
the traditional features of the state-craft leading to the institution of an ambivalent 
and distorted ruling system which was characterised by a ‘decentralised despotism’. 
Within this system, top-hierarchies were invested with the power to decide who 
would be included or excluded from the structures of power. All these aspects were 
inherited by the Somali-led Legislative Assembly, which was elected in 1956, 
marking the establishment of self-government.  
Conventionally, the phase of self-government has been described as the 
moment in which the modernist features of Somali nationalism, (i.e. the Somali 
Youth League) came at odds with the traditionally divisive nature of the clan system. 
In particular, the work of the legislative assemblies clashed with the ‘[non] rational 
approach to economic and social problem’ which characterised the clan system.
1
 
Accordingly, the governing bodies led by the League were challenged by the 
particularistic interests of the southern clans, represented by the Hizbia Digil & 
Mirifle, and by the wider cleavages within the League between the Daarood and 
Hawiya supporters.
2
 As a result, the parliamentary system remained a rather fragile 
and ineffective institution due to ‘partly a matter of conflicting policies, partly a 
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 Despite providing valuable insights on the interrelations between clan-based 
interests and national politics, these analyses tend to ignore the role played by the 
institutional framework set up by AFIS in shaping Somali political space and 
discourse. By looking at the work of the two elected assemblies (in 1956 and 1959) 
led by the Somali Youth League, this chapter sheds light on the ways in which the 
peculiarities of the trusteeship system affected the development of everyday politics 
in Somalia. It argues that self-government marked the beginning of ‘spoils politics’
4
 
and led to the establishment of what came to be known as the ‘Monocolore’ state 
(literally the system government dominated  by a ‘single colour’, i.e. by a single 
party)
.5
 On the one hand, this dominant-party system was characterised by an 
autocratic and repressive phase during which the rule of the majority remained 
uncontested and the attempts to challenge it unsuccessful. After obtaining the 
majority of seats in the Assembly, the League’s leadership occupied the key 
institutional posts previously held by the Italians and made a systematic use of these 
posts to consolidate its power. By 1956 dissent emerged within the League partially 
fostered by the competing forces of the Cold War. In facing the dissent, the 
governments led by the League ratified a series of restrictive legislations with the 
aim of concentrating power in the hands of the ruling party, to monopolise the 
Somali political space and to silence the opposition. In doing so, the League secured 
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the majority of votes, excluded the opposition from power, and crushed the growing 
dissent within and outside the party. 
On the other hand, the establishment of self-government marked the 
beginning of spoils politics in Somalia. In fact, due to the centrality of elections 
within the process of democratisation, the ruling party was in constant need of 
electorate backing. For this reason, the leadership of the League decided to negotiate 
share of power with the opposition leaders especially with members of the HDM. In 
this way, the ruling party used its positions to keep control of the state and to reward 
key supporters and members of the opposition by the appointment of government 
posts. The emergence of a political discourse based on clan needs to be understood 
within this context of restricted political space, politics of patronage, and constant 
electoral competition. Although clan interests played a role in influencing the work 
of the governing bodies, the chapter suggests that the evolution of a clan-based 
discourse should be understood as a reaction to the autocratic policy of the Somali 
government rather than the cause of its failure. 
At first, the chapter discusses how the Somali government dealt with dissent 
and the instruments that it used to silence it. Especially, the chapter looks at how the 
emergence of dissent within the League was coupled with the (mis)use of a clan 
discourse. By discussing the drafting of a new electoral law, the chapter then looks at 
the ways in which the League prevented the opposition from accessing power. It 
argues that the centralising strategy adopted by the government led to the 
suppression of sections of the opposition that merged in the League. This chapter 
suggests that it was only in the context of restricted political competition and curbed 
opposition that clan became an alternative means to articulate dissent, access the 
state and challenge the monopoly of the League. Finally the chapter considers the 
positive and negative sides of the experience of self-government in Somalia Italiana., 
It argues that although the formation of the Assembly represented a very important 
moment within the process of Somalization of the Somali state, i.e. the devolution of 
power and responsibilities to a Somali-led government, its establishment proved 
problematic. Due to a demanding development plan, state-building was characterised 
by misuse of power and by fragile separation of powers.  
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5.2 Establishing self-government: the first Legislative 
Assembly 
On 30 April 1956, the first elected parliament, namely the Legislative Assembly, was 
formed in Somalia Italiana. The Assembly headed the decolonisation plan 
established by AFIS that gave a great deal of autonomy to the Somali government. 
Moreover, the Assembly inherited the culture of dominion established by AFIS 
which invested top-hierarchies with the exclusive power to complete the process of 
decolonisation and of ‘Somalisation’ of the state by appointing Somalis to key 
institutional posts. This exclusive position allowed the ruling party to establish the 
‘Monocolore’ state, to curb dissent, and to negotiate power sharing with opposition 
leaders.  
The Trusteeship System scheduled a demanding programme of legislation for 
the Assembly whose main task was the establishment of the political, administrative 
and juridical bodies of the Somali Republic. Special committees had to be formed in 
order to draft the civil, penal, military and labour codes as well as the codes of penal 
and civil procedure. Moreover, bills on citizenship, press, health, education and 
economic systems had to be drafted. In doing so, the Legislative Assembly was 
initially supervised by AFIS whose approval was needed before any law was passed. 
In turn, the UN advised the Italian Administration on any law the government 
submitted. However, by May 1957 the Italian Administrator withheld his right to 
prior scrutiny leaving the government completely in charge of domestic issues. The 
formation of the Legislative Assembly thus marked the process through which the 
Somali government took control of the administration while both AFIS and the UN 
quit their nominal responsibility for Somalia. The following sections discuss step by 
step the establishment of ‘Monocolore’ state in Somalia. It is discussed the question 
of how a controversial system of representation allowed the Somali Youth League to 
amass a strong majority in the Assembly. The League was able to consolidate its 
power by ratifying restrictive legislation that crushed dissent within the party, and 
instrumentally used the clan system. Finally, by drafting a new electoral law the 
League guaranteed their re-election. 
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5.2.1 A strong majority, an unquantifiable victory: the 
controversial system of representation 
The 1956 election reported a strong victory for the Somali Youth League. Two 
leaders of the party, Aden Abdullah Osman and Abdullaahi Isse Mahamuud, were 
nominated President and Prime Minister of the Assembly respectively. Subsequently 
they formed a government of 6 ministers and a series of under-secretaries who all 
belonged to the League. The 1956 Legislative Assembly was constituted of 70 seats 
with 60 elected members and 10 seats distributed among minority ethnic groups.
6
 
The adoption of the Italian system of representation, which allocated the 60 
parliamentary seats according to regional population, favoured the Somali Youth 
League, the only party to present a list of nominees in all constituencies but one. The 
electoral results reported in Table 5.1 confirm the strong victory of the Somali Youth 
League, which was awarded 43 seats out 60. However, a closer look at the electoral 
results reveals that the League was given a parliamentary representation bigger than 
the proportion of actual votes won. In 5 constituencies out of 25, the League was the 
only party to present lists of nominees for the elections. Due to this circumstance, no 
elections were held in these 5 constituencies and their seats were allocated a priori to 
the League. 
Although the electoral system had the merits to allocate a solid majority to 
the winning party, the decision to rely on the Italian proportional system of 
representation proved controversial. As discussed in chapter four, not only had the 
electoral system established by AFIS shown flaws and inadequacies that seriously 
undermined the validity of the electoral results, but no electoral rolls were completed 
before the election. In fact, AFIS did not undertake a nation-wide census of the 
electorate as prescribed by the trusteeship agreement with the UN. Therefore, the 
decision to distribute the parliamentary seats based on regional population became 
problematic since it could not rely on electoral registers but on the ‘unsatisfactory’ 
                                               
6 The 10 seats were so distributed: 4 to the Arab community; 1 to the Indian Community; 4 to the 
Italian Community; 1 to the Pakistan community. According to the then British Consul in Mogadishu, 
Tony Kendall, these MPs hardly challenged the government: ‘The Italians usually vote with the 
Government; the Arabs with the Government, except when religious factors are involved; the Indian 
and the Pakistani rarely speak and are watchdogs of their communities’ economic interests.’ A. 
Kendall, ‘From Mogadishu to Foreign Office’, 22nd February, telegram no. 45; ‘Internal Political 
Situation in Somalia’, TNA, FO 371/131460. 
Imagining the Nation, Crafting the State 
‘This is political immaturity’  160 
and ‘incomplete’ pre-electoral statistical surveys.
7
 Although the surveys were 
considered unreliable, they were still used to establish the regional representation in 
the Assembly by giving more or less electoral weight to the constituencies. Some of 
the constituencies where no elections were held were also believed to be densely 
populated. For instance, that was the case of the constituencies Beledweyne, 
Bulobarde and Afmadoow  (respectively number 9, 10 and 25 in Table 5.1) where 
the League was the only party to present electoral lists. In this way, a quarter of the 
elected parliamentary seats (14 out 60) was allocated with no electoral competition to 
the League. This lack of competition allowed the party to establish a strong control 
over the Legislative Assembly.  
 
Table 5.1: Results of the 1956 national election. Compiled from Il Corriere della 
Somalia.  
                                               
7 Costanzo, Problemi Costituzionali della Somalia, p. 26.  
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The peculiarity of the system of representation did not go unnoticed among 
the Somali public in the trust region but actually generated a sense of mistrust of the 
electoral process. The local newspaper Il Corriere della Somalia, that followed and 
documented the elections and electoral campaign, received several letters from the 
readers asking clarifications on the mechanisms through which parliamentary seats 
were distributed. Soon after the elections, for instance, a certain Iusuf Guled wrote to 
the editor wondering the reasons why the parliamentary share of the League did not 
reflect the proportion of votes cast. He made the point extremely clear: 
How come the Somali Youth League has been awarded 43 seats with 333,780 
votes and the Hizbia Dighil & Mirifle who won 159,932 votes, half of the votes 
won by League, has been awarded 13 seats only?
8
 
This query expressed the core of the controversy: although the League won by a ratio 
of 2:1 (333,780 votes won by the League versus 159,932 won by the HDM), it was 
given a parliamentary majority by a ratio of 3:1 (43 seats to the League versus 13 to 
the HDM). This strong majority was due to the allocation of seats with no electoral 
competition. Clearly, within the competition between the two main parties, the 
system of representation significantly favoured the League. At the same time, it 
caused problems for other parties, as the HDM which amassed votes in specific areas 
only. 
 
5.2.2 Consolidating the League’s power 
Despite the fact that the first national election confirmed the League as the majority 
party, it appeared clear that the foremost opposition party, the HDM, had strong 
supporters in certain colleges, as Baydhabo, Burhakaba and Xuddur (respectively n. 
11, 12, 15 on Table 5.1). As AFIS placed great emphasis on electoral competition 
and more elections were scheduled before the end of the trusteeship, consolidating 
power became the main concern of the League. The task was made possible due to 
the institutional framework established by AFIS that gave a great deal of power to 
                                               
8 ‘Letters from the audience’, Il Corriere della Somalia, 4th March 1956. 
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the Legislative Assembly. As mentioned, by May 1957 the legislation of the Somali 
government was not subject to AFIS scrutiny but the Legislative Assembly had full 
and uncontested control over domestic issues.
9
 Therefore, nothing prevented the 
League from ratifying legislation to increase the government’s powers. One of the 
first laws passed by the Assembly gave extraordinary powers to the Government for 
a year. In particular, legislative arrangements increased the government’s power on 
issues related to public security including the faculty to order summary arrest among 
those suspected of acting against the public order.
10
 This law was justified due to the 
‘delicate political situation in Somalia’
11
 but, in fact, gave a free hand over internal 
affairs to the League.  
Other legislative arrangements passed by the Somali government ensured its 
control over radio broadcasts and press.
12
 From this point onwards, Il Corriere della 
Somalia, already characterised by a pro-government line, became controlled by the 
Somali government that supervised Radio Mogadishu as well. Due to the 
government’s interference with the radio broadcasts, the Director of the Radio, 
Ahmed Mohamed Alore resigned in December 1956 and his replacement was 
nominated by the government.
13
 The government’s control over radio broadcasts was 
central to controlling political propaganda. If the Corriere, mainly written in Italian, 
sold circa two thousand copies daily,
14
 radio broadcasts reached a broader audience. 
An elderly Somali interviewed for this research recalled that listening to the radio 
was a key part of social interaction at the time.  Radio broadcasts constituted a very 
efficient means to spreading news all over the Somali-speaking regions: groups of 
people used to come together to listen to the news, poetry and songs and information 
                                               
9 AFIS was still in charge of the foreign affairs. However in December 1957, AFIS allowed the Prime 
Minister, the President of the Assembly and Minister of Interior to accept an invitation from Haile 
Selassie to visit Ethiopia without Italian representatives. During the visit, reported as extremely 
successful and friendly, the Somali delegation travelled to Khartoum, where they were hosted by the 
Government, to Djibouti and Hargeysa. A. C. Kendall, British Consulate-General, Mogadishu, 18th 
December, 1957, no. 22 (1018/57), JG/015/6, in ‘Internal Political Situation in Somalia’, TNA, FO 
371/131459. 
10 Costanzo, Problemi costituzionali della Somalia, p. 88.  
11 Il Corriere della Somalia, 10th December 1958. 
12 Lewis, ‘Modern Political Movements in Somaliland. II’, p.353 (see footnote). 
13 His successor was Abdi Mohamed Namus. ‘Monthly Summary for December, 1956’, British 
Consulate, Mogadishu, no. JG/013/1, in TNA, FO 371/125676. 
14 In 1956, a section in Arabic was included in the Corriere. 
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gathered in this way propagated quickly from mouth to mouth, from town to 
countryside.
15
 Other newspapers and magazines were founded and published every 




5.2.3 Dealing with internal dissent  
The formation of the Legislative Assembly generated dissent among some sections 
of the Somali Youth League because of disagreement over the leadership’s pro-
Italian policy.
17
 As chapters two and four have discussed, although the League 
emerged in 1943 as a nationalist anti-colonial, i.e. anti-Italian, political organisation, 
by the mid-1950s its policy had changed radically. Due to the two-fold strategy 
adopted by AFIS that repressed political activities while appealing to political 
leaders, the League’s leadership decided to engage in dialogue with the Italians in 
contrast with the original strategy of the party. The shift was consolidated with the 
formation of the 1956 Somali government and marked the beginning of a 
collaborative period between the Somali government and AFIS. This  attitude  was 
clearly expressed by the new president of the Legislative Assembly, Aden Abdullah 
Osman, in public statements made soon after the national election: 
We, the Somalis, will fully support their work [of the Italian Administration]… 
We are also in need of help from friends and, knowing the Italians, we are sure 
that only the Italians could provide us with such help.
18
  
The new political orientation of the League was met by a certain degree of 
dissent within the party: on the one hand, a section of the League favoured a more 
radical attitude towards AFIS which was perceived as a continuation of the colonial 
rule; on the other, a section, composed of communities’ and religious leaders, was 
unhappy with the allegedly ‘secular’ line of the leadership.
19
 Within this context, the 
competing forces of the Cold War played a remarkable role in determining political 
                                               
15 Interview with Ahmed Ali Hibrahim, 15th July, 2009, Hargeysa. 
16 Interview with Benvenuto Francesco Isaaq, 5th October 2010, Rome.  
17 As discussed in the next chapter, the leadership of the League considered also to adopt a pro-
Commonwealth policy due to the plans of the unification with the British Somaliland.  
18 Il Corriere della Somalia, 13th March 1956.  
19 Adam, ‘Islam and Politics in Somalia’, pp. 199-201. 
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orientation and shaping dissent. In chapters three and four we have seen how the 
formation of the League was influenced by the BMA and by the local branch of the 
Italian communist party in Mogadishu. Conversely, the formation of other political 
parties, as the HDM, was influenced and supported by Italian colonial clerks. 
Throughout the 1950s, Somali political organisations were targeted by the 
propaganda of external powers: the USSR, for instance, attempted unsuccessfully to 
make of the League a communist organisation.
20
 More efficacious was instead the 
propaganda of the Egyptian government that targeted these ‘unhappy’ sections of the 
League with the aim of building up a pro-Third World front.
21
 As it will be 
discussed, this influence contributed to a split within the League and to the 
consolidation of the autocratic policy of the ruling party.  
Since the mid-1950s, the Egyptian government intensely invested in Somali 
education. The historic koranic schools with large nationwide presence, the dugsi,
22
 
were paralleled by the establishment of new schools which, based on Egyptian 
curricula, favoured the teaching of Islamic history and tradition as well as the Arabic 
language.
23
 Moreover and in order to counterbalance the education programmes 
offered by AFIS, a conspicuous number of scholarships was made available for the 
Somali pupils to pursue their degrees in Egypt.
24
 In this way, Egypt became one of 
the major supporters, second to Italy only, of secondary and university education for 
Somalis offering a total of 683 scholarships during the trusteeship administration.
25
 It 
should be noted that similar scholarships were also offered to pupils of the British 
                                               
20 Author unknown, ‘Communist activities in Somalia’, undated, unreferenced. ASDMAE, carteggio 
AFIS, cassa 12. 
21 Antonio M. Morone, ‘L’Egitto di Nasser e la formazione dello Stato somalo: influenze politiche, 
interazioni culturali e identità nazionale’ Contemporanea, XIII:4(2010). 
22 On the dugsi see Mohamed Abdi Mohamed, ‘Retour vers les dugsi, écoles coraniques en Somalie’, 
Cahiers d’Études Africaines, XLIII(2003); Federico Battera ‘Rapporti Storici fra il Benadir, la 
Penisola Arabica e l’Africa Orientale’, Africana, (1996). 
23 See Morone, L’Ultima Colonia, pp. 169-70. 
24 Somali students in Cairo were closely watched over by the Egyptian Government which repatriated 
a few and arrested others on the charge of spying for the British government. British Consulate, 
‘Monthly Summary for January, 1957: Part B’, Mogadishu, JG/013/2, in TNA, FO 371/125676. The 
influences of Soviet Union and of the USA on Somali politics became important in the late 1960s 
only. See for instance, Gary D. Payton, ‘The Somali Coup of 1969: The Case for Soviet Complicity’, 
The Journal of Modern African Studies, 18:3(1980); Lefebvre, Arms for the Horn, part III. 
25 Morone, L’Ultima Colonia, p. 170. 
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Somaliland.
26
 This circumstance led to the formation of a Somali Office in Cairo, a 
socio-political club that promoted Somali students’ interaction whose activities will 
be analysed in detail in the next chapter.  
The Egyptian involvement in Somali education influenced internal political 
development especially due to the close connection with one of the long-standing 
leaders of the League, Haji Mohamed Hussein. Supported by Egyptian funding, the 
Somali leader was able to catalyse the dissent within the party and to form a faction 
that challenged the government’s policy by favouring a pro-Egyptian alignment.  
Haji Mohamed Hussein belonged to the Rer Hamar, the inhabitants of 
Hamarwayne, the historical downtown of Mogadishu. As a young man, he worked 
briefly for the Italian colonial administration and in 1943 was among the 13 founding 
members of the League. He soon became an important political figure and was 
elected to the presidency of the party serving in the period between 1946 and 1951. 
Mohamed is today remembered for having been very committed and passionate 
about politics: he was also ‘a great orator with a strong determination against 
injustice and inequality’.
27
 He combined religious beliefs with leftist political 
orientation and strong anti-colonial, i.e. anti-Italian, positions. He took an active part 
in the riots against the Italians in Mogadishu 1948 and was for this reason, much 
disliked by AFIS. When the Italian authority was restored by the UN in 1950, Haji 
Mohamed Hussein authored a series of articles in certain Egyptian newspapers in 
which he deeply criticised AFIS.
28
 In 1951, he won a scholarship and left for Egypt 
where he lived until 1957, when he was re-elected as chairman of the League and 
returned to Mogadishu. 
                                               
26 It is very common to find Somalis in their 60s who have pursued secondary education or university 
training in Egypt. Fieldwork notes, July 2009, Hargeysa. 
27 Interview, 22nd March, 2009.  
28 A collection of these articles has been gathered by AFIS and stored with no reference in one of the 
AFIS’s files. Although very fragmented, the file offers interesting insights on the nature of the 
articles. For instance in an article published by Al Misri, 25th June 1950, Haji Mohamed Hussein 
accused the Italian administration of abusing power and persecuting the Somalis. At the time, links 
between Egypt and Somali movements caused some concerns among AFIS. In 1950 a new party, 
called the Islamic League (Lega Islamica) was founded with Egyptian support with the aim to 
promote Pan-Africanism among all Muslim population in Africa. The party however did not make any 
progress. ASDMAE, carteggio AFIS, cassa 9, busta 2. On the links between Egypt and Somali 
political parties during the Italian trusteeship see Morone, ‘L’Egitto di Nasser’.  
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The occasion of the presidential election of the League marked the climax of 
the conflict within the party.
29
 Scheduled in July 1957, the elections were a crucial 
time for the League in three key ways: first, for the first time all branches of the party 
were called for electing the president;
30
 second, by choosing the new president of the 
League, the elections also indicated the party candidate for the national elections and 
for the post of Head of State; third, the new leadership had the important task to lead 
the work on the Somali Constitution. Two candidates ran for the presidency: the 
president of the Legislative Assembly, Aden Abdullah Osman supported by AFIS; 
and the former party chairman Haji Mohamed Hussein backed by Egyptian 
government. The victory of Haji Mohamed Hussein over the Aden Abdullah Osman 
was therefore a defeat of the Somali government. The electoral results also indicated 
a regional divide within the League according to which the more peripheral districts 
of Mijertein, Mudugh, Upper and Lower Juba were pro-Mohamed and voted against 
the government. In the Banaadir (the district of Mogadishu) and Beledweyne the 
membership of the League voted in favour of Aden Abdullah Osman and so pro-
government.
31
 Additionally, the results suggested that Egyptian influence could 
constitute a challenge to the party stability since in support of the Haji Mohamed 
Hussein, school and religious teachers were used to promote Egyptian interests.
32
 
Despite his supposedly neutral position, the Egyptian member of the UN Trusteeship 
Council in Mogadishu took part in the competition and contributed to this 




                                               
29 Touval, Somali Nationalism, p. 91.  
30 Previously, the presidents of the League were chosen by the party Central Committee. 
31 British Consulate-General, Mogadishu, ‘Monthly Summary for Period July 9 to August 6, 1957’ 6th 
August 1957, no. JG/013/9; TNA, FO 371/125676. 
32 British records stressed on the active role played by the Egyptian government in Somali politics and 
the use of schools as means of propaganda. One of the monthly political summaries claims as follows: 
‘There are reports, one from an unimpeachable source, that Egyptian schools in the Mudugh are being 
used to give para-military training to pupils and songs in Arabic are taught extolling Egypt and 
denouncing the enemies of the Moslem Somalia. Ibid.. 
33So it was reported by the British Consulate: ‘Decisive vote [for the election of Haji Mohamed 
Hussein] was cast by Mogadishu section of SYL last Sunday and it was influenced in the election by 
the new Egyptian Consul General who distributed pamphlets unhindered by AFIS, in spite of a ban … 
and by meetings held in the Egyptian reading room where threats were uttered by the speaker against 
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After the re-election of Haji Mohamed Hussein, a political crisis between the 
League’s leadership and the government began. While the president of the League 
harshly criticised the government in public speeches, the government replied by 
developing a strategy aimed at isolating Haji Mohamed Hussein and preventing the 
consolidation of his position. Of the two factions, the government’s propaganda was 
more effective due to a more powerful position, the backing of AFIS and the control 
and use of the media.
34
 The conflict reached a climax in 1958 when the President and 
Prime Minister of the Assembly presented a motion to the League’s General 
Committee, calling for the expulsion of Haji Mohamed Hussein from the League. 
The motion claimed that the president’s ‘violent and provocative attitude’ was 
detrimental to the country. By quoting Haji Mohamed Hussein’s public incitement to 
resort to violence, the motion was approved by the League’s General Committee. 
The following is an extract of the motion published by the local newspaper:  
[the president of the League said the words] ‘shed your blood for your 
country’…without considering the consequences that [such words] would cause 
to the Country at the eve of the independence.
35
   
In this way, the League-led government was able to get rid of the main internal 
political opponent and to regain control over the leadership of the party.  
 
5.2.4 Eradicating clan divisions by using clan division 
The ‘decentralised despotism’ that characterised the governing bodies introduced by 
AFIS, clan-based at the bottom level and modern at a top level, contrasted with the 
original aims of Somali nationalism. This tension developed with the introduction of 
self-government reflecting an uneasy relationship within the dual domain of 
nationalism. As illustrated in chapter two, in the 1940s a potent movement from 
                                                                                                                                     
those who did not vote for Haji Mohamed.’ A.C. Kendall, British Consulate-General, Mogadishu, 1st 
August, 1957, n. JG/016/16; TNA, FO 371/125678. 
34 Since his return from Egypt, Haji Mohamed Hussein began a campaign against AFIS whose 
administrators he called ‘colonialist hyenas’ and addressed his propaganda to the labourers employed 
in Italian plantations as at SAIS in Johwar. A.C. Kendall, British Consulate-General, Mogadishu, 18th 
February 1958, no. 5 (1018/58); TNA FO 371/131461.   
35 Il Corriere della Somalia, 26th May 1958. 
Imagining the Nation, Crafting the State 
‘This is political immaturity’  168 
below, led by the League, appropriated certain elements of Somali culture in order to 
(re)imagine a Somali nation with no social division. With the election of the 1956 
Legislative Assembly, nationalists came to accept the institutional framework of 
AFIS domain and by doing so, engaged in conflicts with the national message they 
originally promoted. Some ideological features of this message, as the League’s 
commitment against clan divisions, became propagandistic ways to consolidate its 
leadership position within structures of power. 
As stated by the new League programme drafted before the 1956 elections, 
the main aim was the achievement of a united Somali nation in which ‘traditional 
and tribal prejudices’ and ‘any situation harmful to national interests’ had to be 
eradicated.
36
 In practice, it soon became clear that by pursuing the abolition of clan 
divisions the League instrumentally used clan to crush both internal dissent and the 
opposition parties. The aim was two-fold: on the one hand, by adopting a centralising 
and repressive policy, the government’s legislation severely targeted the opposition 
which the League claimed to be ‘tribal’ and thus adverse to the Somali nation. On the 
other, the rhetoric of the fight against clan divisions was used to conceal conflicts of 
different nature as the dissent within the party discussed above and a conflict of 
interests between the agriculturist communities and the pastoral and urbanised 
Somalis. As it will be argued, the League used this rhetoric to face both internal 
dissent fostered by Egyptian influence and to construct the ‘tribal’ threat constituted 
by the opposition. 
As chapter three discussed, since the formation of political association in the 
1940s, Somali sedentary and semi-sedentary communities came to be represented by 
the political party of the Hizbia Digil & Mirifle named after some of the agriculturist 
communities living in the relative fertile riverine regions of southern Somalia. 
Conversely, the Somali Youth League became more popular among the pastoral and 
urban communities. Nevertheless, political affiliation was not drawn along a clear-
cut divide between clans and regions but was subjected to different variables. In this 
                                               
36 The programmes of the political parties were published in the local newspaper. Il Corriere della 
Somalia, 17th February 1956. 
Imagining the Nation, Crafting the State 
‘This is political immaturity’  169 
way, agriculturist communities were also likely to support the League and pastoral 
Somalis to be the members of the HDM.
37
 
Socioeconomic features, such as the control over the agricultural sector, thus 
played a remarkable role in determining political affiliation or at least they did at the 
top-level. These interests were reflected in the struggle between the League and the 
HDM. By favouring a centralising policy, the League enhanced the formation of a 
firm state control of economic sectors mainly of the agriculture. Differently, the 
HDM supported the formation of a federal state with more regional autonomy in 
order to safeguard the interests of the communities it represented.
38
 The two political 
lines clashed in 1952 when the Territorial Council attempted to draft a land law: the 
League strongly advocated the eradication of clan claims over land ownership; the 
HDM, instead, insisted that client-status claims and property rights determined by 
clan affiliation should be officially recognised by the Somali state.
39
 This demand 
was dismissed by the Somali Constitution drafted in 1959 that did not recognise such 
claims. Future legislation ratified by Somali government, in particular under Siad 
                                               
37 Biographic information collected by the BMA in the 1940s and by the British Consulate in the 
1950s provide some insights on clan belonging of key political leaders. Throughout this period, many 
political leaders and key figures swapped political parties. In fact, members of the same family could 
have different political membership. For instance, Mohamed Ahmed, Imam of the Abgal sub-clan 
supported the ‘pro-Italia’ until 1948 when he joined the League; Abdurrahman Ali Essa, leader among 
the Boras, was member of the League and became supportive of the Italians in the late 1940s. Two 
cousins of the Mijertain ruling family, Haji Mussa Boghor and Mussa Boghor Yusuf held different 
political stances: the former was a well-known member of the League (becoming minister in 1956); 
the latter authored a petition to the UN asking for Italian trusteeship to be implemented in the late 
1940s. Similarly, Aden Shireh Jama, of Darod clan family changed political affiliation: he served in 
the Italian Army and fought with the Italian resistance movement against the BMA; he was member of 
the ‘pro-Italia’ until mid-1950s when he joined the League in 1956. Abdi Nur Mohamed Hussein, of 
Qabawein, was the local secretary of the League at Bur Hakaba until 1950 when he swapped to the 
HDM from which party he was expelled in 1956 and re-joined the League in 1958. Abulqadir 
Mohamed Aden, nicknamed ‘Zoppo’, of the Rahawein, was member and petition writer of the League 
until 1950 when he joined the HDM; as it will be discussed in this chapter, he eventually re-joined the 
League in the late 1950s. This information is taken from two reports drafted in 1948 and 1958 and 
stored in the same file: Political Adviser (name unknown), ‘Personalities in Somalia’, BMA, Asmara, 
7th December, 1948, no. 10 S/PA/36/40; A. C. Kendall, British Consulate-General, Mogadishu, 13th 
November, 1958, Despatch no. 28 (1011/58); ‘Leading Personalities in Somalia’ TNA, FO 
371/131458. 
38 The two aims were stated in the manifesto of the two parties. Author unknown, ‘Political Parties in 
Somalia’, undated. ASDMAE, carteggio AFIS, cassa 9, busta 2. 
39 Marco Guadagni, Xeerka Beeraha. Diritto Fondiario Somalo. Le terre Agricole dal Regime 
Coloniale verso la Riforma Socialista, (Milan: Giuffrè, 1981), p. 220. 
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Barre’s rule, further discarded land ownership claims of sedentary communities 
through a policy of land alienation.
40
 
The policy against sedentary communities originated with the establishment 
of self-government and was concealed by the fight against clan system. One of the 
first measures undertaken by the League-led government in its fight against clan 
system was to ratify a law that forbade the use of clan terminology in the names of 
political parties. In fact, the law was directed against the opposition party, the Hizbia 
Digil & Mirifle named after specific clans, which was forced to change its name and 
became the Somali Independent Constitutional Party, passing from Hizbia Digil & 
Mirifle to Hizbia Dastur Mustakil Somali (HDMS).
41
 At the same time, the 
Legislative Assembly passed a law that called for the payment of the shamba tax, or 
tax on farming. Although the law technically applied to all the regions, it clearly 
targeted the southern regions where the farms were located. The enforcement of the 
new law was met with widespread protests by farmers to which the government 
replied with force. In the winter of 1956, riots between farmers and police led to 
fifteen deaths among the former and a few casualties among the latter.
42
 Although 
the farmers’ protests were not driven by political leaders, the ruling party was able to 
use it against the HDMS due to the regional-based character of the opposition.
43
 
Another occasion used by the ruling party to crush the opposition was given 
by the murder of the Egyptian Delegate to the UN Advisory Council, Kamal el din 
Salah, on 16 April 1957 in Mogadishu. The UN representative was stabbed by a 
Somali student most likely due to personal reasons.
44
 Nevertheless, a plot was made 
by the ruling party to implicate the HDMS in the assassination and to accuse it of 
violent and anti-national conduct: on May 1957 the Legislative Assembly decided to 
                                               
40 See the collection of essays in Besteman, Cassenelli, The Struggle for land; especially, Craven, 
Menkhaus, ‘Land Alienation and the Imposition of State Farms’. 
41 Thanks to a smart use of Arabic and Somali languages, the party changed its name from Hizbia 
Digil Mirifle (Party of the Digil and Mirifle) to Hizbia Dastur Mustakil Somali (Somali Constitutional 
Independent Party). 
42 British Consulate, Mogadishu, 16th January 1957, no. JG/016/2; ‘Somalia: Political Situation’; in 
TNA, FO 371/125678. 
43 Ibid.. 
44 Oral memories confirm that. It is also remembered that this student died in prison under unclear 
circumstances the night before Somalia’s independence. Interview with Mohamed Aden Sheikh, 24th 
April 2009, Turin. 
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lift the parliamentary immunity of two HDMS MPs, the president and vice-president 
of the party, to allow proceeding to be carried out against them on the charge of 
complicity with the murder.
45
 The accusations were soon dismissed but the League 




The political struggle between the two parties was paralleled by certain 
turmoil among political supporters. Oral memories collected recall violent clashes 
between the two different political supporters. For instance on 23 May 1953, an 
important HDMS leader, Ustad Osman Mohamed Hussein,
47
 was stabbed to death by 
League supporters in Mogadishu.
48
 Ustad was a prominent member of the HDMS, he 
was also a member of the Territorial Council, worked for the Italian administration 
and his death was strongly felt by HDMS supporters and still vividly remembered 
today.
49
 Further violent clashes are remembered in the city of Baydhabo where the 
HDMS was the prominent party but also the League had some supporters. It is 
remembered that in the mid-1950s members of the HDMS set on fire houses of 
League supporters and raped their wives in Baydhabo.
50
 This tension was used by the 
ruling party to build up a discourse that depicted the opposition as ‘tribal’, factious, 
because of its regional and clan affiliation and representation.  
As the previous section discussed, the dissent within the League over 
ideological policy led to the expulsion of Haji Mohamed Hussein who formed a new 
political party. It was on this occasion that a discourse based on clan was first used 
                                               
45 The British Consulate in Mogadishu commented the accusation against the HDM MPs as follows: 
‘From the police file and the Public Prosecutor’s report, both of which I have been shown in 
confidence, it is clear that there is to be an attempt to implicate the Hizbia [i.e. the HDM] itself which 
is accused of fostering a separatist movement in the south, and to prove that it was ain league with the 
Ethiopian Liaison Office here, which, the murderer asserts, pay for the assassination. From a 
precursory glance at the files, there is nothing, apart from the murder’s word, to justify action against 
anybody but himself. He... was accused of sodomy when at the University in Cairo and whose mental 
stability was upset by his expulsion.’ British Consulate-General, ‘Monthly Summary for May, 1957’, 
Mogadishu, 1st June 1957; TNA, FO 371/125676.  
46 Ibid.. 
47 Ustad, meaning professor, was an honorific title used to address individuals who pursed some 
educational training. Research notes, April 2009, Italy. 
48 Il Corriere della Somalia, 26th May 1953.  
49 Fieldwork notes. This is also confirmed by oral memories collected by Luling among supporters of 
the HDMS. Informal conversation with Virginia Luling, June 2008, London. 
50 Interview with Mohamed Aden Sheikh, 24th April 2009, Turin. 
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by Haji Mohamed Hussein to build up his challenge to the ruling party and to call for 
national unity. Isolated and expelled from the party he had founded, Haji Mohamed 
Hussein tried in vain to be readmitted in the League and eventually formed a new 
party called the Great Somalia League (GSL).
51
 The new party looked like a revision 
of the League: it shared a similar political manifesto; it pursued irredentism; it 
created a logo with religious and nationalist symbols, and it launched a populist 
motto ‘Somalia to Somalis’. Having no access to the government-controlled media, 
Haji Mohamed Hussein disseminated his propaganda through public speeches. By 
accusing the League of collusion with the ‘colonialists’ (i.e. the Italians) and the 
imperialists (i.e. western powers),52 he tried to invalidate the League’s legitimacy to 
represent Somalia and the Somali people: 
The real League is this GSL. The Somali Youth League is not called League 
anymore. It is the house of colonialists and Somali imperialists that try to subject 
Somalia to the Americans; it is the [W]hite [H]ouse of America
53
 
In order to consolidate his position, Haji Mohamed Hussein tried to appeal 
to some factions of the League that were unhappy with the clan representation of 
the Legislative Assembly. Despite the fact that the League recruited all Somali 
clans into its membership, the majority was drawn from the Daarood and Hawiya, 
the biggest Somali family clans. Consequently, the Daarood/Hawiya representation 
was predominant in the 1956 Legislative Assembly: the Prime Minister Abdhullahi 
Issa was Hawiya and Aden Abdullah Osman was a Hawiya linked through 
marriage to an important Daarood family; the ministers of the Assembly also 
balanced the representative proportion of the two clans.
54
 Nevertheless, their clan 
affiliation represented a means through which the government could be challenged. 
Because it was excluded from power, the opposition represented by Haji Mohamed 
                                               
51 Research findings tend to suggest that initially Haji Mohamed Hussein did not want to found a new 
party. Conversely, he aimed at elaborating a propaganda which would strengthen his position within 
the League, so to facilitate his readmission in the party. 
52 During public speeches, Haji Mohamed Hussein made explicit accusations to Ethiopia: ‘it is a 
shame that regions of our Somalia are still under the rule of colonialist oppressors’. Author unknown, 
‘Summary of Haji Mohamed Hussein’s public speech held on 4th October 1958 in Mogadishu’, 
undated; ASDMAE, carteggio AFIS, cassa 9, busta 2. 
53 Ibid.. 
54 Castagno, ‘Somali Republic’, in Coleman, Rosberg (eds.), Political Parties, p. 532.  
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Hussein played the card of clan and tried to catalyse an unsatisfactory section of 
Daarood members by accusing Aden Abdullah Osman to have favoured the 
Hawiya in the Assembly.
55
  
The way the ruling party replied to the challenge constituted by the Great 
Somali League is important in understanding the use of a discourse based on clan. 
The ruling party constructed an ambiguous narrative that by using clan denied clan 
divisions. The following extracts are taken from the party communiqué issued after 
the formation of the Great Somali League in which the League’s propaganda 
ambivalently denying clan divisions by pointing out that, in fact, clan favouritisms 
had been made by the government. First, the communiqué appealed for a united front 
against clannish divisions: 
Brothers, we warn you from the new party [the GSL] which has taken a tribal 
guise. So far, it has been known as the party of ‘Darod’ and if that was the case 
the Somali Youth League would be the party of ‘Hawiyah’. 
However and despite denying a political discourse based on clan, the League 
addressed the Darod communities by arguing that a fair distribution of power and 
resources among clans had actually been pursued:  
Brothers, if we want to look at the matter from a tribal point of view, then it 
would be clear that the tribe of the ‘Darod’ got the lion’s share within the current 
government. In the finance for instance, it is the only tribe that has the upper hand 
over the country’s economy. For example, which of the six regions of our 
territory has the best share in the economics? After the opening of trade with 
Aden [this region is] the Mudugh and Mijertein. The same consideration is valid 
for the Basso Giuba that has economic relations with Kenya. On the contrary, we 
know well that the other regions do not beneficiate from the above mentioned 
privileges concerning free trade... Considered the great kindness towards the 
Darod-inhabited regions, what else do we want from the Government? Isn’t the 
same Government, who has been accused of tribal politics, making sacrifice and 
justice?  
Moreover, by calling for unity the party propaganda stigmatised the clans 
represented by the opposition and shifted the attention on the threat they represented 
to the party: 
                                               
55 Touval, Somali Nationalism, p. 89. 
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Ask yourselves what benefits we will get by dividing into tribes and splitting into 
parties! Aren’t we aware of the fact that the ‘Dighil and Mirifle’ and their 
miserable party will take advantage of the situation and secure the majority of 
votes? Would this turn to our advantage?
56
  
By 1956 due to a certain dissent fostered by external players, a sense of instability 
characterised the political arena. Within this context, a discourse based on clan 
became the way in which the League’s leadership curbed the opposition and 
concealed the conflicts that had arisen around the distribution of resources. In doing 
so, the ruling party propaganda used the card of clan to overcome the internal 
conflict within the party. By constructing the threat represented by the opposition, 
this discourse stigmatised the communities it represented and also shifted the 
attention on different kinds of conflict. In fact, silencing the opposition became the 
main goal of the first Legislative Assembly. A similar strategy, i.e. constructing an 
external threat not to face internal crisis, will be adopted in the process of unification 
of Somalia and Somaliland discussed in the next chapter. 
 
5.2.5 The new electoral law 
The decolonising plan established by AFIS placed great emphasis on the electoral 
process which was considered a key part within the programme of institutional 
transplantation and devolution of power.
57
 Four elections, two municipal and two 
national, were scheduled within 5 years. The Italian administration planned and 
supervised the 1954 municipal and 1956 national elections. With the establishment 
of self-government through the formation of the Legislative Assembly in 1956, the 
electoral responsibility was passed to the Somali government which was in charge of 
the 1958 municipal and the 1959 national elections. However and in addition to the 
this responsibility, the Assembly inherited an electoral system that had been 
susceptible to a series of deficiencies and that generated electoral tampering and 
                                               
56 Communiqué issued by the Somali Youth League, Central Committee ‘An Invite, Advice and 
Warning to the sensible people’, 13th August 1958, Mogadishu; ASDMAE; carteggio AFIS, cassa 9, 
busta 2. 
57 Morone, L’Ultima Colonia, p. 154.  
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unsatisfactory results, as discussed in chapter five. For this reason, the UN prescribed 
that in order to overcome the electoral deficiencies, the Somali government had to 
draft a new electoral law. Moreover, considering that the distribution of 
parliamentary seats was based on regional population, the UN recommended that the 
drafting of the new law should be accompanied by a census of the electorate.
58
 The 
newly-formed Somali government was pressured by both issues related to the 
electoral process and running a census of electorate within a rather tight schedule. As 
this section explores, the emphasis placed on the electoral process had the unforeseen 
consequence of fostering political competition rather than enhancing 
democratisation.  
The 1958 municipal elections represented an important test of governmental 
management for the Legislative Assembly. Although a census of the electorate was 
carried out in the municipalities by AFIS in 1953, in provision of the 1958 elections 
the suffrage was expanded in order to allow women to vote.
59
 Despite the importance 
of the expansion of the suffrage to the process of democratisation, an update of the 
electoral rolls was not completed in time. Thus, in order to enable the unregistered 
electors to cast ballots in their municipalities, the Assembly decided to rely on the 
ink-voting system.
60
 The result was that, similarly to previous electoral experiments, 
the 1958 elections generated unsatisfactory data and continued to foster a sense of 
mistrust on the electoral system as a whole. As shown in Table 5.2, the electoral 
results were paralleled by an uneven distribution of seats among the municipalities 
between the two main parties. 
  
                                               
58 Renzo Meregazzi, L’Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana della Somalia (A.F.I.S.), (Milan: Giuffrè, 
1954), chapter 3, especially pp. 15-25. 
59 Castagno, ‘Somalia’, p. 357.  
60 The results of the 1958 Municipal Elections were commented by the British Consulate as follows: 
‘The elections passed without incident. The S.Y.L. claimed a “resounding success”, to have won 418 
out of 667 seats. In fact, this victory was due to the imposed “gains” of the S.Y.L. candidates in the 
northern provinces, where opposition was not admitted, in all 237 out of 251 seats. In the southern 
provinces, where the elections were hotly contested, the S.Y.L. lost considerable ground, mostly to the 
Independent Somali Constitutional Party (H.D.M.S.) which obtained 175 seats against 57 won in the 
1954 municipal elections’. A.C. Kendall, British Consulate General, Mogadishu, 4th April, 1959, no. 
JG/011/2; ‘Somalia: Annual Report for 1958’,TNA, FO 371/138306. 
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 1954 Municipal Election 1958 Municipal Election 
Party Votes Seats Votes Seats 
SYL 17,982 141 39,178 416 
HDM (HDMS) 8,198 57 38,214 175 
UGB 2,273 5 6,322 6 
GSL -- -- 10,125 36 
Liberal Party -- -- 11,004 27 
GFS -- -- 341 3 
SDP -- -- -- -- 
Union Merehan -- -- -- -- 
GAA -- -- -- -- 
UGSH -- -- -- -- 
Scidle 954 8 -- -- 
Bagiuni -- -- -- -- 
PDA -- -- -- -- 
UAS 2,584 28 -- -- 
LPS 1,681 22 -- -- 
UNS 1,137 9 -- -- 
Palma 415 3 -- -- 
UPS 1,759 4 -- -- 
AGA 351 -- -- -- 
Ancora 125 1 -- -- 
Muosada 124 -- -- -- 
Leopardo 24 -- -- -- 
Abgalia 47 3 -- -- 
UDS 43 -- -- -- 
TOTAL 37,697 281 105,184 663 
 
Table 5.2: Municipal electoral results. Compiled from: Castagno, ‘Somalia’, p. 358. 
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The discussion of the new electoral law began in 1958 a few months before 
the national elections. As discussed in this section, despite repeated complaints from 
the opposition parties, the Legislative Assembly ratified an electoral law which 
would secure the re-election of the League and prevent a fair representation of the 
political activities in Somalia. Additionally, instead of addressing the issue of 
quantifying the electorate, the Legislative Assembly gave attention to the 
practicalities of the voting system. Moreover, the law introduced restrictive criteria 
for the presentation of lists. These restrictions represented huge limitations for small 
parties in the electoral competition and these criteria were clearly design to favour 
the Somali Youth League in the electoral competition.  
One of the new conditions introduced by the new law was the increase of the 
number of the elected parliamentary seats from 60 to 90, and the introduction of 
restrictions to the presentation of electoral lists. According to the previous law, in 
order to run in a certain constituency, each party had to present 60 nominees. The 
new bill raised the number to 90 nominees for each constituency. Furthermore, the 
bill prescribed that the lists had to be supported in each constituency by 5,000 
signatures and by the payment of 90,000 Somali shillings as a deposit.
61
 These 
requirements constituted adverse circumstances for the smaller political parties that 
in 1956 struggled to present lists in all the constituencies and went unrepresented in 
most. Additionally, the new bill prescribed that each nominee had to be 
knowledgeable (reading and writing skills) in both Arabic and Italian,
62
 conditions 
that could hardly be met in a country with a very low percentage of literate people. 
As recorded by AFIS, the distribution of seats once more followed the ‘few, 
imprecise and uncompleted statistics available’.
63
 
As soon as the Assembly began to debate on the new law, the position of the 
main opposition party, the Hisbiya Dastur Mustakil Somali, clashed with the line of 
                                               
61 The Administrator’s Cabinet, Memorandum, 14th March 1959, Mogadishu. ASDMAE; carteggio 
AFIS, cassa 9, busta 4. 
62 Ibid.. 
63 Ibid.. 
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the Somali Youth League. Due to the controversial electoral procedures and an unfair 
system of seats distribution, the HDMS stressed that the new law should elaborate a 
system to ensure fair elections and party representation. Instead of addressing these 
key questions, the HDMS maintained that the discussions led by the ruling party 
focused on issues of secondary importance such as the actual practicalities of the 
voting system. The following extracts are taken from the minutes of these 
parliamentary discussions. The main concern of the opposition, completely dismissed 
by the majority, was that the new electoral law did not address the faults of the 
previous system. As pointed out by the leader of the HDMS, Aabdulqadir Mohamed 
Aden:  
As we all know, the law was not respected during the administrative [i.e. 
municipal] elections. For this reason, we believe that the situation should remain 
as it is in Somalia until we will come out with another solution.
64
  
In particular, the opposition stressed the need to introduce a system of checks and 
balances, arguing that the ink-voting and representation system in use for the 1958 
administrative elections did not prevent a person from voting more than once. 
Examples of the deficiencies of the previous electoral system were mentioned during 
the discussion:    
[T]he things we saw in Alto Giuba specifically in Baidoa [i.e. Baydhabo], Bur 
Acaba [i.e. Burhakaba] and Dinsor proves that this law does not mean anything 
and is not respected. We saw people who voted by dipping their thumbs in the 
indelible ink, and re-voted again. When we reported the matter to the political 




Issues related to electoral tampering were of particular concern to the HDMS since 
some irregularities were reported in the constituencies where the party had 
previously won by a remarkable majority. In particular, in the constituency of 
Burhakaba where, as illustrated in Table 5.1, 50,000 votes were cast in favour of the 
HDMS, a third of the total number of votes won by the party in the 1956 national 
                                               
64 Author unknown, ‘Minutes of the Meeting no. 33 of the Legislative Assembly’, 3rd  November 
1958, Mogadishu; ASDMAE; carteggio AFIS, cassa 9, busta 4. 
65 Ibid.. 
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election. By allowing and favouring the electoral tampering, the government was 
accused by the opposition of ‘getting the majority in the Alto Giuba... the stronghold 
of Hizbia.’ The government rejected the accusations, arguing that a system of checks 
and balances was already in place. So the president of the Assembly Aden Abdullah 
Osman: 
There are several ways to rectify the past mistakes or to make complains against 
the irregularities that occurred in the administrative elections. The law establishes 
that we have to do so by turning to the Regional Judge.
66
  
But as stressed by Abdulqadir Mohamed Aden, these procedures failed to function 
correctly: 
What if the very same Regional Judge is present there and when they showed him 
the proof [and told him]:- ‘Look this lady has voted because she has an ink mark 
on her finger’, and the judge says ‘she can vote’, then what do we do?
67
 
Nevertheless, the complaints were finally dismissed by the president of the Assembly 
for being inappropriate:  
This is not the right place [to discuss the issue]
68
 
Facing the government refusal to discuss issues related to the electoral 
system, the Hisbiya Dastur Mustakil Somali, which drew its main supporters in the 
agriculturist southern regions, felt its needs neglected by the Legislative Assembly 
and perceived the new law as limiting its activities. On 6 November 1958, hoping to 
induce the government to discuss the issues, the MPs of the HDMS left the 
Legislative Assembly. The main accusation of the HDMS was that by the drafting of 
the new law, the government was in fact aiming at securing the majority and at 
curbing the opposition:  
                                               
66 Author unknown, ‘Minutes of the Meeting no. 33 of the Legislative Assembly’, 3rd  November 
1958, Mogadishu; ASDMAE; carteggio AFIS, cassa 9, busta 4. 
67 Ibid.. 
68 Ibid.. 
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The aim [of the new law] is to secure the majority of votes. If that is the only 
thing we are talking about, at the moment the majority is detained by one party 
therefore the laws made by this Assembly are worthless. 
69
 
However and despite the numerous protests and complaints from the opposition, 
the government decided to continue the parliamentary discussions. On November 
22, the new electoral law was passed leaving the opposition out from the 
discussions.  
 
5.3 The 1959 Electoral Campaign and the election of 
the New Assembly 
National elections were conducted for the second time in February 1959. A new 
Legislative Assembly of 90 seats was formed with the aim to lead the country to 
independence.
70
 Despite the crucial moment for Somali history, the 1959 elections 
were almost universally boycotted by the opposition. As a result, the League was 
able to secure an overwhelming majority of 83 seats out of 90 in the new Assembly. 
In this way, the League became the main party of Somalia Italiana and, given its 
strong parliamentary majority, of the Somali Republic as well.  
 This section illustrates the different stages of the process of consolidation of 
‘Monocolore’ state. Similar to the evolution of the one-party state in West Africa,
71
 
this process was characterised by a phase in which the majority party relied on both 
repression and negotiations with the opposition to consolidate its power. By looking 
at the features of the electoral campaign, this section investigates the reasons why the 
opposition boycotted the 1959 elections. The findings suggest that a series of 
circumstances contributed to create an electoral context in which the League 
remained unchallenged. From one point of view, the restrictive requirements dictated 
by the new electoral law constituted serious limitations for opposition parties to take 
                                               
69 Author unknown, ‘Minutes of the Meeting no. 33 of the Legislative Assembly’, 3rd  November 
1958, Mogadishu; ASDMAE; carteggio AFIS, cassa 9, busta 4. 
70 In 1960, 30 elected MPs from British Somaliland joined the 90 deputies of Somalia Italiana by 
forming a united Somali parliament of 120 seats. The process of unification of Somalia and 
Somaliland is the object of study of the next chapter. 
71 Zolberg, Creating Political Order, pp. 77-92. 
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part in the elections. Additionally, a more openly repressive strategy was adopted by 
the ruling party against those opposition members and supporters that organised 
public protests. As we shall see, the key power positions as well as the degree of 
autonomy that the decolonisation plan gave to the self-government had the 
unforeseen consequences of hindering the consolidation of democratic institutions 
rather than favouring their developments. The League not only abused the 
government’s power and resources but also limited the development of the 
opposition’s campaign. Furthermore, the complicity of AFIS, which denied and 
ignored the accusations of abuse of power, was crucial for the League to consolidate 
its position. 
Additionally, during the campaign a centralising trend was reported 
according to which local branches of the opposition, under some pressure from the 
ruling party, merged into the League. This trend marked the beginning of negotiating 
strategy adopted by the League to engage directly with opposition leaders. Due to 
importance given to election and electoral backing, the League’s strategy to amass 
majority of votes relied on repression and at the same time, made use of its exclusive 
position to negotiate share of institutional posts with opposition leaders which 
eventually joined the majority. A similar strategy was adopted by League’s 
leadership when dealing with the process of unification, as next chapter discusses.  
 
5.3.1 The electoral campaign  
As soon as the electoral cycle began in January 1959, it became clear that the 
requirements dictated by the new electoral law were highly competitive and could 
hardly be met by the opposition parties. For instance, in order to present lists of 90 
nominees in each constituency, illiterate nominees were often included in the lists 
that were, as a consequence, rejected. In particular, the relatively small parties 
struggled to meet these requirements such as the GLS whose lists were rejected in 
Afmadoow  and Bardheere.
72
 A 3-day extension for the presentation of the lists was 
                                               
72 Author unknown, ‘1959 Election. Internal Telegrams’ (undated); ASDMAE, carteggio AFIS, cassa 
9, busta 4. 
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passed by the government but it did not give enough time for the opposition to form 
valid lists. On the contrary, the extension became even more detrimental to the 
opposition because, at a second examination, some of the lists accepted in a first 
instance were rejected as the HDMS list in Baydhabo.
73
 In this way, the Somali 
Youth League was the only party who managed to meet the deadline and was able to 
present valid list of nominees in every constituency while the opposition parties 
remained mostly unrepresented. Due to the difficulties in presenting valid lists, 
electoral competition took place in 8 constituencies out of 30. In the remaining 22 
constituencies, the lists of the League were the only ones to be presented; in this way, 
the seats were assigned to the ruling party by default.  
The struggle to present valid lists of nominees was linked with a singular 
trend reported during the campaign. A series of telegrams sent from local AFIS 
authorities to the Italian administration in Mogadishu reported that, just before the 
elections, a few local branches of the opposition parties merged into the League. This 
trend was especially prevalent in those constituencies where the main opposition 
party, the HDMS, did relatively well in the 1956 elections or where in January 1959 
the HDMS lists were rejected. For instance, unexpected events were registered in the 
constituency of Baydhabo where the HDMS was considered to be the main political 
organisation gaining a strong majority in the 1956 elections. In January 1959, the 
electoral list presented by the party was rejected because it did not meet the 
requirements dictated by the new law.
74
 Facing the possibility of being excluded 
from the competition, the local HDMS secretary decided to join the League. Similar 
cases were reported in the constituencies of Jilib, Beledweyne, Bulobarde, Kismaayo 




This tendency was also reported by Il Corriere della Somalia that devoted a 
great deal of attention to the elections and electoral campaign. In January 1959, the 
                                               
73 A further demand for another extension was denied. Ibid.. 
74 According to AFIS, the list of the HDMS was not supported by the minimum of 5,000 signatures 
required by the new law. Ibid. 
75 As a result, the HDMS did not present any list where it had considerable support as in Baydhabo, 
Marka and Jilib. Ibid..  
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Corriere published a series of articles to acknowledge that branches of the opposition 
merged with the League. The following is an extract of an article reporting the 
HDMS branch of the in Baydhabo merging with the League in which the local 
secretary explains the change in political affiliation as follows:  
[C]onsidering that the Constitutional Party [i.e. the HDMS] pursues tribal aims 
and personal interests and causes division in Somalia, we spontaneously believe 
that the Somali Youth League is the only national party in Somalia and we have 
thus decided to join it.
76
 
This piece was published on 8 January 1959 only few days after the HDMS 
list had been rejected in Baydhabo. The article was coupled by similar statements 
attributed to the opposition leaders as the announcement of the fusion between the 
HDMS and the League in Dinsor, which was the only constituency where the League 
did not manage to present any electoral list in the 1956 election;
77
 or the statement of 
the HDMS Local Committee in Baraawe to announce the dissolution of the local 
branch and the margining into the League.
78
  
It is possible to speculate that in order to win the electoral majority in all the 
constituencies, the League developed a strategy which sought to negotiate key posts 
with the opposition leaders. In return, the latter were expected to join the majority. 
Given the competitive electoral context and the rejection of several lists of the 
opposition, certain local leaders decided to join the League. Additionally during the 
electoral campaign, the ruling party exercised some pressure on the opposition 
leaders. In fact, some reported to AFIS that the ruling party relied on the police to 
induce their local branches to close down or to merge with the League especially 
where valid lists were presented.
79
  
                                               
76 The article attributed the statement to the HDMS secretary in Baydhabo. Il Corriere della Somalia, 
8th January 1959.    
77 Il Corriere della Somalia, 3rd January 1959.  
78 Il Corriere della Somalia, 9th January 1959. 
79 As for instance in Afmadoow and Bardheere. Author unknown, ‘1959 Election. Internal Telegrams’ 
(undated); ASDMAE, carteggio AFIS, cassa 9, busta 4. 
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Map 5.3: The Electoral Constituencies. Compiled from Annalisa Urbano, La Lega 
dei Giovani Somali e L’Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana (1948-60), (Unversità 
di Bologna, Tesi di Laurea, unpublished, 2005), p. 144. 
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The government’s use of the police force to supervise the electoral campaign 
came to constitute a noticeable feature of the 1959 election. In compliance with the 
programme of decolonisation, the 1956 Somali government had to manage the 
replacement of Italians by Somalis, in this way the ‘Somalisation’ of the police, i.e. 
the appointment of trained Somalis to replace Italian officials, was completed in May 
1956.
80
 Additionally, the Legislative Assembly passed some special laws that 
ensured the government’s control over the police: a range of functions to undertake 
on behalf of the ruling party were given to the police such as the arrest of political 
opponents for ‘security reason’. As discussed in chapter four, already in the late 
1940s there was a close relationship between the ruling party and the police, the 
League became very popular among the Somali Gendarmerie to the point that 70% 
of policemen stationed in Mogadishu were believed to be members of the party. 
Following the election of the first Legislative Assembly, this relationship became 
closer. 
The League-led government largely relied on this relationship during the 
electoral campaign especially in the event of demonstrations organised by the 
opposition. For instance, on 24 and 25 February 1959 hundreds of GSL supporters 
took their protest to the streets in Mogadishu. The demonstration against the 
government was repressed by the police and culminated in violent riots in 
Mogadishu: the District Commissioner in Mogadishu, Ahmed Haji Afrah, was 
wounded during the protests; 280 GSL supporters were arrested, almost half of 
which women; hundreds were wounded and two eventually died as a result.
81
 Soon 
after, the government imposed a curfew in Mogadishu and police check points were 
organised throughout the city.
82
 A further attack on the GSL was made by the 
newspaper Il Corriere that published a leading article with the title ‘Anti-patriotic 
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terrorists’ and accused ‘the activists and leadership of the subversive parties’ of 
‘fostering racist hatred and enhancing tribal resentments.’
83
 
Oral memories collected for this research among relatives of the GSL 
chairman, Haji Mohamed Hussein, also confirm the League’s action against the 
opposition. The Somali leader and his party were highly pressured by the 
government and his private habitation was searched by police on several occasions.
84
 
Working in collusion with the police, the government’s repressive strategy 
constituted a serious obstacle to the opposition’s campaign. In particular, it affected 
the GLS such that just before the elections it was made ‘politically inefficient’.
 85
 
Specifically, by the use of political pressure and coercive methods, the League forced 
local branches of the opposition to close down and its members to join the League. 
During the electoral campaign, the opposition lodged a series of complaints 
against the government to the Italian Administration. However since the formation of 
the Legislative Assembly, AFIS had assumed an aloof attitude regarding Somali 
politics and ignored the complaints by delegating all responsibilities to the 
government. For example, in January 1959, as soon as the electoral cycle began, a 
group representing the opposition party went before the Italian Administrator to 
report irregularities in the electoral campaign. In addition to the League’s 
incriminating campaign violations, the opposition accused the government of 
creating unfair conditions for other parties by abusing its power. As the chairmen of 
the HDMS, Abdulqadir Mohamed Aden and of the Liberal Party, Haji Mohamed 
Boracco reported to the Administrator: 
Abdulqadir Mohamed Aden: I went to Assai-Dolo [i.e. Dooloow] where there 
were 10 Land Rover and 6 [FIAT] Millecento used by the district commissioners 
to go to the wells drilled by AFIS; there they [members of the League] asked who 
supported the League in Assai-Dolo, three people raised their hands and in this 
way they were given water. This is political immaturity... [there was] a column of 
cars. 
H.L. the Administrator: I beg your pardon. Let the League do its own politics. 
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Abdulqadir Mohamed Aden: The cars belong to the Government. They are new 
and the number plates say ‘IN PROVA’ [temporary registration plate]. 
Haji Mohamed Boracco: Several cars are now in circulation even in Itala [i.e. 
Cadaley], where no one has ever seen a car before.86 
Although frustrated by the violations, the opposition hoped that the AFIS would 
intervene and request the establishment of a UN Committee to supervise the 
elections. On a second meeting with the Italian Administrator, the opposition 
representatives announced their withdrawal from the electoral competition.
87
 The 
reasons were the following: 
[L]ack of freedom of speech and political expression; our sections have 
disappeared completely. The secretaries of our local sections are forced to sign 




Despite the decision to boycott the election, the opposition in fact aimed at pushing 
AFIS to act: ‘today, Somalia’, the opposition representatives said to the 
Administrator before leaving his office, ‘is in your hands’.
89
 
Within this increasingly restrictive political and legislative environment, the 
Somali opposition sought for support from an international audience. The links 
between sections of Somali society and Egyptian support and funding have already 
been mentioned,
90
 further support was constituted by the Italian Communist Party 
(PCI). As mentioned in chapter two, in the 1940s the PCI set up links with some 
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members of the Somali Youth League. Being the main opposition party in Italy, in 
the 1950s the PCI challenged the AFIS administration within the Italian government 
and through Italian media. In December 1958, the Italian communist newspaper, 
Paese Sera, published an article reporting an interview with Haji Mohamed Hussein 
chairman of the GSL. The piece explicitly accused both the Somali Government and 
AFIS of working in complicity with one another to silence and suppress the 
opposition by passing special bills.
91
 At the same time, two MPs of the PCI presented 
a petition to the Italian government in which the administration in Somalia was 
criticised harshly.
92
 Their extremely detailed petition clearly indicated a link between 





5.3.2 Somali political state of affairs: official and unofficial 
versions of the story  
AFIS documents produced in response to the PCI petition show how the Italian 
authority was able to hide the state of political affairs in Somalia. On the one hand, 
AFIS presented an official summary for the Italian government listing 
enthusiastically the progress of the Legislative Assembly in Somalia and firmly 
denying any accusations. On the other, the internal documents that circulated among 
AFIS tell a different story that confirmed the accusations from the opposition and 
predicted a gloomy future for Somalia. The official summary was presented to the 
UN while the other documents were discarded.  
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The official report on the political development in Somalia Italiana expressed 
confidence in the Somali Government whose conduct allowed a ‘completely free and 
legal environment’ for carrying out the electoral campaign and elections.
94
 
Furthermore, the report pointed out the progress achieved by the Legislative 
Assembly since the establishment of self-government. Among these achievements, 
the report indicated the drafting of a new electoral law in concordance with the UN 
recommendations. The electoral law was, according to the Italian report, the product 
of a joint effort of the majority and opposition:  
The Government presented the law to the Legislative Assembly promptly. A 
parliamentary commission which included members of the opposition, widely 
examined the law... Subsequently, it [the law] was discussed during numerous 
sessions of the Legislative Assembly and eventually passed by the majority. In 
that occasion [when the law was passed] the leader of the opposition 
congratulated with the Government for the law.
95
  
Furthermore, the report directly confronted the accusations against AFIS by pointing 
out that, with the establishment of self-government, Italy was no longer responsible 
for the development of Somali domestic issues.
96
 It was reported that even in case of 
legislative and administrative irregularities, AFIS had no power to interfere with the 
Somali government.  In other words, the report denied the accusations but also 
declined the responsibilities. For example, according to the report ‘no arbitrary arrest 
took place’: 
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Needless to say, the necessary police measures were adopted by Somali 




Conversely, the unofficial version of the story gave a gloomier picture of 
Somali politics. First of all, the Italian Administration was very sceptical about the 
new electoral law, the ways the elections were carried out and, more generally, the 
electoral results.  
The electoral law was conceived badly and developed even worse. After vain 
attempts to extend the term of the first Assembly, it was approved in hurry, with 
no census [of population]… the UN believed [that a census of the electorate was] 
absolutely necessary considering the highly criticised use of indirect system 
based on ‘shir’ and the distribution of seats before the elections according to the 
few, inaccurate, incomplete statistics available.
98
 
Second, AFIS confirmed that the electoral campaign and elections were marked by 
fraud and abuses of power by the Somali Youth League. In that, the League worked 
in complicity with the government:  
In fact, the electoral campaign has been characterised by plots and pressures 
especially in the peripheral districts where the candidates of majority [i.e. the 
League] tried at all costs to secure the seat or seats in their favour. That happened 
due to a certain tolerance of the government [that was] not strong enough to 




Although the fraud and electoral tampering were not considered as such ‘to 
necessitate the call for new elections, as requested by the opposition’, AFIS 
considered the electoral result ‘not satisfactory at all’. For these reasons, the 
Legislative Assembly elected in March 1959 did not represent ‘the state of political 
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parties in the Territory.’
100
 In April 1959, the Italian Administrator summaries the 
political development as follows:   
Due to the wear and tear of ruling, the majority is in crisis [sic!]. There have been 
several significant displays [of the crisis]. For instance in 1957, the election of the 
well-known Hagi Mohamed Hussein as chairman of the S.Y.L. was the result of 
plots inside the League and contrasts with the government. Afterwards, at the 
[League] congress in December 1957, the Minister of the Interior, Hagi Mussa 
Bogor, resigned although his resignations were rejected. Later, the League 
congress to work on the electoral law and campaign was about to bring the party 
to dissolution, especially after the expulsion and destitution of Hagi Mohamed. 
[The party did not dissolve] thanks to the timely and strong measures taken by 
Aden Abdulla. A further and more serious crisis unfolded in December 1958 at 
the eve of the national elections. Luckily enough for the sake of public order 
during the elections- the crisis was overcome or, at least, postponed. 





5.4 Assessing the impacts of self-government  
The replacement of Italians by Somalis has proved to be no solution  
for the many problems facing the country.  





In assessing the effects of the introduction of self-government on Somali politics, this 
section discusses its positive and negative aspects. Scholarly studies of political 
parties underscored a general tendency to the consolidation of one-party system in 
Sub-Saharan Africa at the dawn of independence. Due to the fragmentary nature of 
both institutional and social fabric, these studies argued that the one-party system 
was an efficient means to enforce internal stability in the newly-formed African 
nations.
103
 Throughout the 1950s and 1960s there was a need for a strong, centralised 
political entity and institutional framework capable of appealing to the masses and 
firmly leading the independent countries. From this viewpoint, Somalia also required 
                                               
100 The Admnistrator’s Cabinet, Telexpress to the Italian Government in Rome’, 14th April 1959, 
Mogadishu, n. 2051; ASDMAE, carteggio AFIS, cassa 9, busta 4. 
101 Minister Franca, Telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 14th April 1959, Mogadishu. 
ASDMAE, carteggio AFIS, cassa 9, busta 4. 
102 British Consulate-General, Mogadishu 10th July 1957; TNA, FO 371/125678. 
103 Coleman, Rosberg (eds.), Political Parties, pp. 4-8. 
Imagining the Nation, Crafting the State 
‘This is political immaturity’  192 
a robust ruling system to ensure political stability over competing different interests. 
The context of the Cold War, as illustrated in this chapter, constituted a challenge to 
internal stability to the point that Egyptian propaganda contributed in part to the split 
within Somalia’s most important political expression, the Somali Youth League. 
Arguably, the establishment of the one-party system in Somalia reflected the 
contingent need to develop a united and robust response to certain destabilising 
forces.  
However and in that differently from other contemporary ruling parties, the 
Somali Youth League was a relative young political organisation that did not have 
the backing of well-defined social groups as the trade union base of Guinean 
nationalists,
104
 or the pivotal mineworkers’ support to the United National 
Independence Party in Zambia.
105
 As argued in chapters two and four, although the 
Somali Youth League developed an efficient strategy that successfully engaged in 
dialogue with the masses in the 1940s, this process was put on hold and repressed by 
the imposition of the trusteeship system of the UN in 1950. The system advanced 
self-government by imposing restrictive political conditions that were ultimately 
accepted by political parties. The result was, as argued in chapter four, the 
verticalisation of Somali nationalism that, once inserted in a highly centralised and 
fixed institutional framework, came to lose its original horizontal and inclusive 
political line.   
The case of All India Muslim League in Pakistan makes a good comparison 
with the case study under investigation. As the Somali Youth League enjoyed a rapid 
success in the 1940s, the All India Muslim League capably catalysed the masses’ 
anti-colonial feelings by demanding Pakistan’s independence in 1940 and achieving 
the goal within a few years. However, once Pakistan was created the All India 
Muslim League failed to address and aggregate the different groups’ interests in the 
process of state-building and its repressive autocratic policy of exclusion eventually 
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undermined the stability of the whole country.
106
 Similarly, the Somali Youth League 
gained power in a crucial transitional period of state-building however it failed to 
promote an inclusive form of national governments and to address the needs of the 
different Somali communities and minority groups. In fact, the national message 
promoted by the League came at odds with state domain inherited from AFIS. 
Structural features contributed to this failure. The trusteeship system 
scheduled a demanding development plan in the fields of education, economics, 
state-building and democratisation within ten years. As argued by recent literature on 
state-building in the post-Cold War era, the imposition of state-building via 
international administration is often problematic. In particular, certain scholars have 
pointed out that when pursuing the consolidation of more than one process at the 
same time the robustness and stability of the institutional framework are often 
compromised. As Hehir and Robinson have remarked ‘not only does building state, 
democracy and market at the same time run the risk of one or more of the processes 
corrupting the others, it actually provides incentives for such behaviour and hence for 
the ruination of all and the perpetuation of state weakness.’
107
  
The transitional character of the trusteeship system in Somalia was 
characterised by the establishment of overlapping structures. Self-government was 
imposed when the Somali state was still in the process of transition and the 
Somalisation of this fragile state structure had the accidental consequence of 
enhancing misuse of power and, eventually, widespread corruption. Additionally, a 
certain degree of confusion arose around concepts like state, government, ruling 
party and regime. As seen in some of the quotes in use for this chapter, these terms 
became synonyms and were indistinctively used by political activists to refer to the 
political leadership in power.   
Another point to consider is the great emphasis placed by AFIS on the 
elections –considered a key moment within the process of devolution of power and 
‘Somalisation’ of the state. This emphasis had two main consequences: first, it 
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increased the level of political competition among political parties and in particular 
between the League and HDMS, the two main parties representing different 
socioeconomic and regional interests. As seen in the examples provided throughout 
this chapter, the response of the ruling party to this context of increasing competition 
was to foster its autocratic, centralising political line. Throughout the 1959 electoral 
campaign, local branches of the opposition were induced to merge with the League 
and after the elections key members of the opposition were given state positions and 
some were made MPs for the ruling party: the chairman of the Somali Democratic 
Party Abdullahi Haji, its general secretary Mohamed Shek Osman, and Haji 
Mohamed considered by AFIS among the most-qualified government functionaries; 
additionally the former HDMS chairman Abdi Nur Mohamed Hussein and the 
chairman Abulqadir Mohamed Aden who passionely denounced the government’s 
repressive policies and abuse of power during the electoral campaings.
108
 This 
aggregating policy necessarly weakned the cohesion of the ruling party both at a top 
and bottom levels, and hindered the development of a healthy opposition.    
Second, absorbed with issues related to elections and electoral campaign, the 
Somali government neglected tasks of vital importance for the future republic. 
Among these tasks, the formulation of the Constitutional Chart of the Somali 
Republic suffered greatly from the increasing political competition. The 
decolonisation plan dictated that in 1956 two committees had to be formed in order 
to work collaboratively and complementary on the Somali constitution. On the one 
hand, a Political Committee, constituted by representative of the Somali government 
and political parties, had the task of elaborating the Constitutional Chart according to 
the needs and aspirations of the political parties.
109
 On the other, a Technical 
Committee, constituted by nine Italian ‘experts’ on juridical matters, had the task to 
assist the work of the Political Committee and to provide the juridical framework for 
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the constitution.
110
 However and despite the emphasis placed on the joint effort, the 
two committees never collaborated. In fact, while the Technical Committee was 
instituted and began its work in 1957, the Political Committee ‘never really began its 
work, actually its composition was never fully achieved’ because of the majority’s 
refusal to work with the opposition.
111
 When in April 1959, under the pressure from 
AFIS, the Legislative Assembly finally instituted the Political Committee, the works 
for the constitutional chart were almost completed.
112
  
The Somali constitution, approved by the Assembly on 26
th
 June 1960, was 
the result of the exclusive work of the Italian ‘experts’ on juridical matters who, 
unsurprisingly, produced a constitutional chart that was ‘an imitation, not to say a 
copy, of the 1948 Italian constitutional chart’.
113
 The Republic of Somalia, thus, 
adopted a constitutional model that had very little regard for issues related to the 
specificity of the Somali society. Moreover, although inspired by the principles of 
the Enlightenment, the Italian constitutional model was taken from a very young 
republic (established in 1946 only) with little experience of republican matters. 
Issues related to Somali identity, citizenship and national politics indicated as 
fundamental by recent studies on constitution-writing in post-Soviet Europe, were, 
therefore, dismissed.
114
    
The autocratic policy of the Somali government hindered the possibility of 
different political parties being able to confront one another for the construction of a 
new state based on people’s needs and aspirations. In fact, the different expectations 
of the agriculturist, pastoral and urban communities were never addressed. The 
drafting of the Constitution Chart, for instance, did not leave space for discussion 
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between those who supported the creation of a unitary state and those who instead 
wanted a federal state.
115
 This circumstance was very unfortunate especially 
considering that the Somali Constitution had to serve for the unification of British 
Somaliland whose political parties were excluded from the discussion. The British 
Consul in Mogadishu commented the work on the Somali constitution of the 
Legislative Assembly in the following way: 
Can [Somaliland] be expected to welcome a Constitution that caters solely for 
Somalia’s needs, is anti-tribal, inclined to laicism and aims at a strongly 
centralised administration? … There is no sign whatsoever in Mogadishu that the 
Government of Somalia, preparing the way for complete independence next year, 
is taking Somaliland interests into account when making financial, economic, 




Eventually the Somali Constitution was rejected by Somaliland communities in a 
national referendum in 1961. The same year, a group of young officials from 
Somaliland attempted a coup to secede the union.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
The previous chapter argued that the state-construction during AFIS imposed a series 
of institutional patterns that led to the ‘verticalisation’ of Somali nationalism into 
autocratic and centralised post-colonial state whose structure was ambivalently clan-
based at the bottom and nationally oriented at the top. This chapter investigated the 
effects of the trusteeship system on the everyday politics and argued that the 
peculiarities of the institutional framework imposed by AFIS together with the 
destabilising influence of other powers led to the establishment of the ‘Monocolore’ 
state and suppression of the opposition. By scheduling four elections, two municipal 
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and two national, within five years, the decolonisation plan of the trusteeship system 
placed a great emphasis on the electoral process. For this reason, issues related to the 
electoral competition became central throughout the legislation. The result was the 
creation of a political space of, to quote a member of the opposition, ‘political 
immaturity’ where winning and keeping the majority was the only aim of politics. 
By 1959 the autocratic and centralising policy of the majority reached 
completion. The opposition, curbed and excluded from power, was forced to revise 
its strategy. From this moment onwards, Somali politics came to be characterised by 
a dual political system: clan-based at the bottom-level and centralised at the top-
level. In provision of political elections, an increasing number of political 
organisations mushroomed based on clan-ties. However, as soon as the elections 
were over, the elected candidates of the small parties joined the League. This trend 
began with the first Legislative Assembly when the government pressured local 
branches of the opposition to close down or to merge with the League.  
The emergence of this political space had two important consequences on 
Somali politics whose appreciation is essential for understanding the development of 
post-independence politics, especially for those studies that are concerned with the 
emergence of a political discourse based on clan. Absorbed with issues related to 
elections and electoral campaign, the Somali government failed to promote an 
inclusive political discourse as seen by the case of formulation of the Constitutional 
Chart of the Somali Republic. Thus, the emergence of a political discourse based on 
clan, discussed by certain Somalist scholars, should be considered a reaction to the 
emergence of a restrictive political arena rather than the cause of the failure of 
democracy. 
Finally, the phase of self-government led to the emergence of a political 
discourse that monopolised and revived nationalism. Accordingly, nationalist 
features, as the project of Greater Somalia, were used to overshadow issues related to 
domestic crisis. One of the elements of this discourse centred on the external threat 
constituted by the unresolved border issue with Ethiopia. Speaking at the post-
electoral League meeting the president of the Legislative Assembly Aden Abdullah 
Osman addressed the audience as follows:  
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It would be good if all Somalis remained in agreement and united instead of 
fighting against each other because of petty political rivalries. Let’s all think of 
our true enemies, enemies like Ethiopia... These are the enemies we should fight 
with all our strengths and [we should] not indulge in hatred and useless polemics 
with our own people. We have to be united, to abandon any factionalism, only in 




The ways in which this political discourse manipulated nationalism affecting the 
process of unification and completing the ‘verticalisation’ of the Somali political 
space will be the object of study of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6:  ‘The guardians of the nation’: 
Unifying Somalia, struggling for the gate 
 
‘…Lower this flag and hoist this one in its place… 
This flag that God provided us with and, 
Which nobody gave us as charity… ’ 







The lines above are part of a song composed by the Somali poet Cabdillahi Suldaan 
Timacade on the occasion of Somaliland’s Independence Day on June, 26 1960. 
People’s enthusiasm was palpable. The hockey stadium in Hargeysa was filled with 
massive and joyful crowds which gathered together to witness the event.
2
 
Timacade’s song narrated the moment of independence by capturing evocatively the 
symbolic lowering of the British flag and raising of the Somali blue flag featuring a 
white five-pointed star. In 1960, this flag assumed a special significance as its white 
star symbolised the union of the five Somali-speaking regions in the Horn of Africa, 
also known as the national project of Greater Somalia. A few days later, on July, 1 
1960, another well-attended ceremony put down the Italian and UN flags and raised 
the same blue flag in Mogadishu. On the same day, following negotiations that 
started years before, the two regions merged together forming the Somali Republic, 
and marking what it was perceived to be the first step towards Greater Somalia. 
The unification of Somalia and Somaliland did not come without practical 
problems. For decades, the two regions had been ruled by different colonial regimes. 
At the eve of independence, the two institutional apparatus could have not been more 
dissimilar. For instance, colonial policies drafted different reforms and plans thus 
achieving different results. In addition, education, administrative and legal systems 
                                               
1 Cabdilaahi Suldaan Timacade, ‘Kaana Siib Kaana Saar’ Song of Somaliland’s independence. 
Courtesy of Boobe Yussuf Duale, August, 2009, Hargeysa.  
2 Interview, 24th June, 2009. 
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had also been conceived separately and run in different, colonial, languages.
3
 
Nonetheless, throughout the 1960s and most the 1970s, there was a tendency among 
scholars to overlook these practical obstructions proposing instead attention to 
homogenous elements within Somali society as a source of unity for the country. It 
was contended that Somalia was one of the very few homogenous countries in 
Africa, in terms of ethnicity, culture, language and history.
4
 It was claimed that, in 
spite of colonial partitions, Somalia had always been a ‘ virtual nation’ but lacked a 
centralised administration. In this sense, the republic of Somalia emerged in 
‘truncated circumstances’
5
 and, as a result, irredentism would have played a big role 
in Somali national politics because Somalia was a nation ‘in search of state’.
6
 
However, as pointed out in the introductory chapter, the dissolution of the 
nation-state in Somalia pushed scholars to revise previous historiography and to 
challenge ideas regarding the homogeneity of Somali society. At the same time, 
primordialist approaches took a clear stand in the debate highlighting that the 
paradigm of agnation – the clan system – is provided with centripetal and centrifugal 
forces that respectively push towards union and desegregation, the latter having been 
predominant in recent decades. More recent approaches have pursued a balance 
between these trends. For instance, in analysing the core features of Pan-Somalism, 
Schraeder emphasises that, while its origins were embedded in historical processes 
fostered by the Second World War, most notably the class formation of political 
elites, the development and dissolution of Somali nationalism (nation-state) are 
attributable to both centrifugal/centripetal forces along clan lines, and to instrumental 
uses of nationalism by self-interested political leadership.
7
  
Although this approach has the merits to set the basis for comparison with 
other case studies, it does not suffice to explain the reasons why the historical 
trajectory that led to the dissolution of the nation-state by clan cleavages and elites’ 
                                               
3 For a detailed discussion on these diversities and how they had been tackled see Contini, The Somali 
Republic. 
4 The others being Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland. A. I. Asiwaju (ed. by), Partitioned Africans: Ethnic 
Relations Across Africa’s International Boundaries1884-1984, (London: Hurst & Co., 1985). 
5 Lewis, ‘The Politics of the 1969’, p. 384. 
6 As summarised by the title of a well-known monograph on Somali politics. Laitin, Samatar, 
Somalia: A Nation.  
7 Schraeder, ‘From Irredentism to Secession’. 
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interests passed through unification first. Certain degrees of ethnic homogeneity 
might help understanding irredentist aspirations and grass-roots support to Greater 
Somalia, however, it remains less clear why self-interested political elites fostered 
unification rather than pursuing their interests within the borders inherited from 
colonial partitions. A comparison with the development of local politics in Djibouti 
helps appreciating this problematic. Similar to Somalia Italiana where the project of 
Greater Somalia managed to catalyse grass-roots support in spite of the radicalisation 
of different groups’ interests, nationalist and irredentist agenda was met by a certain 
degree of popularity in Djibouti in the late 1940s.
8
 This, however, was not 
encouraged by the French rule and the restricted pro-French ethnic Somali political 
leadership which managed to amass solid control over state institutions and resources 
without ‘squandering whatever degree of pan-Somali nationalism existed’ as, 
Schraeder contends, did their counterparts in Somalia.
9
    
This final chapter of the thesis provides more historically informed insights to 
this problematic. It argues that a combination of factors needs to be taken into 
account as this contributed to advance plans for the unification. A series of pressures 
from below, consisting of people’s support and commitment to the project of Greater 
Somalia, were coupled with the development of external activities, that is on the one 
hand the (re)definition of colonial partitions as the cession of Haud and RA to 
Ethiopia and on the other, the missed definition of the border between Ethiopia and 
Somalia during AFIS. From this perspective, it is possible to make use of approaches 
to the studies of political unification which indicate external threats to internal 
security as main reasons behind the process.
10
 Similarly, the final partition (and/or 
the missed partition) of the Horn of Africa provided with a context of insecurity 
which played a significant role in the process of unification of Somalia and 
Somaliland. 
Moreover, the chapter points out how the establishment of considerable 
investments  for development plans in economic, social and political fields during 
                                               
8 Touval, Somali Nationalism , pp. 69-70, see also chapter 10; Lewis, Modern Political Movements, 
pp. 344-6. 
9 Schraeder, ‘From Irredentism to Secession’, p. 108.  
10 William H. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964). 
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AFIS contributed to draw considerable attention upon Somalia Italiana within the 
area of Greater Somalia. This led other social and politic groups to claim their 
allotments in the processes of nation and state building on the ground of sharing 
common national aspirations. In exploring this historical context, the chapter makes a 
further contribution to current debates on Somali studies. It illustrates how, during 
the process of national unification, the model of a verticalised, autocratic and 
exclusive state emerging from AFIS, discussed in the previous chapters, was 
extended to the project of Greater Somalia which by 1960 had become the exclusive 
domain of a few political contenders.  
The chapter begins with an analysis of the special role played by Somalia 
Italiana and by the Somali Youth League within the area of Greater Somalia. It 
illustrates how this circumstance led to an increase of demands from below that 
urged to revive the campaign for the unification. At the same time, the political 
leadership from other Somali-speaking regions advanced their ambitions over the 
structures of power in Somalia. Under the guise of unifying the nation, competition 
for the control of the state expanded, including contenders from the Somaliland 
Protectorate. Before turning the analysis to the campaign for the unification, the 
chapter draws an overview of the territorial adjustments made by the British in the 
mid-1950s. It argues that these adjustments spurred the revival of nationalist 
propaganda in the Somaliland Protectorate. As a result, the political leadership made 
use of the campaign for the unification in order to oppose the territorial adjustments 
made by the British. The final part of the chapter is devoted to the issue of 
manipulation and monopolisation of the project of Greater Somalia by the leadership 
of the Somali Youth League. Due to a context of increasing pressures, the League’s 
leadership appropriated the domain of Greater Somalia and influenced the process of 
unification. By doing so, the League’s leadership aimed to establish a solid control 
over the Somali ‘gate’ state system. 
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6.2 The ‘lighthouse for freedom in East Africa’: 
Somalia Italiana and the Somali Youth League 
within the area of Greater Somalia 
Since the late 1940s, Somalia Italiana came to assume a distinct position within the 
Somali-speaking regions due to the processes of decolonisation and self-government 
imposed by the UN. Already in 1949 following the public declaration of the UN 
resolution, it became clear that, to a certain extent, Somalia Italiana had been more 
successful in advancing its political aspirations. By the late 1940s, political activities 
and, more generally, organisations, had been banned in the Ogaden, Haud, RA, and 
Northern Frontier’s District and the prospect of territorial unification precluded. 
Conversely, in the trust region, in spite of the repressive measures adopted by AFIS, 
political parties not only remained solid but new associations were formed 
throughout the 1950s. Moreover, the decolonisation plan provided these 
organisations with a certain, even though restricted, representation within the 
governing bodies.  
More important, independence was granted to Somalia Italiana in 1949 
already, and the terms and conditions of the trusteeship were conceived accordingly. 
This constituted an unusual trend for the time. Where in 1950 issues like self-
government and independence had not even been raised in British Somaliland and 
Djibouti, a fast and demanding plan of self-government began in Somalia Italiana 
and was proceeding at full speed. This programme established representative 
councils, training courses, scholarships programmes, and scheduled multiple 
administrative and national elections. It also introduced a progressive  ‘Somalisation’ 
of the state by appointing trained Somalis to institutional posts. In 1956 most 
governing bodies and military force had been ‘Somalised’. This contrasted with 
similar reforms in the Somaliland Protectorate whose results looked scanty in 
comparison: there were 5,000 Somali occupying institutional posts in the trust region 
compared to only 30 in the Protectorate.
11
 
                                               
11 John Markakis, National and Class Revolution in the Horn of Africa, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987), p. 53. 
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Possibly the most impressive measure taken towards self-government in 
Somalia Italiana was the organisation of a series of elections, two municipal and two 
national since 1954. The 1956 and 1959 political elections elected two Legislative 
Assemblies, both led by the Somali Youth League, which enjoyed a good deal of 
autonomy over domestic affairs. In the 1958 municipal and 1959 national elections, 
universal suffrage was broadened up to include women, representing a very 
progressive trend not just with respect to colonial Africa but to the whole world.
12
  
The symbolic role played by the Somali Youth League in this context was 
also very important. As discussed in chapter two, since its foundation in 1943 the 
party developed from a Mogadishu-based organisation to a wide-spread national 
mass-party. By promoting national unification and links of solidarity among Somali 
communities, it campaigned for Greater Somalia before the UN and across the 
Somali-speaking regions. For this reason, when in 1956 the party was elected to lead 
the first Legislative Assembly, it came to symbolise the success of Somali 
nationalism. As a response to the League’s achievements, a series of demands and 
pressures began to address the Somali government. These came from outside the 
trust region by Somalis who thought that a campaign for Greater Somalia would 
enhance collective standards of living conditions. Significantly, it was a new wave of 
youth associations which was uninvolved into top-level politics but witnessed 
national campaigns and propaganda of the 1940s, to urge for territorial unification. 
New youth movements were founded in Cairo by students from Somaliland, 
Somalia and Djibouti who moved to Egypt to pursue education.
13
 As discussed in the 
previous chapter, scholarship programmes had been set up by the Egyptian 
government with the aim to counterbalance the plans made by AFIS in the field of 
education. Perhaps under this influence, the youth movements began to revive and 
promote the project of Greater Somalia. Thanks to some private donations, they 
founded an association, namely the Somali Office, which worked independently 
from the associations and political leaderships of British Somaliland and Somalia 
                                               
12 It is perhaps worth remembering that women were granted suffrage in 1946 in Italy and in 1973 in 
Switzerland.  
13 Interview with Sahara Abdulqadir Haji Ahmed, 22nd August 2009, Hargeysa.   
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Italiana.
14
 Their propaganda consisted of printed issues and radiobroadcasts 
transmitted on a regular base to comment on politics in the Horn of Africa.
15
 They 
had close connections with the editors of the magazine The Horn of Africa, published 
in Somaliland at the time.
16
 
The ways in which the propaganda of the youth movements attempted to 
revive the project of Greater Somalia is important to understand the level of 
pressures that arose around national politics. It also sheds light on the resolute 
reaction of the League’s leadership to these pressure. The Somali Office in Cairo 
constructed an ambivalent and subtle discourse that invested the League’s leadership 
as ‘the chiefs’ in the realm of Greater Somalia and made them accountable for the 
plans of national unification. In this sense, the following extract is very telling. It is a 
piece broadcasted by Radio Cairo in 1959 to comment on the election of the second 
Legislative Assembly in Mogadishu which was marked by an overwhelming victory 
of the League. The opening lines of the speech pay tribute to the ruling party as a 
sign of official recognition of its achievements: 
We are not surprised at this victory, which was won by those calling for the unity 
of Somaliland [the Somali-speaking regions], especially when we bear in mind 
that they were the first to take the Somaliland case to the UN and the whole word 
[i.e. in the late 1940s]; it is a chain of continuous victories...  
Nevertheless, soon, it demanded the League to honour its national obligations and to 
fulfil unification: 
It is our right to call those gentlemen [the Somali Youth League’s leadership] into 
account, especially after this victory… Free Somalis who were elected by the 
people in Somalia to represent them in the first free Parliament, we beg you not to 
overlook or despise the hopes the Somali people have placed in you, making you 
their guardians, for universal Somaliland unity. We beg you to awaken it from its 
deep slumber and march forwards it without fear… The Somali people in their 
great homeland look for the Government soon to be formed with hearts full of 
faith and trust, begging it to do its best to achieve their national ambitions 
                                               
14 According to AFIS, the Somali Office was established due to some unspecified ‘private initiative’. 
The Administrator’s Cabinet, ‘Note on the activities of the Somali Office in Cairo’, 14th December 
1959, Mogadishu; ASDMAE, carteggio AFIS, cassa 9, busta 2. 
15 Ibid..  
16 Interview with Sahara Abdulqadir Haji Ahmed, 22nd August 2009, Hargeysa 
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represented by universal unity and free independence, our people also swear in 
the name of Almighty God, to stand as one rank behind their Government to 
enable it to attain these goals. They will accept no substitute.
17
  
By acknowledging the League’s position of predominance in national politics 
and making it the ‘guardian’ of the nation, the discourse made the party subject to 
demands coming from within the area of Greater Somalia. In this way, the Somali 
Office in Cairo advanced ideas on how to proceed forward on the issues: 
Call upon the U. N., the Security Council and the international court to intervene 
immediately and put an end to the British and French forces, which are being 
carried out in Ethiopia. 
Call upon the U. N. to send an international commission to Somalia to grant self-
determination to the Somali people with a view to gaining their complete liberty 
and unity in accordance with the principles of the U. N. and with the charter of 
the rights of man. 
Consider the current events in Somalia contrary to our people’s wishes and to 
consider the brutal method used by French and Ethiopian imperialists as 
threatening to world peace and stability.
18
 
The political line adopted by the Somali Office was straightforward and radical. In 
reviving the collective project of Greater Somalia, the objective was to ‘collectivise’ 
the control over the process of state-building in the trust region and to have a say on 
its developments: 
Somalia must be a lighthouse for freedom in East Africa. This will not be 
possible without reinforcing the internal situation. It is hoped that the caravan of 
                                               
17 (Author unknown), ‘Summary of World Broadcasts. Part IV. The Arab World, Israel, Greece, 
Turkey, Iran’ 1st April 1959, daily series, no. 817; in ‘Broadcasts from Egypt to Somalia by Radio 
Cairo’; TNA, FO 371/138344. 
18 The first two articles published by the Somali Office addressed the French-Ethiopian agreement 
which regulated the control of the railway Addis-Djibouti. The articles accused the agreement of 
being imperialist and against the Pan-Somali interests: ‘It [the French-Ethiopian agreement] is 
detrimental to our people in the [F]rench and [E]thiopian Somalia and prevents them from taking part 
in nationalist politics.’ Additionally, the Office claimed to organise demonstrations across the Somali-
speaking regions to protest against the French and Ethiopian agreement; moreover, the Office called 
for the United Nations to apply the principle of self-determination for Somali communities. The 
Administrator’s Cabinet, ‘Note on the activities of the Somali Office in Cairo’, 14th December 1959, 
Mogadishu; ASDMAE, carteggio AFIS, cassa 9, busta 2. 
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Further aspects need to be considered, especially in relation to the Italian 
initiatives in the realm of local economic development. As pointed out by Cooper, 
notions and plans of development became central themes of the post-war colonial 
policies and African aspirations.
20
 Although actions were directed towards different 
fields, a great deal of attention focused on the plans and initiatives to boost economic 
growth. The establishment of the Trusteeship System of the UN was also embedded 
with the notion of ‘development’. The Italian administration in Somalia was 
expected to fulfil a series of achievements in the economic, political and social 
systems, coupled with the established of structural infrastructures.
21
 However, as the 
system was preoccupied more with the results rather than the actual practice, it 
became less clear what these expectations meant. In particular, questions arose on the 
ways through which these achievements were going to be completed within ten 
years. To face this problematic, a series of debates, propositions, discussions among 
‘experts’ and academics took place in Italian newspapers and magazines starting by 
the late 1940s.
22
 However, these discussions did not produce well-defined and 
forward-looking plans, but fostered large-scale investments which proved fruitless, at 
best, in the long term.
23
 
By 1950, considerable funds were established for the implementation of 
socioeconomic development plans in Somalia Italiana. Lacking clear programme, 
economic plans addressed the agricultural system of production, where colonial 
interests lied, trade, and the commercialisation of livestock.
24
 AFIS economic 
initiatives centred on the banana production, to greatest extent controlled by Italian 
farmers, advancing irrigation schemes. Additionally, agreements were signed 
                                               
19 (Author unknown), ‘Summary of World Broadcasts’; in TNA, FO 371/138344. 
20 Cooper, African Since 1940, pp. 91-3. 
21 The final report, completed by AFIS and presented to the Italian government in 1961, offers a 
detailed overview of these programmes. See, Libro Verde, especially chapters 3-4. 
22 See for instance, the lengthy debate that took place in the Italian magazine Relazioni Internazionali 
from 1949 onwards. 
23 Great part of the final report on AFIS produced by the Italian government was devoted to discussion 
of economic investments and achievements in Somalia. See Libro Verde, Section III.  
24 See Ibid., chapter 3. 
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according to which Italy would purchase at least 65 % of the export production of 
bananas.
25
 Further arrangements established that the Italian government would 
support Somalia with US$ 2million per year after independence.
26
 
Scholars’ assessments of the economic initiatives carried out by AFIS tend to 
suggest that they increased Somalia’s dependency on Italian aid and support,
27
 while 
negatively shaped state/society relations.
28
 However, it should not be underestimated 
the impression that these initiatives made at the time, in particular where similar 
policies had not even been contemplated. In the British protectorate, for instance, the 
political leadership was positively impressed by the quality and the speed of the 
development programme in the trust region. Conversely, similar reforms were 
proceeding at a very slow pace in the British protectorate.
29
 As a response to this 
disparity, the local leadership began to demand for the implementation of equal 
development programmes.
30
 These demands were soon paralleled with demands for 
the unification with Somalia Italiana. The shift led to an expansion of the 
competition over the governing bodies, or over the ‘gate’ state of the trust region. 
Frederick Cooper’s concept of ‘gatekeeper state’ is useful to understand this 
competition. The establishment of a ‘gate’ state system, as a part of the colonial 
legacy, provides insights on the failure of African states to perform their political and 
economic functions properly. Similar to their colonial predecessors, African states 
                                               
25 These agreements, designed to give benefit to the Italian farmers in Somalia, became a matter of 
controversy in Italy at the time. See Ernesto Rossi’s 1952 reports on the Italian lobbies interested in 
the banana trade and plantations published in the newspaper Il Mondo and collected recently in Rossi, 
Settimo: Non Rubare, pp. 451-71.  
26 Tripodi, The Colonial Legacy, pp. 95-6. 
27 A comprehensive study on AFIS political economy is Karp The Economics of Trusteeship in 
Somalia. Further assessments can be found in: Umberto Triulzi, ‘L’Italia e l’Economia Somala dal 
1950 ad Oggi’, Africa(Rome), 26:4 (1971); Del Boca, Nostalgia delle Colonie, Part II, chapters 2-3; 
Lewis, A Modern History, pp. 142-4. 
28 Samatar, Samatar, ‘The Material Roots’, pp. 674-9. 
29 Lewis, A Modern History , pp. 148-55. 
30 Following the visit of a political delegation from Somaliland to the trust region in 1956, political 
leaders raised a series of demands to the British administration in the protectorate. As the delegation 
remained positively impressed by the social and political achievements and by the investments and 
economic opportunities in the trust region, they asked for the implementation of similar programmes 
in the British protectorate. For instance, one of these demands was the establishment of ‘self-
government without control of foreign affairs or defence and with some limitations on financial 
control.’ Author unknown, ‘Note of a Meeting between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and 
Political Parties’, 8th February, 1959, Hargeysa; in ‘Activities of Political Parties in Somalia and 
British Somaliland’ TNA, CO 1015/1769. 
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derived their authority chiefly from international recognition. However, they 
struggled to extend their power inwardly in an effective way. In this way, since 
independence, African states have become ‘gates’ through which the revenues from 
taxes, customs and foreign aid are collected and distributed. Getting hold of the gate 
and its institutions became instrumental for accessing the resources it controlled. In 
this way, Cooper suggests that post-colonial politics were reduced to conflicts among 
political and economic contenders over the control of the gatekeeper state.
31
 Within 
the area of Greater Somalia, the imposition of AFIS with its plans, reforms, and 
investments, attracted attention upon the ‘gate’ emerging in the trust region. It was 
this attention, as well as the lack of equalities among regions, that contributed to 
foster the plans for unification.  In addition to this, it is important to note the role 
played by the late territorial adjustments of the Haud and RA made by the British in 
1954. As next section discusses, these dispositions contributed to create a sense of 
insecurity around foreign and domestic affairs fostering the plans and campaign for 
the unification of Somalia and Somaliland.  
 
6.3 The campaign for unification   
The historical trajectory of post-war Somali national politics took a sudden turn 
towards unification following the late territorial adjustments made by the British in 
the Horn of Africa. These arrangements completed the post-war disposal of the 
former Italian colonies and territories occupied by enemies’ armies during the 
conflict. With this regard, the disposition of Haud and RA took a long time to be 
completed. The Haud and RA are Somali-speaking regions situated at the eastern 
border with the today Republic of Somaliland and are important to Somaliland 
because they provide grazing lands for Somali communities who usually entered the 
area with their cattle in the spring and remained there until the autumn.
32
 After 
signing treaties of protection with Somali communities in 1884-6, the British 
administration made a further agreement, the 1897 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty, to 
                                               
31 Cooper, Africa Since 1940, pp. 156-61. 
32 Drysdale, The Somali Dispute, p. 79. 
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delimitate the spheres of influences between the protectorate and Ethiopia.
33
 This 
treaty put the Haud and RA regions under Ethiopia’s sphere of influence, although its 
control of the area remained loose. Following the Italian attack on Ethiopia in 1935, 
these regions were annexed to a single, centralised Somali-speaking colony which in 
1940 included the British protectorate as well. At the end of the Second World War, 
the British proposed to maintain the territorial adjustments made by the Italians and 
that these regions remained annexed to a single Somali-speaking territory. In spite of 
the fact that this was rejected during international negotiations and that Ethiopia’s 
sovereignty in the area was ratified in 1942-44 already, the British kept formal 
control of the regions and withdrew in 1954 only.  
It is important to emphasise that the late territorial adjustments contributed to 
foster irredentist claims throughout the regions. As discussed in chapter two, in the 
Ogaden, Haud and RA irredentist aspirations were catalysed by a group of Somali 
entrepreneurs who had benefited from the Italian occupation and who in the 1940s 
supported the idea of Greater Somalia in order to advance their interests as opposed 
to Ethiopian rule.
34
 On a similar note, in the British protectorate local communities 
supported the irredentist claims due to economic and cultural ties with the Haud and 
RA, as most of the livestock for the trade came from the area.
35
 The hand-over of the 
Haud and RA was therefore marked by popular discontent and ‘massive’ 
demonstrations against the adjustments took place especially in the regions under 
concern and in the British protectorate.
36
 Moreover, the hand-over marked the 
beginning of the unification campaign in the British protectorate and revival of the 
idea of Greater Somalia. Another matter of concern was constituted by the ‘missed’ 
partition of the border between Ethiopia and Somalia Italiana. This long-lasting 
border dispute, which had never been really defined, was due to be settled during 
                                               
33 Lewis, A Modern History, pp. 129-31. The 1897 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty placed the Haud and RA 
under Ethiopian control and acknowledged Somali grazing rights in the area. Throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s, the issue produced a bitter debate among scholars and policy-makers which discussed the 
legitimacy of this treaty producing conflicting interpretations. 
34 Barnes, ‘The Somali Youth League’, p. 283. 
35 Samatar, The State and Rural Transformation, chapter 2. 
36 Lewis, A Modern History, p. 151. 
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AFIS. However, as discussed in chapter four, Ethiopian and Italian governments 
failed to do so and the border was settled through arbitrary procedures.  
The late territorial partitions and the missed partition of the Somali-speaking 
regions had a series of negative consequence on political developments in the area. 
Most notably, they set the background to multiple conflicts among neighbouring 
countries keeping alive a certain tradition of expansionist trends in the area.
 37
 In the 
short term, these adjustments contributed to foster a sense of insecurity and 
uncertainty over foreign and domestic affairs. The context of insecurity led to a 
revival of the project of Greater Somalia and, as a consequence, to sudden demands 
by the political leadership of Somaliland for unification with Somalia.   
 
6.3.1 The National United Front, the campaign for the ‘lost 
territories’ and revival of Greater Somalia 
Following the completion of the territorial adjustments, a new movement, the 
National United Front (NUF) was formed in the protectorate with the aim to object 
the disposition of the Haud and RA.
38
 Accordingly, a delegation was sent to London 
to raise concern on the issue. The formation of the NUF, the delegation to London 
and Michael Mariano, one of the NUF main leaders, became very popular in 
Somaliland  in what is remembered as the campaign to gain back the ‘lost 
territories’.
39
 Looking at today’s memory of the campaign is important to appreciate 
how the territorial adjustments were perceived and the significance that the prospect 
of unification assumed within this context. A first element to consider is the 
solemnity with which the delegation to London is recalled. Oral memories indicate 
that by taking an official stance and by engaging with colonial rule in the domain of 
the metropole, the delegation questioned the legitimacy of the Anglo-Ethiopian 
Treaty and, more generally, of the British rule in Somaliland.
40
 The core point that 
                                               
37 Markakis, ‘Ethnic Conflict and the State’, pp. 220-1. 
38 Drysdale, The Somali Dispute, p. 75. 
39 Elderly Somalis interviewed for this research recalled that the NUF delegation, headed by Michael 
Mariano, went to London with the aim ‘to bring the territories back to Somaliland’. Significantly, they 
claimed that the British had no right to give the regions away and they did so by discarding the treaties 
signed up with the Somali communities (the 1884-86 treaties). 
40 Interview with Nimco Samater Jama, 3rd July 2009, Hargeysa. Interview with ‘Gahaydhee’, 14th 
July 2009, Hargeysa. 
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emerges is that the British rule had no right to dispose of these regions on the Somali 
behalf because the treaties of protection signed with local communities in 1884-6 did 
not contemplate such a right.
41
 To prove this point, one of my informants contends 
that the NUF delegation carried a leather copy of these treaties to London.
42
 Another 
correlated element of this narrative is that the dispositions of the Haud and RA were 




In spite of the efforts, the NUF and its delegation to London did not succeed 
in renegotiating the issue. In fact, the British administration, although admitting 
certain irregularities in the disposition of the Haud and RA, declined any 
responsibilities.
 44
 Conversely, the formation of the NUF provoked an aggressive 
response of the Ethiopian government which advanced claims over the project of 
Greater Somalia. For instance, in 1956 during a trip to Ogaden, the Ethiopian 
Emperor Haile Selassie gave a speech in which he appealed for Somali unity within 




Due to these tensions, a sense of disillusion and apprehension for the 
expansionist trend of neighbouring countries, the attention of Somaliland’s political 
leadership turned on the project of Greater Somalia and unification with Somalia 
Italiana. In 1956, after having failed in seeking support from the British, the NUF 
asked for the support of the Legislative Assembly led by the Somali Youth League.
46
 
In doing so, the NUF made use of the popularity gained during the campaign for the 
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 Interview with Ahmed Ali Hibrahim, 7
th
 July 2009, Hargeysa. 
42 Interview with Nimco Samater Jama, 3rd July 2009, Hargeysa. 
43 It was contended that according to the Anglo-Somali treaties, British control over the Somaliland 
Protectorate was temporarily. In fact, the agreements stated that ‘when the Somalis would tell the 
British to leave the British would leave.’ Ibid. 
44 Before the NUF delegation the British would have ‘regretted’ the arrangement of 1897 Anglo-
Ethiopian Treaty but said that they could not ignore it. Lewis, A Modern History, p. 152. 
45 Quoted in ibid.. This narrative informed some of the Ethiopian press throughout the 1950s. For 
instance, a few months before Somaliland’s independence, the newspaper Ethiopian Herald invited 
the Somali brothers to get back within Ethiopia after 75 years of colonial dominion. Mr. Wright, 
Telegram no. 244 to FO, Addis Ababa, 7th April 1960, in ‘Relations between Somaliland Protectorate 
and Italian Trusteeship of Somalia’, TNA, CO 1015/2481. 
46 (Author unknown), ‘Extract from Somaliland Protectorate Intelligence Summary 1st – 31st January 
1957’ (undated); in ‘National United Front Party of British Somaliland’, TNA, CO 1015/1765. 
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‘lost territories’ and revived the idea of Greater Somalia and unification with the trust 
region as a means through which continuing their original campaign.
47
 By 1957, 
these themes gained momentum in the protectorate. The NUF was transformed into 
political movement and visited Somalia in late 1956. Its popularity increased 
especially in main towns such as Barbara and Hargeysa. In response, the Somali 
National League (SNL), the foremost party in Somaliland, began to support 
unification with Somalia Italiana which became a key theme of local politics.
48
  
Once more, looking at the memory of the campaign for unification is 
important to appreciate what the local aspirations were and the importance they 
assumed locally at the time. A central element of this memory is a certain emotional 
bond to the Somali national flag with a white five-pointed star as a symbol of 
territorial unity.
49
 By claiming Somaliland’s share over this ‘star’, interviewees 
opposed the struggle for Greater Somalia to post-colonial developments and the 
unequal treatment of Somaliland within the union. In this sense, it is significant that 
most of the interviewees pointed out that the Somali national flag was ideated in the 
protectorate by a ‘Somalilander’ but eventually taken away from the ‘south’.
50
 
Another element of the narrative is that Somaliland would unify with Somalia on the 
condition that the other regions would join immediately after.
51
 In this sense, it was 
claimed that Somaliland had been betrayed by their ‘brothers’ in Djibouti who 
refused to merge in the Somali Republic.
52
 
By the late 1950s, the campaign for the unification became very popular. 
Local parties organised public meetings on a weekly base in which flyers were 
distributed and magazines were sold. Although at the time very few people could 
                                               
47 As the NUF statute states: ‘A united independent Somaliland comprising the five Somali territories 
with the union of Somalia and of the Somaliland Protectorate as the first step towards this end.’ 
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48 Government House, ‘Somaliland Protectorate: The Political Scene’, 11th February 1958 Hargeysa, 
despatch no. 118/58, in ‘Reports from Governor on Internal Situation in Somaliland’, TNA, CO 
1015/1834. 
49 Still today, the national flag of the Somaliland Republic has a five-pointed star. 
50 Fieldwork notes, Somaliland, 2009. I have not found confirmation of this. However, the Somali flag 
was in use in Somalia Italiana in 1954 already. On the inauguration of the Somali flag see Il Corriere 
della Somalia 6th September 1954. 
51 Interview with Abdhullahi Hibraim, 13th August 2009, Hargeysa. 
52 Ibid. This view was also collected by Alexandra Diaz. Informal conversation, 15th June 2011, 
Uppsala. 
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read and write in Somaliland, parties’ magazines were even purchased to financially 
support the movements: one of my informants recalled his pauper and illiterate aunt 
buying the SNL magazine weekly and then using the paper to fill the holes of her 
hut.
53
 Political ferment spread from the urban area to rural areas passing from mouth 
to mouth, from one place to another within Somaliland and to the Haud and RA.
54
 
The networks among pastoral communities became ways through which letting the 
propaganda campaign been heard everywhere. The towns of Barbara and Hargeysa 
were the centres for exchanging communication, to which pastoral Somalis headed to 
sell their stock and from where they returned to pastoral life. In addition to these 
activities, the NUF and the SNL launched a series of protests against the British 
Administration possibly representing the most significant people’s action since the 
20-year long war by Sayid Maxamed Cabdhulle Xasan against colonial rule starting 
in the late 1890s. For instance, the NUF proposed to wear the wair (a white 
mourning head band) on the 28
th
 February as a day of mourning for the loss of the 
Haud and RA.55 The SNL instead organised crowds protesting against the British, 
sitting down with their backs to the British Administrator as he was passing by.
56
 
The revival of the idea of Greater Somalia within a context of increasing 
tensions with Ethiopia created a sense of urgency over the prospect of unification. As 
discussed in the next section, the rapidity that characterised the plans for unification 
negatively affected the whole process. Issues regarding the actual forms of 
unification were discarded as well as the ways through which merging the 
institutional, administrative, economic systems of the two regions, and the role that 




                                               
53 Interview with Mohamed Barood Ali, 6th July 2009, Hargeysa. 
54 Interview with Nimco Samater Jama, 3rd July 2009, Hargeysa. 
55 (Author unknown), ‘Extract from Somaliland Protectorate Intelligence Summary 1st – 28th February 
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56 Jama Mohamed, ‘Imperial Policies and Nationalism in the Decolonization of Somaliland, 1954-
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6.3.2 Rushing into ‘unconditional amalgamation’: poor 
negotiations and missed opportunities 
The previous section illustrated how the late territorial adjustments of Haud and RA 
led to a revival of the project of Greater Somalia and the campaign for unification in 
the protectorate. This revived national enthusiasm, however, was not coupled by 
similar commitment from the leadership of the Somali Youth League. On the 
contrary, the more requests and pressures for unification increased, the more 
detached the League became on the issue. The result was a rush into unification with 
no real intentions to define terms and conditions.  
The following two telegrams provide good insights on the ways in which 
Somali unification was conceived and carried out. The first is the formal request of 
unification sent by the SNL to the Legislative Assembly in Mogadishu, the second is 
the Assembly’s official reply. As it appears, not only the telegrams do not dwell 
beyond the undefined issue of unification but indicated the distinctively different 
positions held by the two leaderships on the matter. Where the SNL expressed a 
sense of anxiety and urgency on the issue, the response of the Assembly was vague 
and less committed. The first was sent in November 1958 by the SNL:  
Being the majority in the Protectorate we demand unconditional amalgamation 
with Somalia in 1960 . We could  welcome neutral commission from U.N.O in 




To which, the Assembly led by the League replied:  
With regard to your telegram 67[sic!], your feelings correspond to the wishes of 
every Somali wherever he/she is and with the final aim of the whole Somali 
nation. Meanwhile on the behalf of the Somali people, Assembly and 
Government, we state out gratitude and thanks, we pray that the Almighty God 
will help us [in fulfilling] our just and common ambitions.
58
 
                                               
57 The General-Secretary of the Somali National League, Telegram to the Legislative Assembly in 
Mogadishu’, 5th November, Hargeysa; ASDMAE, carteggio AFIS, cassa 9, busta 4. 
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Where the SNL called for ‘unconditional amalgamation’, for the UN to hold a 
‘plebiscite’ and for an ‘imperative’ action to be taken as soon as possible, the 
diplomatically positive but rather less enthusiastic reply of the Somali Youth League 
stated ‘gratitude’, and appealed to the rhetoric of ‘just and common ambitions’ 
whose achievement was linked to faith into future and better time to come. In fact, as 
the Somaliland’s former minister for Foreign Affairs Edna Adan recalls, during 
private talks between Ibrahim Egal, leader of the SNL, and Aden Abdullah, president 
of the Assembly, the latter advised the SNL not to advance union with the trust 




The failure to discuss plans for unification in detail had several consequences 
for the protectorate and for the Somali Republic alike. From one point of view, it 
precluded the matter from being discussed within Somaliland. This became 
problematic because the two main parties, the SNL and NUF, held different views on 
the future of Somaliland and these disparities were never addressed. For instance, the 
NUF was a pro-Western and ‘moderate’ movement which advanced the idea of 
Greater Somalia within the Commonwealth and was, for this reason, supported by 
the Somali Youth League. Conversely, the SNL held a different stance proposing 
alignment with the Egyptian government. Thus, the SNL was not supportive of the 
prospect of an independent Somaliland and/or Somali Republic within the 
Commonwealth. Most important, the NUF and SNL conceived the question of 
unification differently. Where the NUF promoted unconditional unification with 
Somalia to be reached as soon as independence was granted, the SNL had a more 
cautious attitude and promoted a unification to be reached through negotiations 
between the two political leaderships.
60
 A missed dialogue between the two parties 
came to be detrimental for Somaliland as it pursued the goal of unification with no 
clear scheme. 
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From another point of view, this rush into unification precluded opportunities 
of negotiating the issue with the Somali Legislative Assembly in Mogadishu and led 
the latter to impose its leadership. The creation of the Cameroon Federal Republic in 
1961 following the unification of British-ruled West Cameroon and French-ruled 
East Cameroon makes a good comparison with the case study under investigation. 
When drafting plans for the unification, the respective leading parties failed to 
address issues related to institutional integration precluding the establishment of 
clear plans for the federation. The result was that the political leadership from East 
Cameroon, which had clearer ideas on the issue, managed to impose their vision of a 
strong and centralised state system as a model for the federal republic.
61
 Similarly, 
the urgency towards unification led the political leadership in British Somaliland to 
discard issues related to terms and conditions to be discussed with their counterpart 
in Somalia Italiana. The result was that the centralised and autocratic state system 
crafted during AFIS became the model for the Somali Republic. Significantly, and 
differently from Cameroon, the unification of Somalia and Somaliland did not take 
the form of federation but of ‘amalgamation’ indicating the role of subordination 
played by Somaliland in the whole process. In this way, the state model and 
governing bodies crafted during AFIS were imposed on Somaliland. 
On a different level, the institutional arrangements of the unification became 
a matter of controversy. A first problem arose around the share of representation 
within the unified parliament. In fact, instead of favouring an equal share of 
parliamentary seats, the two assemblies, the one elected in the protectorate with 33 
seats, and the other elected in the trust region with 90 seats, simply merged one to 
another. This clearly disadvantaged the political representation of Somaliland which 
was reduced to a tiny minority within the parliament.
62
 A second issue was 
                                               
61 On the Cameroon Federal Republic see: Willard R. Johnson, The Cameroon Federation: Political 
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represented by the fact that the two assemblies were elected through different 
procedures and voting systems. The 1959 election in Somalia was based on universal 




The role of subordination given to the representatives of Somaliland within 
the institutional practicalities of the unification reflected the ruling trend that was 
consolidating in the trust region. As the previous chapter discussed, once the 
leadership of the Somali Youth League amassed majority within the governing 
bodies, it used its position to curb internal dissent and opposition. At a second stage, 
however, it was forced to engage in dialogue with the leadership of the opposition, 
leading some opponents to join the League. A similar policy was adopted during the 
unification process. As the opposition within Somalia Italiana was excluded from 
accessing the governing and decision-making bodies, autocratic measures were taken 
to preclude the political leadership of British Somaliland to advance claims over the 
‘gate’. Once again, the case of the drafting of the Constitutional Chart is telling of 
this trend. The previous chapter discussed the ways in which the Somali-led 
government acted to preclude possibilities of confrontation between the majority and 
opposition parties when drafting the constitutional framework of the post-colonial 
state. Dialogue with the SNL or the NUF on the constitution were excluded on the 
ground that the leadership of the Somali Youth League claimed to be politically more 
‘advanced’ than their counterparts in the protectorate. This assumption was reported 
by the British Consul in Mogadishu while commented on the work on the Somali 
constitution of the Legislative Assembly: 
I was assured only last night by an influential official in the Somali Government 
that the Somalis of Somaliland were so backward that they would have no option 
but to accept the leadership of Somalis from Somalia for an initial period.
64
 
                                                                                                                                     
he wishes to negotiate as an equal.’ Sir D. Hall, Inward Telegram to the Secretary of State for the 
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Chatterjee’s formulation of dual nationalism is once more useful to 
understand what the League’s leadership meant by being politically ‘advanced’ or 
‘backward’. Following the imposition of plans for decolonisation by the UN, 
nationalists were forced to engage with colonial rule within its own domain. As 
chapter four illustrated, this shift became concrete with the Italian strategies to amass 
consent that addressed political leadership with the establishment of scholarship 
programme that would qualify Somalis to access institutional posts. Political 
leadership accepted to engage with AFIS as a means through which claiming their 
share within the making of the new state and entering the ‘gate’. Once this leadership 
became knowledgeable of the institutional framework of AFIS, or politically 
‘advanced’, they were appointed to key state posts and governing bodies as the 
legislative assemblies.  
However, this shift happened at a crucial time in Somalia Italiana. Self-
government was introduced at a time when institutional structures of the state were 
still evolving and the ‘Somalisation’ of the state not completed yet. In this way, 
following the 1956 election of a Legislative Assembly which was in charge of 
domestic affairs, the League’s leadership came to lead the process of state-craft and 
the appointment of institutional posts. Due to its position of predominance within 
governing bodies, this leadership was, thus, in the position to decide who would be 
included or excluded from accessing the ‘gate’. This attitude to dominion, or ‘culture 
of power’, which derived from the ways in which state-craft was imposed and 
articulated, was used to deal with internal and external competitors to the gate.  
At the same time, due to great emphasis placed on the electoral process, the 
leadership in power had to rely constantly on support from the electorate highlighting 
a tension between the autocratic attitude to dominion and the democratic setting of 
the state system. This tension was overcome by the League’s leadership by engaging 
in dialogues with opposition leaders locally and on a national level. As discussed, 
this attitude led several sections of the opposition to merge with the League before 
the elections. Moreover, by appointing opposition leaders to key institutional posts, 
the ruling party was also able to attract these key figures, and their electoral weight, 
within the majority. Following the 1960 unification, the Somali state ‘gate’ came to 
be dependent on the support from Somaliland’s electorate. In order to secure this 
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support, the League’s leadership engaged in dialogue with the political leaders of 




Within this context, political propaganda came to play a significant role. In 
particular, it was used to counter the contenders to the gate. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the rhetoric of the ‘fight against clan divisions’ became a means 
through which discrediting the opposition in Somalia. Similarly, the project of 
Greater Somalia became a means through which excluding external competitors from 
the domain of the state. Moreover, a monopolisation of the national project aimed at 
preventing competitors to ally with one other. Due to the pressures deriving from the 
revival of the project of Greater Somalia, the leadership of the Somali Youth League 
appropriated the nationalist project in order to establish a more direct control on the 
issue. It did so by founding a new nationalist organisation, namely the Pan-Somali 
Movement. However, after gaining credits from this organisation, the League’s 
leadership sabotaged the whole project. 
 
 
6.4 Reviving and monopolising the idea of Greater 
Somalia 
In discussing the establishment of self-government, this study illustrated how 
competition for key institutional posts became central in Somalia. It also discussed 
the measures taken by the League’s leadership to amass majority and to enforce a 
solid control over state hierarchies. As self-government was introduced when the 
process of state-building was still evolving, ensuring access to key positions became 
important to control who would share power and resources and who would be 
excluded from them. Demands for political unification coming from the protectorate 
became, in this sense, problematic to the League’s leadership as they raised the 
possibilities of sharing the control of key institutional positions and amplified the 
struggle for the ‘gate’ including new contenders. These demands arose in a context 
of increasing pressures from below. As argued, new students’ movements in Cairo 
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made good use of the rhetoric of the idea of Greater Somalia in order to pressurise 
the leadership in Mogadishu to make concrete steps towards national unification. As 
a response, the League took the lead on the project of Great Somalia and promoted 
the formation of a Pan-Somali Movement which would work on the issue. However, 
this was directed to ensure solid control on both the processes of state and nation 
buildings. 
The League’s leadership operated in particular circumstances. In addition to 
the demands for unification and the revival of the project of Greater Somalia, the 
League’s leadership was heavily influenced by its relations with both the British and 
Italian governments. None of the two administrations approved a revival of the 
irredentist claims which would complicate the state of affairs within international 
relations. The influences of the British and Italian positions should be not 
underestimated as the economic future of the Somali Republic was dependant on aids 
coming from former colonial rules, Italy chiefly. The following quote, an extract of a 
report on discussions held between the British Consul in Mogadishu and the 
president of Legislative Assembly, Aden Abdullah, captures the delicate situation in 
which the political leadership operated. The object of discussion is the formation of 
the Pan-Somali Movement and the revival of the project of Greater Somalia. During 
the meeting, the Consul expressed concern on both issues and asked reassurance that 
they would not constitute a threat to the territorial status quo in the Horn of Africa. 
By reassuring the British government that plans were issued to keep the matter under 
control, Aden Abdullah also noted certain difficulties and pressures which were upon 
the Legislative Assembly: 
Aden Abdullah, President of Legislative Assembly…said that he wanted to give 
an unequivocal assurance to Her Majesty’s Government that the Pan Somali 
National Movement…would not indulge in subversion in the neighbouring 
territory and that the Somali Government had in no way changed its policy on the 
Greater Somali issue. He pointed out that having a permanent secretariat of this 
movement in Mogadishu rather than somewhere else would be a guarantee that it 
would not fall into the hands of extremists…Aden Abdullah insisted that the aims 
of the movement were legitimate and that no Somali Government could survive 
which ignored the strength of feeling on this issue. The Movement would use 
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propaganda and persuasion to draw world opinion to the wish of all Somalis to be 
united. It would not go any further than this.
66
   
It seems possible to speculate that the more pressures from below and from 
other parties increased, the less committed to national issues the League became. As 
the trajectory towards unification seemed irreversible, the League adopted a line 
which would monopolise the project of Greater Somalia and dismiss other parties 
from the national domain. The first action towards this goal was to downplay the 
enthusiasm for the campaign for unification, and to minimise the role played by 
Somaliland and by its political leadership. This was achieved by controlling media 
information, in particular through the government-controlled newspaper Il Corriere 
della Somalia which gave little space to the matter as a whole. For instance, when a 
delegation of the SNL visited Mogadishu to hold talks with the Legislative Assembly 
in December 1959, the newspaper published the news two weeks later.
67
 In fact, once 
the arrival of this delegation was acknowledged by the newspaper, no details were 
given on the meeting and discussion held with representatives of the Legislative 
Assembly.
68
   
This neglect reflected the strategy at curbing dissent adopted by the 
government when dealing with domestic affairs. In establishing a centralised, 
autocratic position within governing bodies, Somalia’s political leadership prevented 
opposition from consolidating its positions and the government’s propaganda 
ridiculed claims and policies of the opposition accordingly. A similar strategy was 
adopted when dealing with the political leadership of Somaliland. As a consequence, 
on the one hand, the government’s propaganda attempted to downplay the political 
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activities in the protectorate, on the other, it showed contempt for their poor 
achievements. For instance, news of the national election held in the protectorate 
were not reported by the government media which, instead, spread false 
misinformation: 
[…]the General Elections in British Somaliland passed without any notice being 
taken of them by the Press or Radio in Somalia. On the contrary, prominence was 
given in the “Corriere della Somalia”[…] to a report from Jibuti [Djibouti] stating 
categorically that the Elections had been postponed for a while due to the success 
of the boycott campaign of the National Somali League. In spite of the fact that… 
the Jibuti message was a fabrication, no denial was published and, when the 




   On a different level, the League adopted a series of defamation campaigns 
to counter the opposition constituted by the political leaders of the various political 
organisations. In this sense, the League’s strategy attempted to prevent a political 
alliance between the opposition leaders. In constructing local backing, the League 
created a new organisation, the Pan-Somali Movement. At the same time, the 




6.4.1 Manipulation and monopolisation of Greater Somalia: 
the case of the Pan-Somali Movement 
The case of the Pan-Somali Movement is exemplary of the ways through which the 
‘verticalisation’ of the Somali political space by AFIS reached its completion. 
Chapter four investigated what were the vertical features of state-craft by reviewing 
institutional structures and governing bodies, and the previous chapter explored how 
this ‘verticalisation’ affected the process of state building following the 
establishment of self-government in 1956. This section looks at how this 
‘verticalisation’ came to comprise the domain of nation building by considering the 
formation, use, and sabotage of the movement. 
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The formation of the Pan-Somali Movement in 1959 was the League’s 
response to the revival of the project of Greater Somalia. As seen in section 6.3, 
although the actual practicalities were discarded and in spite of the scepticism of the 
League on the matter, unification seemed incumbent and grass-roots support solid. 
The reaction of the League’s leadership to these pressures was to use and monopolise 
the issue of unification as a proof of its success and commitment to the idea Greater 
Somalia. This propaganda addressed Somalia Italiana first, where, as discussed in 
the last chapter, the party had to face internal criticism on the scarce development of 
national politics. On a different level, the League’s role of predominance within the 
process of unification was propagandised within the Somali-speaking regions.
70
 
Accordingly, the League promoted the foundation of a new political association, the 
Pan-Somali Movement which would work at the national project of Greater Somalia. 
This represented a turning point on the issue which had been put aside since the late 
1940s. The event was also embedded and charged with solemnity and symbolism. 
Evocatively, with the emergence of the Pan-Somali Movement in 1959, the idea of 
Great Somalia was re-launched from where it originated, Somalia Italiana, and led 
by its original promoter, the Somali Youth League.
71
  
The Movement was founded in Mogadishu in August 1959 to function as an 
umbrella organisation that would bring together representatives of political 
organisations from the Somali-speaking regions to work collaboratively on the 
project of Greater Somalia. A great deal of publicity was given to the event by the 
local newspaper, Il Corriere della Somalia. Its first meeting was attended by political 
representatives of the five Somali-speaking regions (although not by representatives 
of all political parties). Among these representatives, three parties claimed to be the 
promoters of the Movement: the Somali Youth League of Somalia Italiana, the 
Somali National League of British Somaliland, the Union Démocratique Somalis of 
Djibouti. It was maintained that the national project would be advanced through the 
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Movement as it was a collective organ consisting of political representation of all 
Somali-speaking regions.   
In spite of these aims, the Movement was a short-lived digression in 
Somalia’s national politics. Following its formation the Movement was characterised 
by competition among its three founding parties each pursing different scopes. For 
instance, the Somali National League used the Movement to gain consensus for the 
political election of February 1960 in opposition to the NUF; the l’Union 
Démocratique Somalis aimed instead to get credits within the international 
community as it was excluded from top-level politics in Djibouti. Conversely, the 
Somali Youth League used the Movement to get a strong hold in the domain of 
Greater Somalia. Due to its control over governing bodies and media, the Somali 
Youth League was more successful in the competition. In fact, in spite of the 
League’s active role in organising the Movement, it deliberatively prevented the 
organisation from making any progress at all. 
Once more, Cooper’s theorisation of the ‘gatekeeper state’ as a part of the 
colonial legacy constitutes a useful tool for appreciating this issue. By necessity, the 
‘gatekeeper state’ is the domain of a few who seek control of key posts and 
institutions. Due to this exclusive character, it reduced politics to a zero-sum political 
competition. The gate state-system emerging from the trusteeship was in 
contradiction with the collective national project of Greater Somalia. This thesis 
addressed this tension by confronting the horizontal features of the Somali nation 
imagined in the 1940s and the vertical institutional structures imposed by AFIS to 
support this nation. This contradiction came to light fully when in the late 1950s a 
series of pressures led to a revival of talks about the project of Greater Somalia. In 
establishing the Pan-Somali Movement, it was created a fake collegial organ whose 
domain was, instead, very exclusive. 
An analysis of the propaganda used by the Government-controlled newspaper 
Il Corriere della Somalia sheds light on how competition expanded and developed 
within the area of Greater Somalia. On August, 31 1959, Il Corriere reported with 
enthusiasm the news of the formation of the Movement whose aims were the 
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achievement of independence and unity of the ‘Somali territories’,
72
  the abolishment 
of racial and clan divisions, and the promotion of links with African and Muslim 
countries.
73
 Although these aims did not differ from the objectives of most parties at 
the time, the newspaper’s propaganda centred on the fact that, for the first time, 
thanks to the Movement representatives from within the area of Greater Somalia 
gathered officially together in order to discuss the issue. On this ‘extraordinary’ 




The core claim of this propaganda reflected the comments of the League’s 
main leaders. For instance, the themes of continuity with the past, Somali success, 
optimism and faith towards the future were expressed by the then President of the 
Legislative Assembly, Aden Abdullah Osman: 
With no doubt and with God’s help we will achieve our goals… we have to strive 
for the union of Somalis as well as all Somalis have to be united. Therefore I ask 
the present company to stress the historical importance of the event today in here 
as well as in the other Somali regions.  
However, it was stressed that all the credits for the event lied with the League. In this 
sense, the Somali Youth League was depicted as the original promoter of 
nationalism, the success of Somali politics and the hope for the future of Somali 
people. In other words it represented the past, present and future of Somali 
nationalism. The declaration of the president Sheikh Issa Mohamed made this point 
very clear: 
                                               
72 According to the statute of the Pan-Somali Movement: ‘the expression ‘Somali Territories’ as 
herewith intended comprises the regions of East Africa starting North with the French Somaliland, 
bordering southward with Kenya and westward with Ethiopia notoriously inhabited by that indivisible 
ethnical, political and religious unity called Somali and universally known as the Horn of Africa’. 
Author unknown, ‘Note on the Pan-Somali Movement’, undated; ASDMAE, carteggio AFIS, cassa 9, 
busta 2. 
73 The aims of the Pan-Somali Movement were: ‘to achieve, through peaceful and legal means, the 
Unity and Independence of all Somali Territories; to reject categorically whatsoever from tribal and/or 
racial division, be it influenced by [S]omali elements or by foreigners; to create and maintain close 
relations with the people of [A]frican continent; to create and maintain links with the people of 
Moslem World.’ Ibid.. 
74 Il Corriere della Somalia, 31st August 1959. 
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God has made our path towards independence easier. In that today we hold our 
destinies in our own hands and control them, but our expectations won’t be 
satisfied until the unification of Somali-lands will be achieved. Our duty is to 
help our brothers that are not free yet and we will devote ourselves with 
everything and every skills so that the day of the great union, of which the party I 
represent has always been the standard-bearer, can happen as soon as possible.
75
 
At the same time, the leadership attempted to contain the enthusiasm and to post-pone 
concrete discussions on the issue after independence. As confirmed by the first President 
of the Legislative Assembly, Abdullahi Issa: 
We are strongly convinced of the necessity of the unification. We don’t want 
anything outside our rights... the end of the Trusteeship System is very near... as 
soon as the independence will be granted we could devote ourselves to the 
achievement of this other goal with more intensity.
76
  
This last quote captures the scarce commitment of the party’s leadership to the actual 
project and its unwillingness to negotiate issues and share key competences. In fact, 
as soon as it was time to discuss terms and conditions, the whole project was 
boycotted.   
In spite of the great deal of publicity, the Pan-Somali Movement did not 
make any progress at all: its second meeting, scheduled for December 1959, was 
replaced by a ‘pre-congress’ whose aims were ‘exclusively organisational and 
preparatory for the Congress’.
77
 However, once the pre-congress was held, it lasted 
four days during which none of the issues on the agenda was discussed,
78
 the 
President of the Movement resigned as a protest, and all the questions concerning the 
Movement, the Congress and Somali nationalism were postponed to an indeterminate 
future. In explaining the lack of progress, the Corriere blamed clan rivalries among 
parties which, it was maintained, were ‘deeply in contract with the aims of 
                                               
75 All the quotes are taken from Il Corriere della Somalia, 31st August 1959. 
76 Ibid. 
77 The Administrator’s Cabinet, Telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26th December 1959, 
Mogadishu. ASDMAE, carteggio AFIS, cassa 9, busta 2. 
78 The main points on the pre-congress agenda were the following: admission of new parties; 
enlargement of the temporary Committee; nomination of new offices and confirmation of old offices. 
Ibid.. 
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Movement since its foundation’.
79
 It was implicitly suggested that clan rivalries were 
specific features of other parties constituting a crucial point of the government’s 
propaganda. As the previous chapter illustrated, following the establishment of self-
government, the rhetoric of the eradication of clan divisions was used to ridicule the 
opposition. In the doing so, this discourse made a clear-cut divide between the 
‘national’ party and the ‘tribal’ movements, the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’, respectively 
‘us’ (i.e. the League) and ‘them’ (i.e. the other parties). Similar methods were 
adopted by the newspaper to blame other political organisations for the failure of the 
Movement. 
Archival findings provide more insights on the reasons behind the sabotage of 
the Movement and the League’s unwillingness to confront with its colleagues. First, 
certain questions arose following international pressures from British, Ethiopian and 
Italian governments which did not support the revival of the project of Greater 
Somalia.
80
 Consequentially, as Somalia Italiana was close to independence and 
subject to economic links with Italy, the League proposed to postpone any discussion 
on the issue. As this was opposed by other parties, the League’s reaction was to 
sabotage the Movement.  
Second, considerable competition among different leaders developed within 
the Movement underscoring clashes between different positions, in particular 
between the provisional president of the Movement Mohamed Harbi  and the 
League’s leadership. Although excluded from top-level politics in Djibouti, 
Mohamed Harbi enjoyed a certain solid backing within the Movement.  He was 
eager to hold an official meeting in December so that he could attend the meeting of 
the Organisation of African Union in 1960 as representative of all Somali-speaking 
regions. His position within the Movement was challenged by the League’s 
leadership leading to scheduling a ‘pre-congress’ on the 31
st
 December with no 
                                               
79 The Corriere della Somalia published a concise press release to acknowledge the negatives 
outcomes of the Pan-Somali Movement pre-congress. The Administrator’s Cabinet, Telegram to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5th January 1960, Mogadishu, n. 500130; ASDMAE, carteggio AFIS, 
cassa 9, busta 2.  
80 Italian sources suggest that the Somali Youth League preferred to hinder the growth of the 
Movement especially due to pressures coming from international community. At the same time, the 
government and press strongly criticised the event. Ibid.. 
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political agenda. At the same time, dispositions were issued for Il Corriere della 
Somalia, to dedicate little space and importance to the pre-congress and to the whole 
issue.
81
 Furthermore, although not specified, measures were taken to prevent 




A third issue was constituted by the competition among different groups in 
particular between the SNL and the Somali Youth League the foremost parties of 
Somalia and Somaliland.
83
 As they were both engaging in a competition over the 
‘gate’, the idea of Greater Somalia and the Pan-Somali Movement became other 
domains of conflicts. Accordingly, their competitions developed at three different 
levels within the Movement: to advance their positions and grass-roots backing; to 
exclude opposition from taking advantage and/or to participate at the Movement; 
finally, to support their competitors’ opposition respectively (the SNL engaged in 
dialogue with the Great Somalia League, whereas the Somali Youth League became 
close to the NUF).
84
  
                                               
81 ‘No publicity will be given to the pre-congress discussion by the Government and by its organ of 
information (Corriere della Somalia) [it will be given notice of] the agenda and of the conclusions [of 
the pre-congress only].’ The Administrator’s Cabinet, Telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5th 
January 1960, Mogadishu, n. 500130; ASDMAE, carteggio AFIS, cassa 9, busta 2. 
82 Ibid.. From colonial sources, it is possible to speculate that Mohamoud Harbi managed to amass 
considerable backing in Djibouti. In the 1960s, he continued to put the issue of Greater Somalia 
forward before the international community, however he soon died in a crash on a small plane of the 
United Arab Airlines from Geneva to Cairo, on September, 29 1960. See http://aviation-
safety.net/database/record.php?id=19600929-0 
83 As reported by the British Consulate in Mogadishu, after the formation of the Pan-Somali 
Movement, the leadership of the League began to engage more critically with the politics in the 
protectorate and in particular with the leadership of the SNL. For instance, in December 1959, the 
president of the Legislative Assembly, Aden Abdullah Osman authored a piece published in the 
Corriere della Somalia in which he criticised the Horn of Africa the SNL-controlled magazine. This 
caused a certain concern on the development of the relations between the two parties: ‘While it is 
generally accepted that the Somali Government is more friendly to the Protectorate’s National United 
Front, (N.U.F.), this attack on the S.N.L. caused considerable surprise since hitherto the Somali 
Government had made an effort to display a degree of impartiality with regard to the Protectorate’s 
internal affairs.’ (Author unknown), British Consulate-General, Mogadishu, 22nd December 1959, 
JG/0112/13; in TNA, FO 371/138348. 
84 The leadership of the Somali Youth League became closer to the leader of the NUF, Michael 
Mariano, whose party competed with the SNL for political election in Somaliland scheduled in 
February 1960. When Michael Mariano paid a visit to the Assembly: ‘He was given the full V.I.P. 
treatment, being received at the Airport by an imposing delegation headed by Aden Abdullah and the 
Minister of Public Works and Communications, Mohamed Abdi Nur. Mariano was installed in the 
visitors’ quarters of the Assembly and was given an immediate audience with the Prime Minister 
which lasted over two hours.’ Ibid.. 
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Conflicts assumed grotesque features. In a desperate attempt to prevent 
opposition from joining the Movement, the League made last-minute changes on 
terms and conditions of the membership with no public notification. However, the 
secretary of the Movement, who belonged to a competing group, was able to 
sabotage the League’s plot and to allow opposition to be able to meet the new 
requirements on time: 
An arrangement was made whereby political parties which did not submit their 
official application before December 13, to take part in the Congress would be 
excluded. This would have eliminated the three Somali opposition parties: Great 
Somalia league (G.S.L.), Somali National Union (S.N.U.) and the Independent 




Within this zero-sum game in which competitors’ gains were matched by equal 
losses, the immediate consequence was that discussions of the idea of Greater 





The previous chapter investigated the effects of the decolonisation programme on 
state-building and everyday politics and illustrated how the introduction of self-
government led to the establishment of a one-party system in which the majority 
acted to ensure and amass control over governing institutions and structures of state 
power. This chapter assessed the effects of the process of decolonisation on Somali 
unification and, more generally, on the nationalist project of Greater Somalia.  
In many ways, the effects of decolonisation on the national project were 
similar. The state became a very exclusive domain and its institution were crafted 
according to centralised, autocratic features and based on vertical ties. The top-level 
                                               
85 (Author unknown), British Consulate-General, Mogadishu, 22nd December 1959, JG/0112/13; in 
TNA, FO 371/138348. 
86 Paradoxically, as the British Consulate put it, the Somali Youth League preferred to sabotage the 
whole Movement rather than contributing to its development. This attitude created a fracture inside 
the Movement: ‘The prospect of not having a comfortable majority at the Congress caused Abdullahi 
Issa to arrange for a postponement of the Congress. This infuriated Yusuf Ismail Samatar who 
returned to Hargeisa [Hargeysa] on December 16, promising not to return until such time as the 
Somali Government makes its peace with the S.N.L.’ Ibid.. 
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hierarchies, at first appointed by AFIS and from 1956 onwards by Somali-led 
governments, were invested with the arbitrary power to include who would access 
power and who would not. The idea of Greater Somalia, which formerly symbolised 
a collective dream of territorial unification based on horizontal fraternity, was 
appropriated by a political leadership whose tight control made the whole project 
very exclusive. The case of the Pan-Somali Movement, the ways through which it 
was created, propagandised and sabotaged illustrated this process of manipulation 
clearly. Due to a series of pressures from below and pressures from external 
competitors to the ‘gate’ represented by the emerging Somali state, the leadership of 
the Somali Youth League took the lead of the movement in order to make sure that it 
would not share its position of power with other counterparts.   
Once the League’s leadership managed to consolidate its position outside 
Somalia Italiana, and confirmed its hold to power, political competitors had no other 
choice than accessing state institutions within the League rather than opposing it. As 
seen in the previous chapter, the autocratic policy adopted by the League’s leadership 
towards opposition pushed political competitors to merge within the ruling party. It 
was not a case that this trend was reported just before the 1959 national election 
when, due to coercive measures adopted by the League to curb dissent, it became 
clear that the opposition had little chance to claiming its share of the gate through the 
‘legal’ means planned by AFIS, i.e. electoral competition. Similarly, once the 
unification of Somalia and Somaliland marked a clear role of subordination of the 
latter, the political leadership of the SNL and NUF adopted a similar strategy to the 
one of the HDM, they joined the League with the aim to advance their interests and 
obtain their share within governing structures.  
In analysing this process, the chapter has made recurrent reference to 
Cooper’s formulation of the ‘gatekeeper’ state because it provides useful tool for 
understanding the importance given to political competition for accessing the state 
that characterised Somali politics since the 1950s and eventually 1960s. This 
emphasis had origins in the decolonising programme planned by AFIS which placed 
great emphasis on elections and electoral competitions, and constructed verticalised 
state structures designed to give predominance to the top-hierarchies. Moreover, the 
chapter has also argued that different decolonisation programmes within Somali-
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speaking regions contributed to foster pressures from below within the area of 
Greater Somalia. AFIS and its commitment to a development programme placed the 
former Italian colony at the centre of attraction and its state object of desire to 
different groups. This, coupled with adjustments of colonial arrangements within the 
areas, as the cession of Haud and RA, caused an expansion of the struggle for the 
gate which came to include competitors from outside Somalia Italiana.  
The way in which the unification was achieved is a key feature of 
contemporary debate in Somaliland. The literature in support for international 
recognition for the Republic of Somaliland contests the fact that the two former 
colonial possessions did not negotiate the issue of political unification as equals.
87
 As 
discussed in the chapter, the role of subordination given to Somaliland within the 
union and process of unification is attributable to the League’s unwillingness to share 
state control with its counterpart and to poor planning carried out by Somaliland’s 
political leadership. 
The chapter argued that due to a sense of increasing insecurity around 
domestic and foreign affairs, Somaliland’s political leadership rushed into 
‘unconditional amalgamation’ failing to discuss issues related to the process of 
unification within Somaliland and with Somalia. Classic approaches to the 
comprehension of political unification argue that the presence of an external threat 
(or the prospect of future aggression) is the main push for two, or more than two, 
territorial entities to merge into one.
88
 The role played by the tension over border 
issues should be not underestimated. It was this tension to lead both the SNL and the 
NUF supporting the creation of a strong, centralised and unified government instead 
of a federal state with regional autonomy.
89
 From this perspective, all parties agreed 
that a centralised government would constitute the best security from external 
threats. The presence of a constant tension with neighbouring countries is a key 
feature of post-colonial Somali history setting the background to multiple armed 
conflicts with neighbouring countries. 
                                               
87 Caqli, ‘Somaliland Election Registration’. 
88 Riker ‘Federalism: Origin’. 
89 In fact the only party who supported a federal Somali state was the HDM which represented the 
southern clans, mostly sedentary and semi-pastoral. 
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The struggle for the ‘gate’ among political competitors soon led irredentist 
aspirations and optimistic expectations to disillusionment. Already in 1961, a 
referendum held to abrogate the Constitution of the Somali Republic was approved 
with strong rejection in Somaliland, and only passed because the votes were counted 
all together. Soon after, a military coup was organised by young military officials in 
Hargeysa. One of these officials, who was interviewed for this research, claimed that 
the main scope of the coup was to raise awareness among central government in 
Mogadishu that terms and conditions of the unification had to be re-negotiated.
90
 
These claims were never addressed.  
 
 
                                               
90 Interview with Hussein Ali Duale ‘Awil’, 12th August, 2009, Hargeysa. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
In 1992, in one of his last, and perhaps most provoking and controversial, 
contributions to African studies, Basil Davidson confronts the system of nation-state 
with the charge of having imposed an alien and disruptive political model upon 
African countries. Enforced as a part of the colonial heritage, the system of nation-
state has ‘cursed’ Africa to socioeconomic underdevelopment and political instability 
and precluded the establishment of African-rooted alternatives to this model. In 
considering the collapse of Somalia, he notes that:  
Somalia by 1990 had ceased even to be a nation-state; nothing seemed to remain 
save clan warfare and destruction. Yet it could not be said that Somalia’s brief 
attempt to follow “the route of escape” had failed for reasons inherent to itself: in 
this sense, rather, the attempt had succeeded. But the circumstances in which it 
could persist and mature were simply not present.
1
 
Although subject to critiques, Davidson’s argument addresses core issues regarding 
the history and recent development of Somali politics. To what extent did the 
imposition of the system of nation-state contribute to ‘Somalia’s self-destruction’?
2
 
What were the features, claims and activities of the Somali ‘route of escape’? More 
important, what were the historical conditions and possibilities? How did the two 
interrelate with each other?  
This study began with the intention to explore the process of the making of 
nation-state in Somalia. The reasons for doing so were simple. While the dissolution 
of the Somali nation-state has fostered a lively scholarly debate on the dynamics of 
dissolution and prospects for future reconstructions, the ways in which this system 
was crafted were under-explored. Nevertheless, a first-hand historically grounded 
investigation was needed to provide more insight to this problematic, contributing to 
a deeper understanding of the patterns of political development in Somalia.  
                                               
1 Basil Davidson, The Black Man’s Burden. Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State, (London: Verso, 
1992), p. 310. 
2 The expression is taken from an account of recent political development by a former Somali 
diplomat: Mohamed Osman Omar, The Road to Zero: Somalia’s Self-Destruction: Personal 
Reminiscences, (London: Haan Associates, 1992). 
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The research investigated the interplay between nationalism and 
decolonisation or, to use Davidson’s wording, the interaction between the Somali-
rooted ‘route of escape’ and the set of historical and structural circumstances. The 
period under investigation coincided with a change of regime following the defeat of 
the Italians in 1941 in the Horn of Africa. This phase was characterised by the 
emergence of a national movement that began to address the wartime challenges by 
imagining home-grown alternatives. In addition to this, a debate in the UN raised the 
possibility of self-government and independence scheduling a fixed programme of 
social, economic and political development. This study investigated the ways in 
which the decolonisation process came to terms with the Somali nationalist 
movement determining modes and patterns of the post-colonial state. The findings 
illustrated how the peculiarities of the decolonisation process led to a ‘verticalisation’ 
of Somali political space. This meant, the institutional framework crafted during the 
international trusteeship was not only in stark contrast to the Somali-rooted 
alternatives emerging in the wartime, but it established a distorted version of the 
‘western’ nation-state ambivalently ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’.  
The research findings make a significant contribution to Somali studies. 
Despite different theoretical approaches have emerged over the last decades, a 
general consensus among scholars tends to agree that the system of nation-state 
imposed in Somalia was an inadequate western imposition oblivious of the 
peculiarities of the Somali social structure.
3
 By proving a more historically informed 
scrutiny, this thesis challenged these assumptions for being too simplistic. It was 
demonstrated how the institutional framework established in support of the Somali 
nation was, in fact, a distorted version of the western nation-state. The research 
expressed this tension by exploring the features of the decision-making bodies 
established by AFIS, including the electoral procedures and the representative 
councils and demonstrated how these created an ambivalent ruling system, both 
‘modern’ and ‘traditional’. An appreciation of this circumstance is important for 
                                               
3 This position is also shared by some journalist who critically addressed international intervention in 
Somalia. See for instance Harper’s recent contribution to the debate: Mary Harper, Getting Somalia 
Wrong? Faith and Hope in a Shattered State, (Zed Press, 2012).  
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those studies concerned with the relations between state, society and tradition in 
Somalia, as well as for the ones researching Somali nationalism and national politics. 
In investigating the historical trajectory leading to independence, this research 
provided insight to better understand the longue durée of Somali politics.  
In particular, the thesis emphasised the importance of approaching the issue 
of Somali nationalism in historical perspective. In explaining the disintegration of the 
Somali nation-state, Schraeder has recently revised the issue of Somali nationalism. 
His argument contended that the interplay between clan rivalries and self-interested 
elites prevented the post-colonial state from performing effectively. From this 
perspective, he concluded that ‘a true, populist-based Somali nationalism was never 
born. Somali leaders…[were incapable] to promote a pan-Somali nationalism truly 
capable of overcoming clan-based differences.’
4
 Although compelling, this 
perspective runs the risk of being ahistorical. By contrast, this study has shown the 
importance of conducting empirically-grounded research on the topic beyond the 
series of biases of the wartime propaganda which characterise accounts of the early 
nationalist politics in Somalia. In this way, it was possible to investigate and 
appreciate the characteristics of the Somali-rooted nationalist trends.  
In particular, chapter two underscored how within a context of power 
vacuum, a powerful movement from below (re)imagined the Somali nation by 
appropriating certain cultural elements and by ideating new means for promoting the 
national agenda. This study provided historically informed insights on the activities 
emerging as a response to a change of regime. In investigating the features and 
characteristics of the nation imagined in the post-war period, the thesis revealed the 
features of the trends emerging in the 1940s. The findings are significant as they 
suggested that modern nationalism was characterised by an inclusive message 
supported by horizontal links and structures. Appreciating these features, as well as 
the achievements of local politics, is important because it indicates that external 
circumstances – i.e. the peculiarities and institutional structures of the decolonisation 
                                               
4 Schraeder, ‘From Irredentism to Secession’, p. 116. 
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process – need to be taken into account when discussing the ‘failure’ or the ‘limits’ 
of Somali nationalism. 
Attention was turned to the dynamics that determined the patterns of political 
developments in Somalia. Due to the impact of the War and the change of regime in 
1941, the decolonisation of Somalia followed a peculiar trajectory. In particular, the 
establishment of the UN mandate marked a progressive attitude in addressing the 
issue of former Italian colonies. As self-government and independence had already 
been granted in 1949, the UN decision paved the way towards the end of colonial 
dominion in the Horn of Africa. By contrast, the thesis demonstrated that the 
progressive attitude of the international community did not come without problems. 
Already in 1947 the UN adopted a democratic approach to the issue of former Italian 
colonies by sending a special commission to investigate the aspirations of local 
communities. This approach was, in fact, very limited. By urging local 
representatives to express their aspirations, the UN enforced political competition 
between different groups. Moreover, in investigating these aspirations, the UN 
divided the local communities into two groups: the ones who were opposed to and 
the ones who were not opposed to a restoration of Italian rule. It was discussed the 
implications of this restricted choice for local communities, especially for the ones 
who had been heavily affected by the war and by the impacts of the military 
occupation. As a result of the enforcement of competition, the various groups’ 
interests became politicised and the divide among them intensified. 
The limits and contradictions of the UN democratic approach to Somalia 
contributed even further to the creation of a restricted political space. By analysing 
the features of the trusteeship administration, the research demonstrated that despite 
the progressive attitude towards decolonisation of the UN, international approach 
was negatively affected by the conflicting interests of the Great Powers. As a result, 
discussions on the modes through which enhancing self-government and 
democratisation in Somalia were discarded. In this way, the Trusteeship System of 
the UN was a powerful international body at a nominal level, but it proved to be 
rather ineffective. Significantly, the System tailored a powerful position for the 
administrative power which controlled all the practical issues related to the everyday 
administration. Moreover, the administrative power was made accountable for the 
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administration but was not compelled by the decisions of the UN. This study 
discussed the case of the border issue between Ethiopia and Somalia to illustrate how 
the UN did not have any effective power to make trust powers compelling by 
international resolutions.  
The thesis decided to use the Somali adaptation of the acronym AFIS – ‘we 
ripped off the indigenous Somalis’ – to emphasise the contradiction laying at the 
heart of the Trusteeship System. In seeking a solution to the administrative future of 
Somalia, the UN acted as a third, allegedly ‘neutral’, party mediating between the 
Somali communities and Italian (colonial) interests. However, the final UN decision 
to nominate as a trust power Italy became very problematic as it enhanced former 
colonial interests to the detriment of the political front opposed to Italian rule. In this 
way, the imposition of the trusteeship was perceived as a ‘rip-off’ as it granted self-
government and independence with non-negotiable terms and conditions. The 
immediate result was that AFIS became less susceptible to the pressures and 
demands coming from the Somali political leadership. In fact, the latter were forced 
to engage in dialogue with the trust power according to the requirements and 
expectations of AFIS. It was seen how this critically affected the relations between 
AFIS and political leaders, and the political stance of the foremost political party, the 
Somali Youth League, that assumed pro-Italian features. Overall, the institutional 
approach to Somali decolonisation created restricted conditions for political action.  
This research investigated the consequences that this restricted political space 
had on the development of local politics. In particular, chapter five unpacked the 
trajectory of the consolidation of an exclusive, autocratic government (the one-party 
system government). Once elected to power, the leadership of the Somali Youth 
League began to engage with the practice of ‘spoils politics’. This was due to a series 
of circumstances linked to the specific historical and institutional framework of 
AFIS. The transfer of power from the trust administration to the Somali-led 
government took place when the process of ‘Somalisation’ of the state was 
proceeding at full speed. In 1956, the first elected Legislative Assembly inherited a 
set of structures of power that were in demand of skilled Somalis. For this reason, the 
first Somali government came to lead the process of ‘Somalisation’ of the state, i.e. 
the appointment of Somalis to key institutional posts.  
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This circumstance had several consequences whose appreciation is important 
for achieving a  broader understanding of the development of post-colonial politics. 
First, the Somali-led government inherited a specific attitude to power, marked by 
the key positioning of top-hierarchies within the decision-making bodies. Due to the 
fact that self-government was established at crucial moment of state-crafting, the 
ruling majority was invested with an exclusive task. The thesis referred to the special 
position given to the ruling majority as ‘the exclusive power to include.’ This meant, 
the exclusive power of the ruling majority to allocate nominations for key 
institutional posts. This research investigated the development of national and 
municipal elections to demonstrate how the Somali-led governments relied on this 
exclusive position to curb the opposition (both within and outside the ruling party) 
and to set the conditions according to which it remained uncontested during the 
electoral competitions.  
On a different level, the exclusive position held within the system of self-
government was also used by the ruling leadership to counter the constant electoral 
pressures. As the thesis illustrated, the democratisation programme placed a great 
deal of emphasis on the electoral process by scheduling four elections within five 
years. Pressured by the concerns related to electoral competition, the ruling 
leadership negotiated a share of key institutional posts with the opposition in return 
of their electoral backing. In this way, the leadership of the League managed to 
amass consent in certain areas where the opposition was stronger. It was argued that 
the strategy of co-opting opposition leaders within the majority necessarily weakened 
both the majority and minority parties. Moreover, it began the phase of political 
corruption, clientelage, or ‘prebendalism’ that came to characterise the politics of the 
Somali Republic.   
Another consequence of the introduction of self-government at a crucial 
moment within the process of democratisation was  the great deal of confusion that 
emerged around concepts such as ‘state’, ‘government’, ‘ruling leadership’ and 
‘majority party’. This confusion was detectable from the discussions held by political 
leaders during the parliamentary sessions. These suggested that the system of self-
government was perceived as one monolithic system of power. Although this 
reflected a general tendency to the consolidation of the One-Party state elsewhere in 
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Africa, it assumed peculiar features in Somalia. Following the introduction of self-
government, the ruling majority did not simply appropriate the structures of power, 
but it came to play an active role in the process of the construction of these 
structures. The use of the term ‘Monocolore’, i.e. single-color, by the opposition to 
point to this process is very telling as it indicated that the institutional framework of 
Somalia was perceived as a system in which all different structures and bodies were 
made in the shades of a single colour. Within this ‘Monocolore’ system, the space for 
political action became very restrictive and subject to the vertical ties established 
during AFIS. It is, therefore, unsurprising that some leaders of the opposition decided 
to join the majority in order to access a share of power. Paradoxically, by doing so 
they contributed to the consolidation of the system of power they had previously 
rejected.  
Within this restrictive political space, a political discourse based on clan 
came to assume a special significance. The thesis, in particular chapter four, linked 
the proliferation of clan-based parties that characterised local politics in the 1960s to 
the electoral procedures adopted by AFIS in the 1950s. It was illustrated how in 
order to overcome the difficulties in completing a census of the electorate, AFIS 
relied on both direct and indirect voting methods. In particular, the practices of the 
indirect voting system centred on clan affiliations. In this way, competition among 
different groups was placed into the realm of national politics. Further research is 
needed to investigate the role played by a clan-based discourse by looking at the 
development of local politics in the 1960s. The thesis suggested that the 
(re)emergence of a clan-based discourse in Somali politics should be seen as a 
reaction to the ‘verticalisation’ of the political space. From this perspective, the clan 
became a means through which challenging the ruling majority and a vehicle for 
accessing power. Particular attention was given to the manipulation of the clan, or to 
be more precise, to the use of the rhetoric against clan divisions by the leadership of 
the League. Future research needs to address the ways in which this rhetoric was 
perceived from below. Despite a series of problems and limits related to archival 
sources and to conducting fieldwork in Somalia, future investigation can be based on 
oral tradition which, for this research as for others, constituted a rich source of 
information.  
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A final argument made by this research is that the process of ‘verticalisation’ 
of the Somali political space affected the process of unification of Somalia and 
Somaliland in 1960. It was seen how the domain of the national project of Greater 
Somalia was appropriated by the political leadership while competing for the control 
of the Somali state. In this way, the ‘verticalisation’ of political space started with the 
decolonisation process and reached a completion with the unification and the 
creation of the Somali Republic. The idea of Greater Somalia, once a collective 
project, became the domain of very few. These findings are important for 
contemporary debates discussing the issue of international recognition of the de facto 
independent Republic of Somaliland. As the unification is often associated with 
bitter memories, an investigation of the patterns through which it took shape is 
important for any future relations between Somalia and Somaliland.  
Before ending this research, it is worth asking what lesson can be learnt with 
respect to the current situation in Somalia. Although lots of things have changed over 
the last decades, today international community is once more in the position to 
critically influence future resolutions to the ‘Somali question’. On February 23, 
2012, the international community, represented by delegates from over forty 
governments and multi-lateral organisations including the secretary-general of the 
UN, attended a conference in London to hold discussions on how to restore peace 
and security in Somalia. The country has been without an effective central 
government since 1991 when president Siad Barre was overthrown by rival clans 
whose leaders, however, in an attempt to prevail on each other, embarked in brutal 
civil war plunging the country into chaos and clan warfare. At a Peace Conference in 
Djibouti in 2000, a transitional government (later Transitional Federal Government, 
TFG) was elected by clan leaders and other key representatives of social and 
economic groups. The TFG had the task to begin processes of negotiation among the 
various militias. Despite enjoying the backing of international community, western 
governments and donors, the TFG has, so far, failed to let the various interested 
parties agree on each other and to restore peace and stability. As the TFG had no 
control of the country but was based in Nairobi, its authority was challenged locally 
by the rise of militant Islamists, the Islamic Courts, which in 2006 managed to 
establish forms of stability in the south and to defeat the localised power of the 
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warlords. However, the Islamic Courts were attacked by TFG’s forces, backed by 
Ethiopian troops, causing the insurgence of an even more extremist Islamic group, 
Al-Shabab. The latter defeated Ethiopian forces and gained control of most of 
southern Somalia in 2008. Ever since, the TFG has been struggling to establish any 
credible forms of ruling system in Somalia. In fact, as it exercises effective power in 
limited areas (which included Mogadishu only recently), Al-Shabab forces  
continued to control most of the country.  
In many ways, the approaches of the international community to Somalia 
have changed little over the years.  As seen for the decolonisation process, the 
imposition of solutions from-above have shown limited effectiveness. In fact, in the 
late 1940s these approaches led to a radicalisation of conflicts. On a similar note, 
recent international interventions contributed to increase the divide among different 
groups and to exacerbate conflicts. Most notably, the international refusal (i.e. of the 
United States) to deal with the Union of Islamic Courts, a bottom-up alternative to 
the lack of a central state that established local security and defeated the warlords’ 
power, led to exacerbation of conflicts and to the emergence of an even more radical 
organisation. Evidence from this research as well as from recent case studies on 
Somaliland and Puntland suggests that the bottom-up approaches should be not 
discarded as they often provide reliable and effective alternatives to state-building.  
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Appendix. List of Interviews 
Interview with Anthony Lawrence Scawin, 4
th
 December 2008, Wadebridge. Born in 
1920, Tony Scawin joined the army acting as major of the Somali Guard Company 
during the Second World War. He served in the Military Administration in the 1940s and 
in the Colonial Civil Service in the 1950s, at first as assistant District Commissioner in 
Burco, and later as District Commissioner in Ceerigaabo and Hargeysa. One of the 
founder and long-standing member of the Anglo-Somali Society, he died in 2008.  
Interview with Abdulkadir Ali Bollay, 16
th
 March, 2009, London. Born in the 1930s in 
Mogadishu, Abdulkadir Ali Bollay is member of the Rer Banaadir community. At a very 
young age, he became member of the Somali Youth League. After obtaining university 
education in Italy in the 1950s, he worked as a journalist and acted as Mayor of 
Mogadishu city council in the 1980s. Currently, he lives in London. 
Interview with Mohamed Aden Sheikh, 24
th
 April, 2009, Turin. Born in the 1930s, 
Mohamed Aden Sheikh studied Medicine in Italy. In Somalia, he worked at first as a 
medical doctor later becoming a politician. He supported the 1969 military coup and was 
appointed to the Ministry of Health, Culture and Information during the regime of Siad 
Barre. Due to some disagreements with the regime, he was arrested in the 1970s. 
Subsequently, he moved to Italy. A well-known and active member  of the Somali 
diaspora in Italy, he acted as director of Centre for African Studies in Turin. He died in 
October 2010. 
Interview with Angelo Del Boca, 22
nd
 April 2009, Turin. Born in 1925, Angelo Del Boca 
is an Italian journalist, writer and historian of Italian colonialism, with an interest in the 
history of Italian colonial empire. As a journalist, he visited Somalia in the 1950s drafting 
a few reports published by the Turin-based newspaper Gazzetta del Popolo.   
Interview with Nimco Samater Jama, 3
rd
 July 2009, Hargeysa. Born in the 1930s in 
northwest region of the British Protectorate, Nimco Samater Jama lived from time to time 
in Hargeysa in the 1950s. A sympathiser of the National United Front, she fervently 
remembers features, poems and facts related to the local national politics leading to 
independence. She owns a farm a few kilometres far from Hargeysa. 
Interview with Mohamed Barood Ali, 6
th
 July 2009, Hargeysa. Born in 1950 (circa) to a 
nomad family, he grew up in Hargeysa with an aunt. In the 1970s together with other 
fellows he was involved in some charity activities. For this reason, they were imprisoned 
and detained for many years under the most miserable conditions by the regime of Siad 
Barre. His memoirs have been published recently. 
Interview with ‘Gahaydhee’, 14
th
 July 2009, Hargeysa. Born in 1940 (circa) in the British 
protectorate, he joined the army in February 1960 and was posted to Hargeysa where he 
was on duty on the day of independence. In the 1950s, he was a supporter of the National 
United Front. After independence, he was posted to the south and left the army soon 
after. 
Interview with Ahmed Ali Hibrahim, 15
th
 July, 2009, Hargeysa. A Somali elder who was 
born in the early 1930s in Goryo, a region located western of Hargeysa. During the late 
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colonial time, he used to go the capital of the protectorate on a regular base. He was a 
sympathizer of the Somali National League. 
Interview with Edna Adan, 22
nd
 July 2009, Hargeysa. Born in Hargeysa in the 1930s, 
Edna Adan was trained as a nurse in the United Kingdom. She married the leader of the 
Somali National League, Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal moving with him to Mogadishu in 
the late 1960s. After the civil war, she founded the Edna Adan Maternity Hospital in 
Hargeysa. In the early 2000s, she acted as Somaliland Foreign Minister.  
Interview with Mohamed Said Mohamed ‘Gees’, 3
rd
 August 2009, Hargeysa. Mohamed 
Said ‘Gees’ attended secondary education at Sheikh Secondary School moving to 
Mogadishu in the late 1960s where he lived for a few years. He acted as director of the 
Academy for Peace and Development in Hargeysa. After the 2010 national election in 
Somaliland, he was appointed Ministry of Finance. 
Interview with Hussein Ali Duale ‘Awil’, 12
th
 August, 2009, Hargeysa. Born in the 
British Protectorate, Hussein Ali Duale pursued secondary education in Somaliland and 
Aden, and military training in the United Kingdom. He was one of the young officials 
who planned and attempted  a military coup in 1961 to protest against terms and 
conditions of the 1960 unification. When interviewed, he acted as Somaliland Ministry of 
Finance. 
Interview with Sahara Abdulqadir Haji Ahmed, 22
nd
 August 2009, Hargeysa. She married 
a well-known Somaliland entrepreneur, who financed education (journalism courses) for 
some Somalis in Egypt  and started a printing-house business in the Protectorate. In the 
1950s, they moved to Mogadishu living there for several years. 
Interviews with Benvenuto Francesco Isaaq,  5
th
 October 2010, 12
th
 January 2011, Rome. 
Born in the early 1930s, Benvenuto Francesco Isaaq grew up in a Catholic orphanage in 
Afgooye. He moved to Mogadishu in his teens attending the Catholic school and working 
for their printing-house. He was a member of the Somali Youth League. After pursuing 
further education in Italy, he became a civil law notary and worked in Mogadishu before 
fleeing the country and moving to Italy in early 1990s. 
Anonymous Interviews   
Interview 1, 26
th
 March 2009. A representative of the Somali government in the 1970s 
and 1980s.  
Interview 2, 15
th
 March 2008. Born in the 1930s in the southern region of Somalia 
Italiana. Supporter of the ‘pro-Italia’, later of the HDMS. Pursued education in Italy 
before returning and settling in Mogadishu. Left Somalia in the early 1990s.  
Interview 3, 22
nd
 March, 2009. An acquaintance of Mohamed Haji Hussein, leader of the 
Somali Youth League, and later of the Great Somali League. Born in Mogadishu in 1950 




 June, 2009. Born in 1940 (circa) in the British Protectorate, the 
interviewee’s father was involved in local politics, supporting the Somali National 
League. The interviewee lives in Somaliland and works as a journalist.  
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